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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the evolution of the political and economic relations 
between Venice, Byzantium, and Southern Italy from 1081 to 1197. These years 
were mostly characterised by hostile relations between the Eastern Empire and the 
rulers of Southern Italy, which led to a series of conflicts. In the early ones, Venice 
fought alongside the Byzantines. This happened because Venice obtained 
significant commercial concessions in Romania, and worried that the same 
monarch might hold both shores of the Strait of Otranto, thus potentially hampering 
its Mediterranean trade. However, from the mid-twelfth century, the Byzantine 
attempt to acquire land in the Adriatic worried the Venetians, who thus decided not 
to help the Eastern Empire in its attempt to recover land in Southern Italy. 
Even though, politically, Byzantine-Venetian relations had already worsened 
by 1155, the scale of Venetian trade in Romania kept increasing until 1171, when it 
suddenly stopped after the Byzantine decision to incarcerate all the Venetians who 
were in the Eastern Empire, and to have their goods confiscated. This measure led 
to a dozen years of hostility between the two, and to continued reciprocal 
scepticism, and to the strengthening of the political bonds between Venice and the 
Kingdom of Sicily. 
After 1183, Venetian trade in Romania resumed (albeit on a limited scale), 
but the political bonds between Venice and Constantinople were only strengthened 
when the Byzantine Empire was facing serious military threats from the West. The 
best indication that a partnership between Venice and Byzantium could no longer 
be formed can be seen by looking at what happened in 1185. In this year, William II 
of Sicily followed in his ancestors’ footsteps by attacking the Balkans, and Venice 
did not intervene militarily alongside the Byzantines.  
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I. Introduction 
The aim of this work is to provide an analysis of the evolution of the political 
and economic relations between Venice, Byzantium, and Southern Italy from 1081 
to 1197. These were crucial years for the expansion of Western Europe. Indeed, 
while the First Crusade marked the beginning of the political expansion of the 
Westerners into the Eastern Mediterranean, this conflict was preceded by the 
beginning of the commercial penetration of the Italian merchants into the Central 
and Eastern Mediterranean. The first extensive commercial concessions for Venice 
were granted by Alexios I Komnenos before 1095, probably around 1081, as a 
reward for some highly-needed naval help. It was in this year that Robert Guiscard, 
the Norman Duke of Apulia and Calabria, began his campaign against the 
Byzantine Balkans.1 Some of the main consequences of the commercial 
penetration of the Italian cities into the Eastern Mediterranean in the High Middle 
Ages were much better connections within the whole basin, and the increased 
wealth and power of Venice, Genoa, and Pisa. In particular, a century of 
commercial expansion made it possible for the Venetians to have the means to 
provide ships for a huge Frankish army when the Fourth Crusade was called, and, 
later, to enable the survival of the feeble Latin Empire of Constantinople for almost 
sixty years. 1197 (and not 1204, when Constantinople was conquered by the 
crusaders) has been chosen as the chronological end to this work because, 
following the death of Henry VI of Hohenstaufen in this year, Southern Italy could 
no longer pursue a strong foreign policy due to the minority of Frederick, Henry’s 
only son, and his heir to the Sicilian throne. 
One of the aims of this thesis is that of outlining the evolution of Venetian-
Byzantine relations when the Eastern Empire was ruled by the Komnenoi and by 
the Angeloi, and of analysing the role of Southern Italy in their development. This is 
one of the main differences between this work and an important monograph by 
Donald M. Nicol. Also because of its wider chronological range (from the eighth 
                                                          
1 The dating of the chrysobull will be analysed in depth in the following chapter. Most of 
the recent scholars suggest that this charter was issued in 1082: Silvano Borsari, ‘Il 
crisobullo di Alessio I per Venezia’, Annali dell’istituto italiano per gli studi storici, 2 
(1969-70), 111-31; Thomas F. Madden, ‘The Chrysobull of Alexius I Comnenus to the 
Venetians: The Date and the Debate’, Journal of Medieval History, 28 (2002), 23-41; 
David Jacoby, ‘The Chrysobull of Alexius I Comnenus to the Venetians: The Date and 
the Debate’, Journal of Medieval History, 28 (2002), 199-204. However, Peter 
Frankopan, ‘Byzantine Trade Privileges to Venice in the Eleventh Century: The 
Chrysobull of 1092’, Journal of Medieval History, 30 (2004), 135-60 has recently 
argued that the chrysobull was issued in 1092. 
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century until the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453), Nicol’s book mainly 
relies on previous secondary works, and hence does not analyse the period 1081-
1197 in detail. Furthermore, Southern Italy only plays a secondary role in this 
monograph.2 A similar lack of interest in the relevance of the Mezzogiorno can be 
found in another key publication on the topic, Ralph-Johannes Lilie’s Handel und 
Politik zwischen dem byzantinischen Reich und den italienischen Kommunen 
Venedig, Pisa und Genua in der Epoche der Komnenen und der Angeloi (1081-
1204). Furthermore, Lilie’s book also analyses the political and economic relations 
of Pisa and Genoa with the Byzantine Empire, which will not be covered in detail in 
this work.3 The triangular relationship between Venice, Byzantium, and Southern 
Italy has not been analysed by the main publications regarding trade either. Indeed, 
Borsari has focused on Venetian commerce in the Byzantine Empire, and not in 
Southern Italy.4 By contrast, the parts of Abulafia’s The Two Italies that deal with 
Venice focus on the mercantile activity of its inhabitants in Southern Italy, rather 
than in Romania.5 
Therefore, the primary aim of this thesis is to fill this historiographical gap. 
While doing this, some more specific aspects will be analysed. Amongst them, we 
shall ask whether the granting of trading concessions was the only reason why 
Venice intervened alongside Alexios Komnenos when Robert Guiscard invaded the 
Balkans in 1081. Furthermore, we shall see what led to the two main steps that 
marked the end of the Byzantine-Venetian alliance. The first one was the signing of 
an agreement between Venice and William I of Sicily in the mid-1150s, on the eve 
of a Byzantine attempt to recover part of Southern Italy. The second event was 
Manuel’s order, on 12 March 1171, to have all the Venetians that were found in the 
Eastern Empire arrested, and to have their goods confiscated. We shall then focus 
on what led to the beginning of a considerably lengthy period of peace between 
Byzantium and the Kingdom of Sicily in 1158. Finally, we shall ask ourselves why 
the Eastern Empire and Venice reconciled in the early 1180s, and whether this led 
                                                          
2 Donald MacGillivray Nicol, Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural 
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 50-123. 
3 Ralph-Johannes Lilie, Handel und Politik zwischen dem byzantinischen Reich und 
den italienischen Kommunen Venedig, Pisa und Genua in der Epoche der Komnenen 
und der Angeloi (1081-1204) (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1984), pp. 1-68, 103-15, 325-612. 
4 Silvano Borsari, Venezia e Bisanzio nel XII secolo: I rapporti economici (Venice: 
Deputazione di storia patria per le Venezie, 1988). 
5 David Abulafia, The Two Italies: Economic Relations between the Norman Kingdom 
of Sicily and the Northern Communes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 
pp. 9-11, 13-14, 28-30, 54-55, 75-84, 86-89, 133-36, 141-52, 160-61, 202-05. 
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to the resumption of Venetian trade in Romania at a scale similar to that of before 
1171. 
Even though Venice, Byzantium, and Southern Italy are the three main foci 
of this thesis, in order to have a clearer picture of the events, we shall also briefly 
deal with the relations between these polities and other powers which nevertheless 
played an important role in these years. Such is the case of the Western Empire, 
the Kingdom of Hungary, the Papacy, the Crusader States, and the maritime 
republics of Pisa and Genoa. 
The main problems with which such a research project has to contend are 
the patchy chronology of most of our main narrative sources, and the limited 
number of the commercial documents. Indeed, the Byzantine sources seldom 
follow a chronological order, thus making it difficult to have a clear sequence of the 
events. A similar issue can be found in most of the Venetian chronicles, with the 
addition that the most substantial of these texts (Andrea Dandolo’s Chronica 
extensa) was written in the mid-fourteenth century, a long time after these events 
had taken place. Finally, the sources from Southern Italy provide an extensive 
coverage of only limited time ranges. For instance, while there are multiple and 
extensive sources on the mid-to-late eleventh century, there is a lack of chronicles 
for the early decades of the following century. 
Most of the commercial documents come from the Archivio di Stato of 
Venice, and have been published since the 1940s by Morozzo della Rocca and 
Lombardo, and by Lanfranchi. However, unlike in Genoa, these charters do not 
represent the totality (or even a sample) of the whole documentation of Venetian 
trade in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Indeed, all these documents (less than 
four hundred) have survived because they were donated to a monastery, which 
preserved them in its archive, until the charters moved into the Archivio di Stato. 
Furthermore, technically they are contracts concluded between an investor (socius 
stans) and a travelling merchant (socius procertans), or, more frequently, 
securitates, i.e. quittances to previous contractual obligations. Therefore, they are 
notarial documents, rather than properly commercial charters, and hence record a 
commercial operation only in cases which were preceded by some financial 
transaction. This means that, while we have a considerable amount of information 
regarding the merchants and their commercial destinations, we generally know very 
little about the goods that they traded. In most cases, the charters record a 
colleganza contract, or a quittance with regard to such a contract. The way this kind 
15 
of agreement worked was based on elements of Roman and Byzantine law; two 
parties agreed to become commercial partners and to invest some money on some 
trade that was to be carried out in another city. The colleganza could be unilateral 
or bilateral; while the latter was initially preeminent, the former would begin to be 
used later, but would completely replace the bilateral colleganza by the thirteenth 
century. In the former case, the socii stantes would invest all the capital, and would 
remain in the place where they lived; they would then obtain three fourths of the 
profits. The socii procertantes would not invest any money, but would sail to the 
trade destination, and then obtain one fourth of the gains. On the other hand, in the 
case of the bilateral colleganza, the stans could invest two thirds of the money, the 
procertans the other third, and then they would equally divide their gains (or 
losses). It is worth outlining that, by this period, not all of the commercial charters 
from Venice record colleganza contracts. We also have surviving evidence of 
ordinary loans (with an annual twenty percent interest rate), maritime loans (with a 
higher interest rate, but fewer responsibilities for the debtors who conducted trade; 
their expiry date corresponded with the end of the journey of the merchant), 
exchange contracts (a merchant is given a certain amount of money by a creditor in 
one location, and then pays it back in a second location, with the currency in use in 
this place, and adding an interest rate to the amount he owed), donations, and 
compagnie. This final kind of agreement, which started to be used in the twelfth 
century, was a partnership amongst brothers or relatives. They generally invested 
the same amount of money, and traded together until they agreed on dissolving the 
compagnia. After this, the partners would then divide proportionately their gains or 
losses.6 
                                                          
6 David Abulafia, The Two Italies…, p. 9; Attilio Bartoli Langeli, ‘Documentazione e 
notariato’, in Storia di Venezia, ed. by Lellia Cracco Ruggini and others, 12 vols (Rome: 
Istituto dell’Enciclopedia Italiana, 1991-2002), I, 847-64 (pp. 847-54, 856); Borsari, 
Venezia e Bisanzio…, pp. 68-76, 79-82; Giustiniana Migliardi O’Riordan Colasanti, ‘La 
colleganza veneziana: Elementi di diritto bizantino’, Byzantinische Forschungen, 17 
(1991), 25-30 (pp. 27-30); Gino Luzzatto (as G. Padovan), ‘Capitale e lavoro nel 
commercio veneziano dei secoli XI e XII’, Rivista di storia economica, 6 (1941), 1-24 
(pp. 1-3). 
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II. The Dating of Alexios I’s Chrysobull 
The long century beginning with Alexios I Komnenos’s usurpation (1081), 
and ending with the death of the German emperor and king of Sicily Henry VI of 
Hohenstaufen (1197) was characterised by a series of conflicts between the 
Byzantine emperors and the rulers of Southern Italy (or, at least, a portion of it). 
Since the disputed area in these wars was mainly the Lower Adriatic, Venice, being 
the main naval force of the region, often took part in these conflicts. 
For a long time, the granting of commercial and territorial privileges has 
been considered as the main reason why Venice decided to side with the 
Byzantines in the first of these conflicts (1081-85), and in some of the following 
ones.1 This is mainly due to the long-held belief that the cornerstone of these 
concessions, Alexios I Komnenos’s chrysobull, was issued in 1082.2 However, 
Peter Frankopan has recently suggested that this charter was issued ten years 
later, in 1092.3 We shall now sum up the scholarly debate over the dating of this 
chrysobull, and give our own interpretation on when it was issued, in order to 
understand whether the commercial concessions granted to Venice were the main 
reason that led the Adriatic city to fight against Robert Guiscard alongside Alexios I. 
At some point during the earlier part of his reign, Alexios issued an 
extremely important chrysobull, which granted several privileges to the Venetians. 
The Doge of Venice and the Patriarch of Grado (and their successors) were 
respectively granted the titles of protosebastos and hypertimos, and the 
corresponding stipends. In addition, the churches of Venice were to receive a 
yearly amount of money from the Byzantines and from the Amalfitans who had a 
workshop in Constantinople. Furthermore, an area within the city and some of its 
anchorages were awarded to the Venetians, and Venice also received the property 
and revenues of the church of St Andrew in Dyrrachion – modern Durrës/Durazzo 
(except for the goods that were stored there for the Byzantine navy). Finally, and 
most importantly, the Venetians were granted a complete exemption from taxes 
when they traded in most of the Byzantine Empire. In the event that any of these 
concessions were not respected by an imperial officer, the Venetians would be the 
recipients of a fine of ten pounds of gold, and of a compensation worth four times 
                                               
1 Nicol, Byzantium and Venice…, pp. 55-57. 
2 Borsari, ‘Il crisobullo…’, pp.111-31; Madden, ‘The Chrysobull…’, pp. 23-41; David 
Jacoby, ‘The Chrysobull…’, pp. 199-204. 
3 Frankopan, ‘Byzantine Trade Privileges…’, pp. 135-60. 
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the value of the misappropriated goods. The chrysobull did not include any 
obligations on the Venetian side.4 
While there is a general scholarly consensus on the importance of the grant 
of these concessions to Venice (and especially for its consequences on trade in 
Byzantium), there has been a lengthy discussion regarding when Alexios issued 
this chrysobull. This is due to the problematic dating of the sources which mention 
this agreement, or record its text. The main issue is that the original manuscript of 
Alexios’s decree has not survived, and its text can only be found in the Latin copies 
of two chrysobulls that were later issued for Venice, respectively in 1148 by Manuel 
I, and in 1187 by Isaac II. We do not have the original of either text; however, the 
earliest surviving copies were written a few decades after their issue: the oldest 
copy of Manuel’s document is from the late twelfth or the early thirteenth century, 
while the earliest copy of Isaac’s charter was transcribed in the thirteenth century. 
The main major discrepancy in the two texts is the dating, as the year of issue (but 
not the month, May) differs. According to Manuel’s charter, Alexios issued the 
chrysobull in the Byzantine year 6200 (692 CE), while, according to Isaac’s, Alexios 
issued it in the Byzantine year 6600 (1092 CE). While the former year is clearly 
wrong, the latter one is also problematic. This is because, according to both texts, 
the chrysobull was issued during the fifth indiction year, which did not fall in 1092, 
but rather in 1082 (or 1097).5 
The granting of a Byzantine imperial dignity to the doge is also mentioned 
by a few narrative sources. According to Andrea Dandolo’s Chronica brevis, 
Domenico Selvo was granted a chrysobull, which appointed him as protosebastos.6 
A different version of the events can be found in Andrea Dandolo’s extended 
chronicle: at the beginning of Vitale Falier’s dogeship (1084?-95), Andrea Michiel, 
Domenico Dandolo, and Jacopo Aurio were sent as legates to Constantinople to 
ask that the jurisdiction over Dalmatia and Croatia be granted to the Venetians. 
They succeeded in their diplomatic mission, and Alexios also granted the imperial 
dignity of protosebastos to the doge.7 A detailed account on the privileges granted 
                                               
4 I trattati con Bisanzio: 992-1198, ed. by Marco Pozza and Giorgio Ravegnani, Pacta 
Veneta, 4 (Venice: Il cardo, 1993), no. 2, pp. 37-44; Jacoby, review of I trattati con 
Bisanzio: 992-1198, ed. by Marco Pozza and Giorgio Ravegnani, Mediterranean 
Historical Review, 9 (1994), 139-43 (pp. 141-42); Frankopan, ‘Byzantine Trade 
Privileges...’, pp. 138-39; Borsari, Venezia e Bisanzio…, pp. 3-13. 
5 I trattati con Bisanzio…, no. 2, pp. 44-45; Madden, ‘The Chrysobull…’, p. 38; Jacoby, 
‘The Chrysobull…’, pp. 200-01. 
6 Dandolo, Chronica brevis, p. 363. 
7 Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 9, p. 217. 
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to the Venetians by Alexios I can also be found in the Alexiad. Here, Anna 
Komnene records that her father convinced the Venetians to intervene against 
Robert Guiscard in 1081 thanks to his ‘promises and bribes’. The emperor 
immediately rewarded them, and promised to remunerate them further once their 
fleet arrived in Dyrrachion, and engaged in naval combat against Robert. In 
addition, following a naval victory over the Normans in October 1081, the Venetians 
were rewarded by Alexios with large sums of money for the doge and for his 
officers. Anna later adds that, with the promise of a large sum of money, her father 
persuaded the Venetians to intervene again in the Balkans after Robert’s return for 
the second stage of his campaign in 1084. Finally, after her account of a Venetian 
victory near Butrint, Anna writes what seems to be a summary of the terms of the 
chrysobull, which ends by outlining that the Venetians were given a privilege 
allowing them to trade throughout the Byzantine Empire without paying any dues, 
and that they would be ‘free of Roman authority’.8 
Depending on their different interpretations of these sources, modern 
scholars have suggested three possible years of issue: either 1082, 1084, or 1092.9 
However, most of the late twentieth-century scholarship was eventually convinced 
by Borsari, who suggested that the chrysobull was issued in 1082.10 According to 
Borsari, the Venetian government had to have received the Constantinopolitan 
properties that were granted with the chrysobull before 1092. He used some written 
documentation as the main evidence to support his hypothesis. 1092 was not 
considered the correct date because two years earlier, in 1090, some of the 
properties that Alexios had ceded to the Venetians when he had issued the 
chrysobull had already been sold by Doge Vitale Falier to the monastery of San 
Giorgio Maggiore. In addition, Borsari argued that 1084 is not an acceptable date 
either because Doge Domenico Selvo was already indicated as imperial 
protosebastos in two charters issued in 1083. Borsari also tried to explain Anna 
                                               
8 Alexias, bk 4, ch. 2, bk 6, ch. 5, pp. 122-24, 176-79; Alexiad, pp. 111, 113, 160-63, 
496 fn. 6. 
9 For 1082, see Anitra R. Gadolin, ‘Alexis I Comnenus and the Venetian Trade 
Privileges: A New Interpretation’, Byzantion, 50 (1981), 439-46. For 1084, see Enric 
Francès, ‘Alexis Comnène et les privilèges octroyès à Venise’, Byzantinoslavica, 28 
(1968), 17-23; Michael E. Martin, ‘The Chrysobull of Alexius I Comnenus to the 
Venetians and the Early Venetian Quarter in Constantinople’, Byzantinoslavica, 39 
(1978), 19-23; Oldřich Tůma, ‘The Dating of Alexius’ Chrysobull to the Venetians: 1082, 
1084, or 1092?’, Byzantinoslavica, 42 (1981), 171-85. André Tuilier, ‘La Date exacte du 
chrysobulle d’Alexis 1er Comnène en faveur des Vénitiens et son context historique’, 
Rivista di studi bizantini e neoellenici, n. s. 4 (1967), 27-48. None of the scholars 
writing after 1968 took into consideration Borsari’s article (see the following footnote). 
10 Borsari, ‘Il crisobullo...’, pp. 111-31. 
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Komnene’s and Andrea Dandolo’s accounts (which suggest that the charter was 
issued in 1084) by suggesting that the chrysobull might have been re-confirmed to 
Doge Falier after Selvo’s deposition.11 
The scholarly discussion on the dating of Alexios’s chrysobull resurfaced in 
the first decade of the twenty-first century. In the first of these articles, Madden has 
noticed that the archival evidence outlined by Borsari is not an undisputable proof 
for dating the chrysobull to 1082. Firstly, since emperors often handed out imperial 
dignities without issuing an official charter, the document written in 1083 in which 
Selvo used the title protosebastos does not prove that the chrysobull was issued in 
1082. In addition, Madden notes that the contract issued in 1090 refers to land 
granted by Alexios through cartulae, which might suggest that the emperor issued 
either more than one praktikon (a ‘transmission document’ that registered all the 
pieces of property that were granted by a basileus), or more than one chrysobull for 
Venice. In the latter case, it would be possible that the only surviving charter of 
those issued by Alexios summed up all the previous donations, thus making the 
contract an ‘ambiguous document’. Madden also suggests that Andrea Dandolo’s 
narrative accounts do not provide any decisive conclusion regarding the dating of 
this chrysobull: Dandolo’s Chronica brevis is not reliable, while his Chronica 
extensa probably refers to another imperial charter issued in 1084, which only 
granted jurisdiction over Dalmatia and Croatia to Venice. However, Madden notes 
that in no surviving Venetian document issued before 1094 did Vitale Falier use the 
title of Duke of Dalmatia and Croatia, and thus he suggests that this charter must 
have been issued later, after July 1090. Therefore, Madden insists on the necessity 
of a textual and palaeographical analysis of the charter in order to date it correctly. 
Since the indiction coincides in both copies of the chrysobull, and is ‘always correct’ 
in Venetian copies of imperial charters, he suggests that the wrong dating element 
in the charter is the Byzantine year. He believes that in the lost original Latin copy 
of the decree the letter X in ‘ V MDXC’ (that is, 6590) was compressed. This led 
both scribes to miss the X, and to write ‘ V MDC’ (6600) instead of ‘ V MDXC’ 
(6590). In addition, one of the scribes also misread ‘ V MDC’ as ‘ V MCC’. For all 
                                               
11 S. Giorgio Maggiore, ed. by Luigi Lanfranchi and Bianca Lanfranchi Strina, 4 vols 
(Venice: Il comitato, 1968-2016), II, no. 59, pp. 168-75; FZ, no. 1-2, pp. 6, 9; Alexias, bk 
6, ch. 5, pp. 178-79; Alexiad, pp. 162-63; Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 9, p. 
217; Borsari, ‘Il crisobullo...’, pp. 113-15. 
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these reasons, Madden suggests that the chrysobull was issued in 1082, 
confirming the opinion of previous scholars.12 
Madden’s article was soon followed by a rejoinder by Jacoby. Even though 
Jacoby agrees with the 1082 dating of the chrysobull, he rejects Madden’s 
conjecture according to which the document issued in 1090 might refer to one 
chrysobull that summed up previous donations of property. In fact, Jacoby notes 
that, from the late eleventh century until 1192, any time the Byzantine emperors 
issued a chrysobull to grant privileges to an Italian city, they coupled each one with 
one praktikon only, and thus comes to the conclusion that the word cartulae used in 
the text refers to one chrysobull and one praktikon. In addition, Jacoby also has 
some remarks on the palaeographical evidence. He notes that the scribe who 
transcribed the text of Manuel’s chrysobull issued in 1148 also dated John II’s 
chrysobull to Venice incorrectly. In both cases, the Roman letters ‘CC’ were used 
instead of ‘DC’. This happened because the Venetian scribe was used to writing 
‘CC’ while dating the charters that he had to issue during his lifetime, in the early 
thirteenth century, while using the Common Era style. Furthermore, Jacoby 
explains that both copyists omitted the Roman letter ‘X’ before ‘C’ while they were 
writing the text of Alexios’s chrysobull because they were both transcribing the text 
from a previous copy which has not survived, and in which the Roman numeral ‘X’ 
was also erroneously omitted. Finally, according to Jacoby, the familiarity of the 
Venetian chancery with the indiction year suggests that we should consider this 
element the only reliable dating factor of all the chrysobulls for Venice. This 
hypothesis is corroborated by the evidence of Isaac II’s 1187 charter: its scribe 
miswrote the Byzantine year (but not the indiction) of at least two other earlier 
documents included in it. Therefore, according to Jacoby, 1082 is still to be 
considered the correct year of issue of Alexios’s chrysobull.13 
However, only a few years after Jacoby’s article, Frankopan suggested that 
the chrysobull was actually issued in 1092. Frankopan believes that the Venetian 
scribes miswrote the indiction cycle year while they were transcribing the Latin copy 
of the text of the chrysobull from the Greek one. Thus, they wrote fifth indiction 
instead of fifteenth (in Greek, five is ‘ἐ’, while fifteen is ‘ἰε’). Frankopan also notes 
that, if the chrysobull had been issued in 1082 or in 1084, it would probably mention 
the Venetian obligation to continue fighting against Robert Guiscard. However, the 
text only mentions the support that Venice had provided against the Normans in 
                                               
12 Madden, ‘The Chrysobull…’, pp. 33-40; Jacoby, ‘The Chrysobull…’, p. 200. 
13 Jacoby, ‘The Chrysobull…’, pp. 199-204. 
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Dyrrachion, thus possibly implying that, by then, the conflict had ended, or, at least, 
that the Byzantines had recovered this city. This suggests the chrysobull was 
issued no earlier than 1083. The inclusion of a church in Dyrrachion amongst the 
donations handed over to Venice also makes it probable that the concessions were 
not granted in May 1082, when the city was under Norman control. Frankopan also 
believes that Anna Komnene’s frequent chronological inaccuracies warn us to take 
her account with a grain of salt, and that she ‘misplaced her account of the 
concessions’ when she linked it with events that were taking place in 1085. 
Furthermore, Frankopan believes that the fact that Crete, Cyprus, any Aegean 
islands (except for Chios), and Smyrna are not mentioned in the charter is key 
evidence that the charter was issued in 1092. The former two islands revolted in 
1091, and the Byzantines were only able to recover them in the second half of 
1092. Furthermore, in this period all of the Aegean islands (except for Chios) were 
ruled by the Turkish emir Tzachas, who was based in Smyrna. As for the 
arguments pointed out by Borsari, Frankopan emphasises that the chrysobull did 
not confer the title of protosebastos on a single doge, but entitled him and all his 
successors to use it. Therefore, Doge Selvo could have received this dignity as a 
personal appointment before 1083, which would explain why he is mentioned with 
this title in charters issued in this year. In addition, the doge owned some property 
in Constantinople in 1090 because, while Alexios’s chrysobull granted some new 
properties to the Venetians, it also re-confirmed other previous ones. Thus, the 
doge had previously received some land in Constantinople, probably as a reward 
for helping the Byzantines against the Normans. Frankopan also notes that 
Alexios’s chrysobull does not mention that the emperor appointed the doge with the 
title of Duke of Croatia. However, since this title is not used in any Venetian charter 
issued by 1090 (it was first used in 1092), Alexios probably granted this title with 
another charter, now lost. Finally, Frankopan suggests that the information 
provided by Andrea Dandolo, according to whom the Patriarch of Grado Giovanni 
Saponario died in Constantinople in 1092, can be interpreted as evidence that the 
cleric was there in this year in order to witness the signing of the treaty between 
Venice and the Byzantines which was sanctioned by the chrysobull. To sum up, for 
all these reasons, Frankopan suggests that the chrysobull was issued in 1092, and 
that it does not have to be associated with the Norman attacks in the Balkans. It 
was actually a commercial treaty, aimed at attracting foreign capital to the empire, 
and at stimulating its economy. The almost contemporary introduction of a new 
coinage system, in September 1092, shows that Alexios had a consistent 
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programme of economic revival, and meant to increase commerce in his empire 
with both measures. In addition, Alexios granted free trade to the Venetians in the 
Aegean area in order ‘to induce Venice beyond the Adriatic’ to help him recover the 
territories that Byzantium had lost to the Turks.14 
Frankopan’s arguments are for the most part convincing. Furthermore, there 
is an important palaeographical and textual element which strongly suggests the 
chrysobull was issued in 1092. In fact, both Jacoby and Madden omit to mention 
that in the surviving copies of the document the Byzantine era and the indiction 
year are both written in letters, and not in Roman numerals.15 Therefore, their 
suggestion that the copyist of the document might have omitted to write, or to see 
an ‘X’ while transcribing the chrysobull is hardly plausible. In addition, it would 
assume that the subtractive notation of Roman numerals was used, while this 
system was not extremely common in the central Middle Ages.16 Thus, it is quite 
likely that, when the Latin version of the decree was transcribed, the year was 
never written down in Roman numerals. These considerations suggest us that an 
error was made while reading the Greek numerals, and, since the subtractive 
notation is not used for these numerals, this makes it much more likely that the 
indiction year was miscopied in both versions of the chrysobull (and that the 
Byzantine year is correct in the text included in Isaac II’s decree). 
Yet, some other aspects analysed by Frankopan are less convincing. In 
particular, the one regarding the absence of Crete and Cyprus seems rather weak, 
as a series of cities were included in the list even though the Byzantines had lost 
                                               
14 I trattati con Bisanzio…, no. 2, p. 37; Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 9, p. 218; 
Frankopan, ‘Byzantine Trade Privileges…’, pp. 140-55, 158, 160; Jean-Claude 
Cheynet, ‘La Résistance aux Turcs en Asie Mineure entre Mantzikert et la Première 
Croisade’, in Eupsychia: Mélanges offerts à Hélène Ahrweiler, 2 vols (Pairs: 
Publications de la Sorbonne, 1998), I, 131-47 (pp. 145-46); Paul Gautier, ‘Défection et 
soumission de la Crète sous Alexis Ier Comnène‘, REB, 36 (1977), 215-27 (pp. 218, 
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that died in Constantinople right: according to the former, it was one Domenico (but 
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15 ASVe, Secreta, Patti, Liber Pactorum 1, cc. 66v, 71v; ASVe, Secreta, Patti, Liber 
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16 Charles Burnett, ‘Ten or Forty? A Confusing Numerical Symbol in the Middle Ages’, 
in Mathematics Celestial and Terrestrial: Festschrift für Menso Folkerts zum 65. 
Geburtstag (Halle: Deutsche Akademie der Naturforscher Leopoldina, 2008), pp. 81-89 
(pp. 81-82); Charles Burnett, ‘Algorismi vel helcep decentior est diligentia: The 
Arithmetic of Adelard of Bath and His Circle’, in Mathematische Probleme im Mittelalter: 
Der lateinische und arabische Sprachbereich, ed. by Menso Folkerts (Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz, 1996), pp. 221-331 (pp. 234, 264);  
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control over them. The most striking case is that of Antioch, which had been 
conquered by the Seljuk Turks in 1084 after a decade of rule by autonomous 
Armenian lords. It is also unclear why the chrysobull list includes the cities of 
Laodikeia, Mamistra, Adana, Phokaia, and Ephesus, since by 1092 they had all 
been lost to the empire. While most of these cities were important economic 
centres or ports, and Venice might have been interested in obtaining commercial 
privileges there in case of a Byzantine reconquest, this explanation is still weak.17 
Another aspect that is unconvincing is that Frankopan almost ignores the 
many narrative texts that suggest that the privileges to Venice were issued during 
the conflict against Robert Guiscard. While Frankopan discards the collocation of 
Anna Komnene’s words due to her frequent errors in chronology, he does not take 
into consideration that John Kinnamos also associated the concessions with this 
war. Kinnamos, who was Manuel I’s secretary, and thus had access to official 
documents, wrote that, when Robert Guiscard invaded the Balkans, Alexios 
rewarded the Venetians for their military help by granting them a quarter in 
Constantinople, and by allowing them to pay no taxes on commerce.18 
Therefore, while the textual elements of the chrysobull suggest that the 
decree was issued in 1092, according to the Byzantine historians the concessions 
were granted during Robert Guiscard’s campaign. Yet, these elements are not 
necessarily in conflict with each other. During the conflict against the Normans, the 
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Venetians obtained privileges on two different occasions, first following their initial 
intervention against Robert Guiscard, and then when they sent another fleet after 
the Norman leader returned to the Balkans. Yet, a chrysobull that included the two 
privileges granted in the 1080s (the cartulae to which the text refers), possibly 
together with new ones, was issued in 1092, probably in the presence of a 
Venetian legation led by the Patriarch of Grado. It is quite likely that this decree 
was drawn up because the Venetians asked for a charter that would protect their 
merchants from the abuses of the hands of imperial tax collectors (as indeed had 
been the case with the Pactum Lotharii signed with the Western Empire in 840, and 
with Basil II’s chrysobull in 992). The concessions that were not augmented were 
left unchanged, and this is probably why the cities over which Alexios had in the 
meantime lost control, were nevertheless included amongst the places where the 
Venetians would pay no taxes on trade. Since Crete and Cyprus were part of the 
empire in the first half of the 1080s, their absence from the chrysobull is not due to 
their rebellions, but rather to geopolitical reasons. Allowing the Venetians to trade 
there without having to pay any dues would have also given them the chance of 
opening the yet-unexplored sea route that connected the Central Mediterranean to 
Palestine and Egypt. This would have created a Venetian commercial monopoly in 
the Mediterranean, and the Byzantines were not willing to allow this to happen.19 
Therefore, while the surviving chrysobull was issued in 1092, the Venetians 
had already obtained their privileges in the 1080s, as a reward for their intervention 
against Robert Guiscard. 
                                               
19 David Jacoby, ‘Byzantine Crete in the Navigation and Trade Networks of Venice and 
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III. The Context of the Venetian-Byzantine Alliance of 1081 
As we have just seen, the rewards promised by Alexios I facilitated the 
Venetian decision to join forces with the Byzantines against Robert Guiscard. 
However, especially since we do not know exactly what commercial concessions 
Venice obtained when Robert Guiscard was still attacking the Balkans, these 
privileges cannot be considered as the only reason why Venice provided its help to 
Alexios Komnenos. 
Indeed, the mere existence of these concessions does not explain why, of 
all the Mediterranean powers, the Byzantines asked Venice for help. Had there 
already been some previous Venetian military interventions alongside the Eastern 
Empire, or was this an isolated event? Furthermore, we need to ask ourselves 
whether, in addition to the promise of obtaining commercial privileges, the 
Venetians had other reasons for being interested in preventing the Norman leader 
from conquering the Balkan coast. A common answer is that they were afraid that, 
if Robert had controlled both shores of the Strait of Otranto, he might have soon 
built a strong fleet to connect his possessions. This navy could have then 
bottlenecked the Venetian ships in the Adriatic, thus preventing them from trading 
in the Mediterranean. This would imply that Venice was already significantly 
involved in commerce in the Mediterranean (and especially in Byzantium) before 
1081. We shall here try to answer these questions by analysing the evolution of 
Venetian policy (especially with regard to the Adriatic) and trade in the two 
centuries before 1081. 
1) Political and Diplomatic Aspects 
Venice, due to its peculiar geographic position, had been militarily involved 
in the Adriatic for centuries before its intervention alongside Alexios I in 1081. It had 
in particular engaged in naval warfare in the Adriatic, and, at times, also in the 
Western Ionian Sea. While most of the interventions along the western shores of 
these seas took place following a Byzantine request for help, the Venetians tried to 
pursue their own policy in the Eastern Adriatic. 
i) Until c. 950 
Even though Venice had already managed to obtain internal political 
autonomy in the eighth century, when the Byzantines had allowed local doukes to 
rule over the city, its external policy remained partly dependent on the Eastern 
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Empire during the following centuries.1 In particular in the early ninth century, the 
Byzantines had often asked the Venetians for naval help in the Adriatic in order to 
counter raids from the Arabs, and to prevent the fall of their Southern Italian lands. 
In this period, due to the decline of their naval strength, and to a difficult situation 
on the Balkan and Anatolian/Syrian borders, the basileis could not afford to send 
fleets to defend the Mezzogiorno against Saracen attacks.2 Therefore, Venice sent 
its own ships to fight the Arabs on three different occasions (all unsuccessful) 
between the late 820s and 841. According to the sources, the Venetians were 
asked to intervene alongside the Byzantines; however, they might have actually 
been forced to do this. Sending a fleet when asked might have been an obligation 
of the Venetian doges after their marriage to a Byzantine wife, and after receiving 
imperial dignities (the ruler of Venice would become a hypatos, or a spatharios).3 
However, the failure of 841 was followed by a lack of Venetian interventions 
alongside the Byzantines for over 150 years. Since Saracen raids had not ended, 
possibly the Eastern Empire had not asked Venice for help. The conclusion, in 840, 
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of the Pactum Lotharii, the first Venetian treaty with the Western Empire, might 
have led to the end of such military collaborations. Indeed, this pact marked the 
beginning of closer relations with the Western Empire, to the point that Venice even 
promised to provide naval help to Emperor Lothar I, if needed. However, even 
though the Venetians did not intervene alongside the Byzantines, they nevertheless 
maintained their role as patrollers of the Adriatic Sea, as in the following decades 
they twice intervened autonomously (and successfully) against the Saracens. The 
Arabs were defeated near Taranto in the 840s, and in the 870s they were repelled 
while they were raiding Grado.4 
Yet, until the end of the tenth century the relations between Venice and 
Byzantium had generally remained quite good. This is shown by the recurrent 
diplomatic journeys to the Bosporus made by sons of doges, and by the frequent 
exchange of gifts between the two cities.5 In addition, the doges, beginning with 
Orso I Participazio in 879, were given a higher imperial dignity than in the past (that 
of protospatharios), which made their status similar to that of other autonomous 
rulers of Southern Italy. Indeed, Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos’s De 
Cerimoniis, written in the mid-tenth century, indicates that the same inscriptio and 
type of seal were to be used in the correspondence with both the doge of Venice 
and the rulers of the Mezzogiorno. Another analogy between these areas is that all 
these rulers issued charters dated by the regnal years of the Eastern emperors, 
and that their intitulatio included their Byzantine title.6 
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These clashes with the Arabs were not the only military activity in which the 
Venetians were involved, as in the ninth and tenth centuries they often engaged in 
naval battles off the Dalmatian coasts and islands. The Venetians were interested 
in this region mainly for technical and geophysical reasons. Medieval ships had a 
limited stowage capacity, and thus had to stop frequently to get provisions 
(especially fresh water). Several factors made it easier for ships to sail along the 
Eastern Adriatic coast (rather than by the western coast) when they had to traverse 
this sea, and reach the Mediterranean from Venice for commercial and diplomatic 
reasons. Amongst them, we can mention the several natural harbours that can be 
found in Dalmatia, the direction of the winds, and the presence of nearby 
mountains which acted as ‘visual markers’ for sailors before the invention of the 
compass.7 However, the topography of this region, and the weakened Byzantine 
control over its coast, had led to the settlement of pirates on the southern shores of 
Dalmatia in the ninth century. The Narentan Slavs, based on the river mouth of the 
Narenta (now Neretva) and on the nearby islands, were the most troublesome 
threat for Venice.8 
After some minor skirmishes, the Venetians launched their first expedition 
against the Narentans in 839; however, they only managed to achieve some 
significant success some decades later, when Doge Orso I Participazio (864-81) 
                                                                                                                                         
‘Venezia nel giudizio delle fonti bizantine dal X al XII secolo’, Rivista storica italiana, 74 
(1962), 457-79 (p. 461); Veronica Ortenberg West-Harling, ‘”Venecie due sunt”: Venice 
and Its Grounding in the Adriatic and North Italian Background’, in Italia, 888-962: Una 
svolta, Italy, 888-962: A Turning Point, ed. by Marco Valenti and Chris Wickham 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2014), pp. 237-64 (p. 247); Agostino Pertusi, ‘L’Impero Bizantino e 
l’evolvere dei suoi interessi nell’alto Adriatico’, in Le origini di Venezia (Florence: 
Sansoni, 1964), pp. 57-93 (pp. 74-77); Agostino Pertusi, ‘Bisanzio e le insegne regali 
dei dogi di Venezia’, Rivista di studi bizantini e neoellenici, n. s. 2-3 (1965-66), 277-84 
(pp. 280-83); Nicol, Byzantium and Venice…, pp. 22-34; Graham A. Loud, ‘Southern 
Italy and the Eastern and Western Empires, c.900–1050’, Journal of Medieval History, 
38 (2012), 1-19 (p. 5); Vera von Falkenhausen, La dominazione bizantina nell’Italia 
meridionale dal IX all’XI secolo, trans. by Franco Di Clemente and Livia Fasola (Bari: 
Ecumenica, 1978), pp. 34-38. 
7 Pryor, Geography..., pp. 75-77, 83-85, 93-94; McCormick, Origins…, p. 528; Rowan 
W. Dorin, ‘Adriatic Trade Networks in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries’, in Trade 
and Markets..., pp. 235-79 (pp. 236, 238). 
8 Constantine Porphyrogennetos, De administrando imperio, ed. by Gyula Moravcsik, 
trans. by Romilly James Heald Jenkins (Budapest: Pázmány Péter Tudományegyetemi 
Görög Filológiai Intézet, 1949), chs 29, 32, 36 pp. 124-27, 156-57, 164-65. The 
Venetians might have been interested in this area also due to its late Christianisation, 
which allowed them to engage freely in the slave trade. See Johannes Hoffmann, ‘Die 
östliche Adriaküste als Hauptnachschubbasis für den venezianischen Sklavenhandel 
bis zum Ausgang des elften Jahrhunderts’, Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 55 (1968), 165-81 (pp. 167-72); Johannes Hoffmann, ‘Venedig 
und die Narentaner’, Studi veneziani, 11 (1969), 3-41 (p. 29). 
29 
 
forced the Croats (who, until then, had supported the Narentans) to sign a treaty, 
which led to a considerably lengthy period of peace with the kingdom of Croatia.9 
This made it possible for Orso’s successor, Giovanni II Participazio (881-87), to 
focus on the Western Adriatic shore, where the doge obtained the subjection of 
Comacchio, the main commercial rival of Venice in the area.10 Yet, the Narentans 
had not been completely subdued, and the attempts made by Pietro I Candiano in 
887 were notably unsuccessful, for the doge himself was killed in this conflict.11 
Venice was once more active in the Eastern Adriatic starting in the 930s. In 
932 the Istrian city of Iustinopolis (modern Koper), agreed to pay an annual tribute. 
This was an extremely advantageous move for the Venetians, as it gave them 
access to the Istrian woods, and thus to a quality of timber that was particularly 
good for shipbuilding. In addition, in 948, despite an initial defeat, Doge Pietro III 
Candiano (942-59) managed to defeat the Narentans, and to force them to sign an 
agreement.12 This led to the end of hostilities between the Venetians and the 
Narentans until the early eleventh century. 
While it is interesting that Venice was already involved in the Adriatic area 
(both assisting the Byzantines, and acting autonomously) in the ninth and in the 
first half of the tenth centuries, it is the Venetian foreign policy of the century that 
preceded Robert Guiscard’s campaign in the Balkans that needs to be analysed in 
more detail. This will show that the intervention alongside Alexios I was not an 
isolated event. 
ii) C. 950-1081 
Relations between Venice and Byzantium seem to have deteriorated in the 
second half of the tenth century, especially during the dogeship of Pietro IV 
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Candiano (959-76). However, even if Pietro conducted a generally pro-Western 
foreign policy (with military involvement in Northern Italy, which was intended to 
secure access to its agricultural production), he nevertheless still recognised some 
form of Byzantine sovereignty. Possibly out of fear of Byzantine reprisals if he had 
refused to do so, the doge abided by the order of Emperor John I Tzimiskes to 
issue a ban on the trade of strategic goods (wood and metal) to the Saracens.13 
However, the final years of Candiano’s dogeship were marred by internal tensions, 
probably due to the presence of two opposing political factions in Venice, one pro-
Western and the other pro-Byzantine. The Venetians seem to have neglected the 
Adriatic area (except for the renewal of the pact with Koper), due to the turn in their 
foreign policy, and to internal problems: Candiano himself was murdered, while 
during Tribuno Menio’s dogeship (979-91) a civil war between the two factions 
broke out, also leading to tensions with the Western emperor Otto II. However, 
Tribuno Menio managed to put a halt to this crisis in his final years as a ruler, when 
he also resumed relations with the Byzantines by sending a legation to 
Constantinople.14 The negotiations were concluded by the agents of Pietro II 
Orseolo (991-1008), and led to the Venetians being granted a chrysobull by 
Emperor Basil II. The Venetians were asked to help the Byzantines to cross the 
Strait of Otranto in case of a campaign in Southern Italy (which eventually never 
took place). While this charter is an important milestone for its military and 
commercial terms, it also interestingly refers to the Venetians as extranei. This term 
is a translation of the Greek word εξωτικοί, which was used to define imperial 
subjects living outside Constantinople. Therefore, we may conclude that, at the end 
of the tenth century, the Byzantines still considered Venice to be formally a part of 
their empire.15 Pietro managed both to keep good relations with the Western 
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Empire, and to strengthen those with Byzantium. The doge twice sent his son 
Giovanni to Constantinople as an envoy; Giovanni also ended up marrying a 
Byzantine noblewoman, and being made a patrician. Pietro also renewed the 
traditional Adriatic policy of his city by launching new expeditions in Dalmatia, and 
by helping Basil II against the Arabs with his fleet.16 
Since the first two Venetian embassies each preceded a Dalmatian 
expedition, it is possible that these campaigns were planned in Constantinople. 
Dalmatia had been recently occupied by the Croats, whose new king had 
abandoned his predecessor’s pro-Byzantine policy, becoming a supporter of the 
Bulgarians. Thus, the Venetian expeditions in this region are probably to be 
associated with the contemporary Byzantine-Bulgarian conflict that lasted for most 
of Basil II’s reign, until his final success in c. 1018.17 If we trust John the Deacon, 
according to whom in 1000 Zadar was already under Venetian rule (while in 996 
probably it was not), the Byzantines might have ceded it to the Venetians in order 
to facilitate their naval enterprise, or, perhaps, as a pledge for the completion of 
Giovanni Orseolo’s marriage to his Byzantine fiancée.18 
A renewal of hostilities with the Croats led to a first Venetian campaign in 
Dalmatia in 996, which only achieved limited success, and to a second intervention 
in the region (in 1000), which was much more effective.19 According to John the 
Deacon, this second campaign was a reprisal for Croatian and Narentan 
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harassment against the citizens of Zadar (which, as noted above, was then under 
Venetian control). However, this intervention was probably also a diversionary 
move elaborated by the Byzantines in order to recover the Balkan hinterland from 
the Bulgarians. The Bulgarians might have been afraid that Dyrrachion was the 
target of Orseolo’s expedition. This city, then under Bulgarian control, was 
strategically extremely important due to its location opposite the Strait of Otranto, 
and at the western end of the Via Egnatia, which ended in Constantinople, passing 
through Thessalonica. Thus, the Bulgarians would have gathered most of their 
army there, making the undefended Balkan hinterland an easier prey for the 
Byzantines.20 Therefore, this expedition was probably agreed during the talks 
between the Venetians and the Eastern Empire, rather than being, as suggested by 
Nicol and Ferluga, a ‘completely independent enterprise’ by Venice.21 Yet, this 
campaign was nevertheless a major success for Pietro II Orseolo. Most of the 
Dalmatian cities and islands submitted to him, and the doge also received the 
homage of ‘Surigna’ (the brother of the Croatian king, probably to be identified with 
Kreśimir, who himself became king before 1008). Furthermore, several Narentan 
nobles were captured, and were only released after a Narentan princeps swore that 
he and his fellow countrymen would stop asking the Venetians for tribute, and 
would no longer harass any Venetian travelling in this area.22 Therefore, this 
campaign was extremely successful for Pietro Orseolo, as he obtained relevant 
military results, and significant prestige. Indeed, the Narentans kept their word, and 
remained at peace – no Venetian chronicle mentions them after this campaign. 
Furthermore, although Dalmatia was not actually conquered by Venice, but 
remained formally under the Byzantine Empire, following this expedition both 
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chronicles and charters started to refer to Pietro II as dux Veneticorum et 
Dalmaticorum.23 
Some years later, Pietro II Orseolo was once more militarily active alongside 
the Byzantines. Indeed, in September 1002, another Venetian naval expedition led 
to the successful relief of the Byzantine city of Bari during the Saracen siege.24 We 
cannot exclude that Basil II rewarded Orseolo for his help by giving his consent to 
the marriage between the doge’s son Giovanni and an imperial noblewoman. 
The collaboration between Venice and Byzantium continued during the 
dogeship of Ottone Orseolo (1008-26), a son of Pietro II. In 1018, Basil II finally 
secured victory over the Bulgarians, while since the Dalmatians were being 
harassed by the Croats, Ottone launched a new successful expedition against this 
region, probably after a preliminary agreement with Constantinople. On his way 
back to Venice, Ottone also obtained a promise that Venice would receive a yearly 
tribute from some of the cities of the Kvarner Gulf.25 That the intervention was 
arranged by Basil II seems highly likely because it was followed by the submission 
of the Croat king to Byzantium (and not to Venice), and by a strengthened imperial 
control over Dalmatia. In the years following this, after an initial subjection to 
Byzantium, the Croatian toparches of Zadar and Split was imprisoned by Emperor 
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Michael IV (1034-41), who obtained direct control over Zadar.26 By contrast, after 
1018 Venice soon lost its relevance in Dalmatia, mainly as a result of the internal 
tensions between the Orseolos and their rivals. Between 1024 and the early 1030s, 
Ottone was deposed and exiled twice, and reinstated once, and Domenico, a 
relative of his, was installed as doge, but soon overthrown. This internal turmoil led 
to a reduced interest in Dalmatia, and thus the Venetians probably stopped 
receiving the tributes and honours that they had been granted in 1018.27  
Relations with Byzantium improved once again during the dogeship of 
Domenico Contarini (1043-71). Contarini was conspicuously honoured by the 
Byzantines, who first made him first a patrikios, then a protosebastos, and finally an 
anthypatos. Furthermore, according to Andrea Dandolo, Emperor Constantine X 
(1059-67) also awarded him with the high-ranking dignity of magistros.28 The 
existence of such privileged relations was well-known. Indeed, the Papacy tried to 
take advantage of them by entrusting the Venetian Patriarch of Grado, Domenico 
Marango (1043-71), with the task of acting as mediator in a mission which 
unsuccessfully attempted to reunite the Greek and Roman Churches.29 
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The Venetian association with Byzantium also led to a renewed military 
collaboration in Dalmatia. The Croats had taken advantage of the military and 
internal crisis which had struck the Eastern Empire in the early 1060s, to conquer 
most of Dalmatia (a feat that was facilitated by support from Rome, as the Kingdom 
of Croatia had become a vassal state of the Papacy).30 The Byzantines wanted to 
recover this region, and asked the Venetians to send a fleet to this region. Contarini 
abided by this request, and, since the expedition was successful, the Eastern 
Empire recovered control over Dalmatia, to hold it until c. 1069.31 
This privileged relationship continued during the dogeship of Domenico 
Selvo (1071-84). In 1072, the doge married a sister of Michael VII Doukas (1071-
78), probably Theodora, and received the titles of protoproedros, formerly very 
prestigious, but which was widely granted by this time, and of magistros.32 In 
addition, Selvo was particularly active in the Southern Adriatic. During his dogeship 
not only did the Venetians fight against the Normans alongside Alexios I, but they 
also took part in another campaign in Dalmatia. In the early 1070s, Dalmatia had 
been recovered by the Croats, whose king Peter Kreśimir IV had then supported 
the pro-Slavic/Glagolitic clergy, thus falling out of favour with the pro-Roman clergy 
and, consequently, with the pontiff. Pope Gregory VII (of whom the Kingdom of 
Croatia was formally a vassal – see fn. 30) then tried to solve this issue by trying to 
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convince a super partes candidate who was loyal to the Church to intervene and 
depose Peter Kreśimir. The choice eventually fell on a Danish prince, but since he 
never reached Croatia, the pontiff had to send Gerard, the Archbishop of Siponto, 
to Dalmatia to act as his legate. Probably on Gerard’s invitation – which apparently 
had not been approved by the pope –, Amicus of Giovinazzo, who might have 
already attempted an expedition in the Balkans around 1066, intervened militarily in 
Dalmatia in 1074 or 1075. Amicus was a count whose lands neighboured the 
legate’s diocese, and a member of one of the most important Norman kin groups of 
Southern Italy. He had recently led an unsuccessful rebellion against the Duke of 
Apulia and Calabria, Robert Guiscard, and could obtain the support of a prelate 
because, unlike Robert, he was not an excommunicate. Amicus’s second 
Dalmatian expedition was initially successful, as by November he had captured the 
king. However, his intervention led to a Venetian reaction: Doge Selvo sailed to 
Dalmatia, put the Normans to flight, and, if this charter is not a forgery, in early 
1075 or in early 1076 received an oath of fealty from the Dalmatian cities together 
with a promise not to invite the Normans into their region. In addition, Demetrius 
Zvonimir, the leader of the pro-Roman faction, was crowned King of Croatia.33 
This Venetian intervention in Dalmatia was probably not a response to a 
Byzantine request: the empire was facing a political and military crisis, and, even 
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though it would successfully suppress revolts in its territories (for instance, in 
Macedonia), it did not have the resources to attempt a new expansion in the West. 
Furthermore, in contrast to previous instances, after this campaign no Byzantine 
officials are recorded in Dalmatia.34 Nor is it likely that the Venetians wanted 
directly to conquer Dalmatia; they were more interested in holding rights over this 
region, rather than in exercising them. Indeed, in the oath of 1075/76, which does 
name the doge as Duke of Dalmatia and senior of the four Dalmatian cities, while 
the inhabitants of the region swore not to allow any Normans to settle there, they 
made no mention of the Croats.35 Therefore, the Venetians intervened in Dalmatia 
in the 1070s only in order to expel the Normans. 
This analysis seems to suggest, therefore, that, in addition to the granting of 
commercial privileges, Venice assisted Alexios I in 1081 mainly for two other 
reasons. First, there was the existence of a long tradition of collaboration with 
Byzantium. Indeed, many doges had obtained imperial dignities, but, in return, they 
had to provide military help in the Adriatic area when needed. Secondly, a Norman 
conquest of the Balkan coast would have had negative consequences for their 
interests in Dalmatia. As can be noticed when analysing Amicus’s expedition, the 
Venetians did not want to lose their prerogatives over this region, and their access 
to its goods and natural harbours; thus, they intervened militarily in order to prevent 
this from happening. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the Venetians were similarly 
scared when Robert Guiscard invaded the area around Dyrrachion. This region is 
dangerously close to Dalmatia, and its conquest would have enabled the Norman 
duke to control the Lower Adriatic, and hence to block the Venetian sea routes 
towards the Mediterranean. 
This second reason leads us to ask a further question: how much was 
Venice involved in trade in the Mediterranean before 1081? 
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2) Commercial Aspects 
If we suggest that Domenico Selvo intervened to assist Alexios I out of fear 
that the conquest of Epirus by Guiscard might block the Venetian sailing routes, we 
imply that Venice was already very active in sea trade before 1081. Yet, was this 
the case? We shall try to answer this question by analysing the scale of Venetian 
commerce in the Mediterranean and Lower Adriatic before 1081. 
As was correctly observed by Roberto Sabatino Lopez, the ‘Pirenne thesis’, 
according to which trade and communication in the Mediterranean diminished as a 
result of the Islamic conquests, is quite difficult to prove due to the scarcity of the 
surviving written documentation.36 In fact, even though archaeological finds have 
been extremely useful in reassessing the ‘Pirenne thesis’,37 they are not as helpful 
in the ninth century, or when it comes to tracking down trade routes. Indeed, most 
of the finds are from much earlier periods, and furthermore it is impossible to 
identify accurately the place of origin of the later amphorae.38 Therefore, we still 
need to rely mostly on written sources to assess the scale of Mediterranean trade 
during the ninth and tenth centuries. 
Similar considerations apply if we consider the extent of specifically 
Venetian trade at this period. While the political and diplomatic history of this city, 
especially in the tenth and very early eleventh centuries, is well-covered by John 
the Deacon’s chronicle, the documentation on trade is fragmentary until the mid- to 
late tenth century.39 However, the surviving sources nevertheless suggest that, 
already in the ninth century, the Venetians were acting as middlemen, transporting 
into mainland Northern Italy goods probably produced in Byzantium and in the 
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Eastern Mediterranean.40 However, such ware could sometimes remain in Venice, 
as part of the patrimony of the élite of the city.41 
The most significant text regarding the importance of Venetian commerce in 
the ninth century is arguably in the Pactum Lotharii. This is a treaty that Venice 
originally signed with the Western emperor Lothar I in 840, and which was then 
renewed by most of Lothar’s successors. Indeed, amongst the other clauses, the 
Venetians were granted full freedom of movement along the rivers of Northern Italy, 
and promised not to enslave the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Italy, nor to sell them 
to the ‘pagans’. Furthermore, in the prologue of this treaty, it was pointed out that 
the agreement was valid in many cities of the Western Central Adriatic (from 
Comacchio all the way down to Fermo). These three elements suggest that by the 
mid-ninth century, Venetian traders were already quite active in Northern and 
Central Italy, and were probably also trading with the Arabs – the ‘pagans’ of the 
treaty are probably to be identified with the rulers of Northern Africa. The Venetian 
position in Northern and Central Italy was further consolidated in the following 
century, when a series of commercial treaties with neighbouring cities was signed. 
Yet, the event that was arguably the most relevant took place in 932. In this year, 
following decades of hostility, Venice eventually managed to destroy its main 
commercial rival in the Adriatic, Comacchio.42 
The text that better documents the existence of frequent Venetian contacts 
with Africa is arguably the Translatio Sancti Marci. Even though in the 810s the 
doge had implemented the decrees of Leo V the Armenian (813-20), which forbade 
Byzantine subjects to enter Syria and Egypt, and banned trade with the Arabs, this 
disposition (which appears to suggest that the Venetians were already involved in 
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commerce with these areas in the early ninth century) was not respected for long.43 
Indeed, already in 828, some Venetian merchants stole the relics of St Mark in 
Alexandria, and took them to Venice. The dynamics of this theft (the relics were 
covered with pork in order to get through an Arab inspection) also seem to suggest 
a familiarity with Muslim customs. This could be better explained if we take into 
consideration that the Translatio was written much later, probably during Pietro IV 
Candiano’s dogeship (959-76), when Venetian commerce with the Arabs was much 
more common.44 
While there is some scarce evidence regarding Venetian commercial 
contacts with Byzantium and the Eastern Mediterranean, we have by contrast very 
little information about the importation of goods from Dalmatia. In fact, even though 
it has been suggested that Venice was involved in the slave trade, the actual 
evidence for this seems to refer to an import from Moravia, while the documentation 
regarding Dalmatia is extremely weak, and mainly made up of bans on this 
commercial activity.45 In addition, even though other products (especially timber, 
but also a limited amount of wine and oil) were probably imported from this region, 
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we have no actual record of this.46 Possibly, the reason for this lack of evidence of 
trade in Dalmatia is that the frequent conflicts in this area prevented the Venetians 
from creating a commercial network here. If this were the case, the clashes with the 
Narentans would mainly be the consequence of their piratical actions, which 
prevented the Venetians from sailing into the Mediterranean, rather than from 
trading in Dalmatia. Hence, since the Venetian fleet was unable to subdue the 
Narentans, the Venetian merchants were often forced to limit their range of action 
to the Western Adriatic. 
These sources seem, therefore, to suggest that already before 950 it was 
possible to find luxury goods imported from the East in Venice. However, even 
though very little can be determined regarding the scale of Venetian trade with the 
Mediterranean, there are two elements that seem to suggest that commerce was 
quite limited. These were the rivalry with Comacchio, and the threat posed by the 
Narentan pirates, which made navigation towards the Mediterranean extremely 
perilous. 
The year 950 seems to be a turning point, as thereafter there is a slight 
increase in the documentation of Venetian trade in the Lower Adriatic and 
Mediterranean. While this might be mostly due to the production and survival of 
more written sources, it is probable that the scale of trade nevertheless increased. 
This is linked with the improved conditions of Northern Italy, where the end of the 
Hungarian raids, and the political stability under the Ottonians (which came after a 
century of continuous conflicts between claimants to the Kingdom of Italy) had led 
to growing prosperity in this region. Furthermore, the agreements with the Western 
emperors signed by Venice, together with the looser economic bonds between the 
North Italian cities and their neighbouring countryside, facilitated trade in this 
area.47 This meant that the Venetians could have a larger network of potential 
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buyers not only for their own local products (mainly salt), but also for the exotic 
goods that they imported from the East, which could be exchanged for the 
foodstuffs that did not grow in the lagoon. Furthermore, the Arab loss of the main 
Mediterranean islands between the tenth and the eleventh centuries played an 
important role in the decrease in Saracen corsair raids, thus making this sea much 
safer for Christian ships. In particular, the Byzantine recovery of Crete and Cyprus 
seems to have had major consequences. The former island was the mandatory 
gateway for all the ships that wanted to sail not only to and from the Eastern 
Mediterranean, but also from its Northern to its Southern coasts. Further East, the 
shores of Cyprus were also approached by almost all the vessels that were sailing 
to or from Syria and Palestine.48  
Regarding commercial activity in the Mediterranean, many elements 
suggest an increase in its scale. First of all, there is more numismatic evidence 
from this period: a considerable number of Byzantine and Arab coins, with a 
preponderance of late-tenth/eleventh century Byzantine anonymous bronze folles 
(bronze coins), has been found near Venice. Although slightly higher, the overall 
quantity of Byzantine coin finds still does not necessarily prove direct 
communications between the Venetian merchants and to the Eastern 
Mediterranean, as the coins could have reached Venice in other ways.49 
More significant evidence comes from the written sources. In particular, a 
ban on the trade of some strategic materials with the Saracens, issued it in 971 by 
Pietro IV Candiano on the request of the Byzantine emperor John Tzimiskes, 
suggests that Venice was frequently trading with the Muslim world. In addition to 
the ban itself, this charter provides some direct information on commercial contact 
with the Arabs. In fact, the doge allowed the owners of two ships to sail for Megadia 
– modern al-Mahdiyya, in Tunisia -, and those of a third vessel to leave for Tripoli, 
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in Syria, with a very small quantity of wooden treadles of weaver’s looms, beams, 
basins, bowls, and other minutalia.50 
There is also an increase in mentions of trade in the narrative sources. In 
the celebrated account of his second voyage to Constantinople in 968, Bishop 
Liudprand of Cremona wrote that a Venetian ship (probably a mercantile one) was 
about to leave Constantinople in June of that year. Even more interestingly, the 
bishop complained about the confiscation by Byzantine officials of five extremely 
precious purple cloths that he had purchased. When he was asked why he owned 
such goods, the export of which was prohibited, Liudprand replied that Venetian 
and Amalfitan merchants were accustomed to import (that is, to smuggle) them into 
Italy.51 Another case of illegal conduct by a Venetian can be found a few decades 
later. During the dogeship of Tribuno Menio, Pietro Centranico stole the relics of St 
Sabas from a Constantinopolitan church. Since he was there ‘with his ship’, he had 
probably originally reached Byzantium for commercial reasons.52 
Although even before 992 there is more evidence of Venetian commerce 
with Romania, this year marks a definite turning point, with the issue of a chrysobull 
for Venice by the co-emperors Basil II (976-1025) and Constantine VIII (976-1028). 
Following a complaint by some representatives from Venice, the emperors decided 
to reduce the passage fee that each Venetian ship had to pay when she sailed past 
Abydos (i.e. through the Hellespont) from more than thirty to seventeen solidi. 
Furthermore, the Venetians would have to pay the passage fee only to a specific 
Byzantine official, the logotheta de dromo. This official was also the only one who 
could inspect the Venetian ships (which could be held anchored in an imperial 
harbour for a maximum of three days). If any goods belonging to merchants from 
other places were found, then the logothete would confiscate the whole cargo of 
the ship. The document also stated that the Venetians were not allowed to carry 
any goods owned by Amalfitans, Jews, Lombards from Bari, or indeed by any other 
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people, when they were sailing away from Constantinople – this addition might 
have been included in order to prevent the illegal export of silk from the Bosporus.53 
Basil II issued this chrysobull mainly for military and economic reasons. 
Inviting the Venetians to trade more often in his lands would have led to a stronger 
political bond with the empire, out of fear that access to the imperial territories 
might be lost to their competitors. Thus, it would have been much easier to obtain 
Venetian involvement in the conflicts against the Bulgarians and the Arabs.54 
Furthermore, not only would an increase in the number of merchants have enriched 
the empire itself, but it would have also encouraged the Venetians to trade in 
Constantinople rather than in Egypt, which after the Fatimid conquest in 969 had 
become an extremely prosperous commercial centre.55 
Basil II’s chrysobull, possibly together with a greater availability of precious 
metals, probably imported from Germany and, secondarily, from Africa, seems to 
have led to an increase in Venetian trade in Constantinople. Starting from the first 
half of the eleventh century, we have the first surviving charters that record the 
presence in Byzantium of merchants from Venice. Most of these are Venetian 
private charters, for example the grant of two receipts to Leone da Molin for the 
purchase from fellow Venetians of, respectively, cheese (probably in 1022) and 
cloth (probably in 1031).56 That Leone was significantly involved in maritime trading 
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is also confirmed by his being the recipient of a receipt for the loan of two anchors, 
probably in 1030.57 
The presence of Venetians is recorded not only in Constantinople, but also 
in other areas of the Eastern Empire. An example comes in a passage from Niketas 
Stethatos’s life of Symeon the New Theologian, probably written between 1054 and 
c. 1090. Niketas wrote that the servant of the hegumen of St. Stephen’s monastery 
on Mount St Auxentius, near Chalcedon, had been instructed to carry Symeon’s 
icon back to this monastery during the celebration of the saint’s exile to 
Chrysopolis, but instead sold the icon to a Venetian (merchant?). The sacred image 
was nevertheless eventually recovered by the monastery. If we trust this text, then 
it probably refers to the presence of Venetian traders near Chalcedon between 
1022 (the year of Symeon’s death), and 1052, when the saint’s relics were 
translated from Chrysopolis to Constantinople.58 
In addition to this narrative text, there are also some Venetian documents 
which refer to the presence of Venetian merchants in Methoni, and in Thebes. More 
specifically, a trader who was travelling from Alexandria in the early 1070s stopped 
at Methoni on his way to Venice.59 The evidence regarding Thebes is more 
significant, as two colleganza contracts issued in the early-1070s refer to trade in 
this city. The documents record that, following a colleganza contract, in 1072 
Domenico Zopulo issued a quittance to Giovanni Barozzi for a total of seventy-five 
pounds-worth of goods invested in a taxegium (voyage) to Thebes by a ship 
captained by Leone Orefice. One year later, Giovanni Lissado da Luperio and 
Sevasto Orefice agreed upon a similar contract for a future taxegium to Thebes.60 
These charters do not mention the import of any specific goods, but, since this city 
had an important role in silk manufacture in the mid-twelfth century, the traders 
might have imported this fabric.61 
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Some evidence of Venetian trade with Crete may come from a letter from 
the Geniza archive written in the 1060s or early 1070s by a Maghrebi merchant. 
Indeed, some merchants from Venice who were trading in Alexandria were possibly 
involved in commerce with this island as they might have been selling the same 
goods as Cretan merchants.62 There are also some hints that Venetian merchants 
may have been trading in Antioch. It is quite likely that the sailors from Venice (οἷς 
ἔργον θαλαττοπορεῖν) who, in 1074, according to John Skylitzes continuatus, freed 
Bodin (the son of the Prince of Zeta – modern-day Serbia) were actually 
merchants.63 Furthermore, Jacoby has suggested that the letters that the patriarch 
of Grado, Domenico Marango, exchanged with Patriarch Peter III of Antioch in 
1054 might have been transported by Venetian traders.64 Finally, according to Anna 
Komnene, in 1081 a colony of Venetians was residing in Dyrrachion. However, 
since the Alexiad was written over half a century later, Anna might have been 
referring to the demographic situation of the city in her own time, the mid-twelfth 
century.65 
As mentioned above, despite the ban on the trade of strategic goods to the 
Muslims, the Venetians nonetheless remained involved in commerce with the areas 
under Islamic control, especially Egypt. Even though the surviving sources only 
explicitly mention that the Venetians imported alum from there, if the pattern of the 
Venetian trade in North Africa was the same as the contemporary one of the 
Amalfitans, then wax, spices, and gold were probably also imported.66 
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The first evidence of Venetian trade in Northern Africa may be found in 
Thietmar of Merseburg’s chronicle (written between 1012 and 1018), which 
recorded that four Venetian ships were wrecked in 1017 while they were carrying 
pigmenta (dye stuffs or coloured cloth?). Although Thietmar did not mention from 
where the ships were coming, Jacoby has suggested that they might have sailed 
from Egypt.67 Some more specific evidence can be found in the life of St Symeon of 
Trier, written in the second half of the 1030s, which mentions that, on the River Nile 
(probably in 1026 or 1027), a Venetian mercantile ship was attacked by some 
pirates.68 There are two more pieces of evidence regarding Venetian trade with 
Egypt. The first is the passage (already mentioned) in a letter from the Geniza 
archive, which mentions the presence of merchants from Venice in Alexandria in 
the 1060s or early 1070s.69 The other document is a private charter issued in 
Venice, in which Domenico Roso attests the rights of his namesake nepos over 
nine bags of alum. A merchant named Domenico Serzi had carried these bags from 
Alexandria to Venice via Methoni on a ship owned by Pietro Bollo, and then 
Giovanni Martinacio de Castello had sent them to Domenico Roso nepos, since he 
owed the senior Domenico Roso some money.70 
Finally, there is now some further evidence that Venice was involved in the 
slave trade in Dalmatia. Another prohibition of such trade was issued in 960 by 
Doge Pietro IV Candiano. Captains of Venetian ships were not only not to transport 
slaves on their ships, but nor were they to carry slave traders. Furthermore, they 
were not allowed either to ask any Greek to buy slaves for them, or to purchase 
them on behalf of any Greek or Beneventan.71 It has also been suggested that the 
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prisoners taken by the Venetians in 996 were enslaved, and the Venetians might 
have had the same intention when they captured the Narentans in 1000 (but they 
eventually released most of them).72 The oath that he would prevent the ‘sale of 
men’ in his kingdom taken by Demetrius Zvonimir when he was crowned king in 
1075 or 1076, also suggests that the slave trade was quite common in Dalmatia – 
and perhaps hints at a Venetian involvement in it.73 
This cumulative evidence suggests that after 950 it became quite common 
for the Venetian merchants to be involved in commerce in the Mediterranean, and 
that trade with Egypt and, even more, with Byzantium was on the rise since the 
1070s. Even though the decree issued by Basil II in 992 had provided them with a 
lower toll only if they wanted to reach Constantinople, since the 1070s the 
Venetians had also started to trade in other imperial cities. Thus, Robert Guiscard’s 
invasion of the Balkans would have been doubly disadvantageous for Venice. In 
addition to the possible maritime threats by the Normans, a successful attack would 
have also created economic and political instability in the whole empire, and thus 
worsened commercial conditions for the Venetian merchants. 
In addition, the frequent commercial contacts with Egypt suggest that the 
Venetians were still trading strategic goods to the Muslims despite the trade ban of 
971. In fact, by the eleventh century, the once-extensive tree stock of the Arab 
world had been exhausted, and areas where this may still have remained, such as 
the Antioch region and the islands of Crete and Cyprus, had been lost. Thus, the 
Saracens needed to import timber, and probably obtained it from the Venetians, 
who could fairly easily obtain it in Istria and in Dalmatia, which was extremely rich in 
forests.74 This, once again, shows how important it was for Venice to maintain a 
form of overlordship over Dalmatia, as this region provided the Venetians not only 
with plenty of natural harbours, but also with a large supply of timber, of which the 
Islamic world was in constant need.  
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3) Conclusions 
Since the chrysobull of Alexios, issued in 1092, mainly confirmed privileges 
that Venice had previously obtained in return for its intervention against Robert 
Guiscard, the granting of commercial concessions was not the only reason why 
Venice decided to join forces with Alexios when the Normans invaded the Balkans. 
Fear of a Norman settlement in the Balkans was probably the most compelling 
aspect that Doge Selvo took into consideration in 1081. Such an event would 
probably have had negative consequences for Venice, as it would have threatened 
its privileged status in Dalmatia. Furthermore, following a hypothetic conquest of 
Epirus, the Normans would have had to build a strong fleet in order to ensure 
constant communications between the two shores of the Strait of Otranto. Such a 
possibility would have had major negative consequences for the Venetians. Their 
maritime predominance in the Adriatic and Ionian region would have been 
threatened, and this would have hampered their expanding Mediterranean trade. 
Furthermore, any conquest in the Balkans would have created havoc and instability 
in the whole Eastern Empire, where the Venetians were increasingly involved in 
commercial activities. The final aspect to consider is that providing help against 
Robert Guiscard also meant following in the footsteps of a long tradition of military 
and political alliance and partnership between Venice and Byzantium. 
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IV. The Venetian-Byzantine Alliance, 1081-1118 
1) Political Outline 
We have just seen that in the years that preceded 1081 Venice was 
generally an ally of the Eastern Empire. It is safe to say that this situation continued 
until roughly 1118. Throughout this period, Venice was arguably the most important 
partner of the Byzantines, and intervened alongside them whenever a Southern 
Italian army invaded the Balkans. 
i) Robert Guiscard’s Campaigns in the Balkans 
In the spring of 1081, just a few weeks after Alexios I Komnenos had 
deposed Nikephoros III and become emperor, Robert Guiscard initiated his 
campaign against the Balkans. Eventually, the war ended in 1085, with Robert’s 
death in Kephalonia, and with Alexios managing to defend his Western provinces 
successfully. In this chapter, we shall especially analyse why Guiscard attacked the 
Balkans, and what role Venice played during this conflict. 
a) Robert Guiscard’s motivations for invading the Balkans 
The main reason why Guiscard attacked Byzantium in 1081 is because he 
was aware of its political and military weakness. The revolt that had led to Alexios 
Komnenos’s usurpation was only the last of a series of rebellions. Many of these 
had been led by the governors of Illyrikon. Since only the Strait of Otranto 
separated Illyrikon from Southern Italy, this region was a natural bridgehead for any 
invasion of the Southern Balkans from the Mezzogiorno. Furthermore, since the 
main town of this region, Dyrrachion, lay at the beginning of the Via Egnatia (which 
led to Constantinople through Thessalonica), controlling Illyrikon meant posing a 
serious threat to the capital city of the empire.1 Therefore, Robert tried to take 
advantage of the weakness of the Byzantines by attacking Dyrrachion. He probably 
hoped that the Byzantine governor of Illyrikon, George Monomachatos, might 
support his enterprise. Indeed, Monomachatos had been named governor of 
Illyrikon by Nikephoros III, and, since he was afraid that Alexios might march 
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against his province to remove him from his post, he had asked Guiscard for help 
against the new emperor.2 
The appearance in Southern Italy in 1080 of a Greek monk named Raiktor 
who claimed to be the deposed emperor Michael VII Doukas (1071-78) also gave 
Robert a pretext for his campaign: restoring a legitimate monarch to the Byzantine 
throne. However, even though a few contemporary writers thought that Raiktor was 
indeed Michael VII,3 Robert was undoubtedly aware that the monk was an 
imposter, but nevertheless thought that he could take advantage of his presence for 
his own plans.4 
The former emperor, Michael VII, who needed help to secure his position, 
and possibly hoped to obtain military support against the Turks, had agreed to a 
matrimonial alliance with Robert. Guiscard’s daughter Olympias/Helena had indeed 
been betrothed to Constantine Doukas, Michael’s son and heir. Both members of 
the couple were to receive the title of basileus (even Helena, who was a woman), 
while Robert was also given the dignity and pension of nobelissimos (the third 
highest Byzantine dignity after emperor and kaisar), the right to appoint one of his 
sons as kouropalates, and the privilege to distribute to his men forty-three other 
dignities and pensions.5 
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Yet, once Nikephoros III Botaneiates had taken the throne in 1078, he 
annulled the engagement, and probably confined Helena in a nunnery. Thus, 
Robert could justify conducting a campaign against Byzantium, and went on with 
his plan even after Nikephoros was himself deposed by Alexios I Komnenos in 
March 1081. Indeed, Guiscard knew that Alexios would not have agreed to the 
celebration of the marriage between Constantine Doukas and Helena: according to 
Orderic Vitalis, as soon as Alexios became emperor, he swore that he would have 
never allowed the empire to be restored to Michael VII, who had previously handed 
it to the ‘enemies of the empire, [the] treacherous Normans’.6 However, this seems 
more a pretext than a motivation for a Balkan campaign, as no sources suggests 
that Robert attacked Byzantium in order to force Alexios I to renew the matrimonial 
agreement. 
There has also been a considerable scholarly debate over the goals of 
Robert’s campaign. Some of the almost contemporary chroniclers, and also a 
considerable number of modern historians, suggest that Robert wanted to conquer 
the whole empire.7 Yet, while this might have been his original plan, he probably 
changed it once he crossed the Strait of Otranto. Indeed, the advance of the 
Norman armies did not follow the Via Egnatia (the road that, starting from 
Dyrrachion, reached Constantinople via Thessalonica), and Guiscard’s men mainly 
tried to secure control of the coast of Epirus, and of the region of Thessaly, lower 
Illyria, and western Macedonia.8 
Another possibility is that Robert’s main aim was the conquest of Illyrikon, 
possibly in order to install his firstborn son, Bohemond, who was the duke’s 
second-in-command during his father’s Balkan campaigns, as its ruler. Such 
suggestion is based on the fact that Bohemond had been deprived of his 
succession rights after his father’s first marriage had been annulled on the grounds 
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of consanguinity. This meant that, following Guiscard’s death, Bohemond was not 
to receive any of his father’s land (which would be distributed between his half-
brothers and relatives).9 That Guiscard had a limited goal in the Balkans is also 
confirmed by Anna Komnene. Even though, in the first book of her Alexiad, she 
stated that Robert wanted to conquer Constantinople, later in her work Anna wrote 
that, after Robert gained control of Southern Italy, he decided to attack Illyrikon and 
then, in case of a success, ‘extend his operations further’.10 Therefore, it is possible 
that acquiring some lands for Bohemond was indeed one of the reasons that led 
Robert to attack the Balkans. 
Other suggestions have been made as to why Robert wanted to conquer the 
Illyrikon region. This might have been a way to prevent further Southern Italian 
rebels from receiving shelter there (as had already happened), and a way to 
appease his nobles by granting them some land in the Balkans.11 However, both 
Geoffrey Malaterra and, even more, William of Apulia suggest that, despite the 
opportunities that such a campaign could potentially create for them, the Balkan 
expedition was quite unpopular amongst South Italian nobles, who in some cases 
perceived it as extremely risky.12 In particular, the die-hard rebel Count Amicus 
(whose presence in the Balkan campaign was probably due to Robert taking this 
precaution to prevent him from causing trouble in Italy) might have been one of 
these disgruntled peers.13 
Finally, Robert might have felt the need to increase his territories in order to 
be able to recruit a bigger army. In this case, he had probably realised that 
expanding eastwards would have been less troublesome than doing so in the 
Abruzzo. This region was indeed formally under the pope, and Robert had been 
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excommunicated at least three times between 1074 and 1080 for his incursions into 
papal territory.14 
To sum up, Robert probably tried to take advantage of the parlous state of 
the Byzantine Empire to invade the Balkans, and secure as much land as possible 
in this region. However, he hoped that this expedition might be relatively easy, and, 
possibly, that some cities might spontaneously open their gates to him due to the 
presence, alongside his army, of a man claiming to be the former emperor Michael 
VII. However, when he realised that such a ruse was not working, and found out 
the many obstacles that made his expedition much more difficult than he initially 
thought, Robert probably downgraded his lust for conquest. Consequently, his main 
aim became that of conquering Illyrikon, possibly in order to secure it for his son 
Bohemond, who would have created his own principality in this region. 
b) The Military Role of Venice 
While the Normans and the Byzantines were the main protagonists during 
the conflict, both obtained help from allies, who were thus involved in the military 
confrontation. The Serbs of Duklja maintained a duplicitous attitude, and appeared 
to have provided some military support to Robert Guiscard. He probably needed 
some external help in order to obtain indirect control over some wealthy regions 
that had hitherto been under Byzantium by installing there some people loyal to him 
as local rulers. This would have allowed him to exploit better the resources of these 
areas15 Evidence of a Byzantine-Dukljan hostility may be found at the very 
beginning of Alexios’s reign, when the imperial governor of Dyrrachion, George 
Monomachatos, deserted to Duklja when he heard that he was to be replaced by 
George Palaiologos. Yet, this hostility probably temporarily ceased after the Dukljan 
ruler received imperial dignities following an agreement which granted an amnesty 
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to Monomachatos.16 Indeed, according to the Alexiad, the Dukljans were supposed 
to provide military help to the Byzantines in one of the battles during the Norman 
siege of Dyrrachion.  
However, after they took part in an early skirmish, the Dukljans decided not 
to fight alongside the Byzantines in the main battle, as, according to Anna 
Komnene, would only have done so if they had seen that ‘victory was going to the 
emperor’.17 Furthermore, William of Apulia appears to provide evidence that the 
Dukljans eventually took part in the conflict alongside the Normans. According to 
William, at the beginning of Robert’s invasion, the ‘Dalmatians’ had sent some 
ships to the duke, who had asked for their help to transport his army to Corfu. He 
also adds that, in the early stages of Robert’s campaign (July 1081), the 
‘Dalmatians’, together with the people of Dubrovnik, fought a naval battle against 
the Venetians.18 Yet, it is quite likely that the writer used this term to define the 
Dukljans. Indeed, the region of Duklja was also known as Dalmatia Superior, and 
the antipope Clement III clearly used this word to mean part of Dukljan territories.19 
Furthermore, William of Apulia’s ‘Dalmatia’ appears to have extended as South as 
Epirus. Indeed, the writer refers to ‘Dalmatia’ as the target of an attack that Count 
Amicus had planned to launch before 1074-75. This campaign is probably to be 
identified with an aborted expedition against Illyrikon by Amicus’s cousin Godfrey, 
which is mentioned by Lupus Protospatharius.20 Therefore, it seems quite likely that 
William was actually referring to the Dukljans when he wrote ‘Dalmatians’ 
(especially considering that no source mentions the involvement of the Croats in 
this conflict).21 
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The contribution of Alexios’s allies was much more relevant: the basileus 
was joined by some Norman deserters, and obtained help against Robert Guiscard 
both in Italy, and in the Balkans. Among these deserters, who thus joined a group 
of previous Norman expatriates including the likes of Roussel of Bailleul, 
Constantine Humbertopoulos, and, probably, Abelard (Robert’s nephew), we need 
to mention the two sons of a Dagobert, Roger and Raoul. The former deserted to 
the Byzantines just before the Normans invaded the Balkans, and informed Alexios 
about the preparations of this campaign; he was later made a sebastos, and his 
descendants would achieve significant positions in Byzantium. Raoul was the 
envoy who had informed Robert Guiscard that Alexios had become emperor in 
Byzantium, and that Michael VII was still living in Constantinople. He probably 
deserted to Alexios in the early 1080s, and he would have an important role as an 
imperial advisor during Bohemond’s Balkan campaign.22 Yet, other Normans 
deserted and joined the Byzantines during Guiscard’s two years and a half of 
absence from the Balkans, when he had to deal with urgent matters in Italy. Indeed, 
Alexios learned that the Norman counts had not been paid what they had been 
promised for their role in the Balkan expedition. He used this information to his 
advantage by convincing the counts to ask Bohemond for the money they had been 
promised from his father. If they were not to receive it, Alexios let them know that 
they were free to choose whether they preferred to join the imperial army, or to 
return to Southern Italy through Hungary. This strategy appears to have paid off, 
as, following more desertions, Bohemond was also forced to return to Southern 
Italy, to ask his father for some money to pay his army.23 
The absence of Robert from the Balkans was mainly a result of Alexios’s 
diplomacy, which forced Guiscard to return to Italy. Indeed, one of Alexios’s first 
counter-moves after the Balkans were invaded was to send letters to Herman of 
Cannae, Archbishop Hervé of Capua, the pope, and to the German Emperor Henry 
IV, asking each of them for help. According to the Alexiad, Henry IV, who had 
entered Northern Italy in spring 1081, was offered extremely valuable gifts and a 
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huge amount of money to attack Southern Italy, where Abelard (who was probably 
already there, acting as a Byzantine agent) would hand these gifts to him.24 Yet, 
Henry ended up only attacking Rome, and thus Robert did not immediately return 
to Italy, despite Pope Gregory’s request for help.25 
Robert was eventually forced to return to Italy in April 1082 as a rebellion 
had broken out in Apulia. Its ringleaders were Abelard, his half-brother Hermann, 
Geoffrey of Conversano, and Prince Jordan I of Capua – these last two were also 
nephews of the duke. Even though they were probably assisted by funds from 
Alexios, they were eventually defeated by Robert in a series of campaigns which 
probably ended in late 1083.26 It was only after suppressing the revolt in the 
Mezzogiorno, that Robert decided to face Henry IV in Rome. The duke entered the 
city three days after the German ruler had left it, for Henry knew that his army was 
too small to face Guiscard’s. Even though he had not been able to undertake a 
Southern Italian expedition, he was probably quite satisfied with the outcome of his 
expedition, since he had achieved his main aim, being crowned as emperor by the 
pope – even though the pontiff in question was not Gregory VII, but rather Clement 
III, who had been elected in opposition to Gregory by the pro-imperial Council of 
Brixen in 1080.27 
Yet, in order to face the Normans, Alexios mainly needed naval help, and 
obtained it from Venice. The Byzantines persuaded the Venetians to intervene by 
pledging them some immediate rewards, and by promising some more if they 
promptly sailed to Dyrrachion to defend the town and to fight against Robert’s 
army.28 The Venetians arrived after Robert’s men had already captured Avlona 
(modern Valona) and Corfu – the main Eastern terminal for ships that wanted to 
cross the Southern Adriatic – and routed a Byzantine army led by Alexios I himself 
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near Dyrrachion. The North Italians encamped two miles away from the Norman 
army that was besieging Dyrrachion, and, probably in autumn 1081, obtained a 
crushing victory in their first confrontation with the fleet from Southern Italy, and 
subsequently won a land battle with the help of a Byzantine contingent, thus 
returning to their ships full of booty. This success made it possible for Venice to 
blockade Robert’s army, which was still besieging Dyrrachion, and did not manage 
to obtain any reinforcements from Italy. According to Anna Komnene, the Venetians 
were once more victorious over the Norman fleet in the following spring, and 
continued to blockade Robert’s army.29 
However, in the first half of 1082, the Normans had managed to conquer 
Dyrrachion thanks to its betrayal by Domenico, one of the many Venetians whom 
Alexios had entrusted with the defence of the city.30 The numerous Venetian 
casualties during the Norman attack led to ‘dismay and anger’ in Venice, probably 
contributing to the forced abdication of Doge Domenico Selvo, who was succeeded 
by Vitale Falier (c. 1084-96).31 
Yet, the Venetians continued to be an important ally of the Byzantines. 
According to William of Apulia, they had a key role in the recapture of Dyrrachion in 
the summer of 1083. Taking advantage of Robert’s return to Italy, they managed to 
reacquire the city (except for the citadel, which remained under Norman control), 
and set up their camp near its harbour. After this feat, many Venetians returned to 
their homeland as their property had been neglected for a long time. Furthermore, 
their fleet was probably no longer needed because most of the Norman navy had 
accompanied Robert back to Southern Italy. Indeed, as was noted above, Robert 
had returned to the Mezzogiorno in April 1082 to subdue a rebellion that the 
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Byzantines had stirred up.32 During Guiscard’s absence, there seem to have been 
some unsuccessful peace negotiations between the Byzantines and the Normans, 
which were presumably started by Alexios, and conducted near Thessalonica. The 
only source which mentions these talks is a typikon issued by the Byzantine 
general Gregory Pakourianos in Thessalonica in December 1083. According to the 
text of this document, Alexios I had given Patriarch Euthymios of Jerusalem the 
task of brokering peace negotiations with the Normans.33 
Although Robert was forced to remain in Southern Italy for more than two 
years by this further rebellion and by Henry IV’s campaign against Gregory VII, he 
managed to return to the Balkans in autumn 1084. This led the Venetians once 
more to be asked for help in return for a reimbursement of their expenses and the 
conferral of further benefits.34 According to Anna, the Venetians engaged in three 
battles, and were successful in the first two (of which the Alexiad is the only 
source). However, thanks to the help of a Venetian renegade, Robert prevailed in 
the third one, after which he allegedly tortured many of the Venetians, and then 
unsuccessfully tried to initiate peace talks. Alexios nevertheless rewarded the 
Venetians for their loyalty with extensive commercial concessions, and by granting 
generous stipends to the doge and to the Patriarch of Grado. According to Anna 
Komnene, the Venetians took part in one more naval battle against the Normans. 
The battle was fought near Butrint, and it was ‘a conclusive [Venetian] victory’.35 
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1092?’, Byzantinoslavica, 42 (1981), 171-85 (pp. 174-82). 
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Finally, after Robert’s death in July 1085, Alexios I persuaded the Venetians who 
resided in Constantinople to write to their fellow countrymen in Dyrrachion, who 
were unwilling to cede this city back to the Byzantines. The letter of the Venetians 
of Constantinople and the money of the emperor eventually persuaded them and 
the other inhabitants of Dyrrachion to hand the city back to Alexios.36 
This event led to the end of the first attempted Balkan invasion by the 
Normans of Southern Italy. Even though this attack came to an end mainly because 
of Robert’s death, Venice undoubtedly had an important role in contesting the 
advance of the invading army. In particular, the Venetian navy had a crucial role in 
1081. Its victory against Robert’s fleet prevented the duke from receiving supplies 
and reinforcements from Italy until the following year, thus slowing down the 
Norman advance in the Balkans. 
However, two further pieces of evidence seem to suggest that there was a 
faction among the Venetians that did not support an alliance with the Byzantines. 
The first hint seems to be the deposition of Domenico Selvo after the Norman 
conquest of Dyrrachion. Anna Komnene in particular suggests that after this event 
the Venetians withdrew their navy, and that they sent it to Epirus once again only 
after a new series of concessions and promises by Alexios. The second indication 
seems to be the presence in Dyrrachion in 1085 of a nucleus of anti-Byzantine 
Venetians, who did not want the city to be handed over to the basileus after 
Guiscard’s death. Yet, even though the leader of this faction appears to have been 
the same Domenico who had betrayed the Venetians, and allowed Robert Guiscard 
to enter the city, it is quite likely that in this case he wanted to keep Dyrrachion for 
himself, rather than hold it for the Normans.37 
ii) From 1085 to 1107 
In the following two decades, no conflict took place between the main 
protagonists in the Balkan war that had ended in 1085. Roger Borsa’s disputed 
inheritance meant that mainland Southern Italy was no longer united, and this 
effectively prevented any offensive foreign policy in the East. By contrast, while the 
Byzantines had suffered a new and serious military crisis around 1090, they soon 
managed to resolve it. Alexios succeeded in restoring Byzantine authority in the 
Balkans after defeating the Pechenegs and the Cumans. In 1091-92 he had also 
reconstructed the imperial navy, thus being able to defeat the Turkish emir 
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Tzachas, and to put an end to his frequent raids against the Aegean islands. 
Finally, despite the later struggles with the new Frankish states in the East, the First 
Crusade helped the Byzantines to recover control over most of the Western coast 
of Anatolia. The economy had also recovered thanks to a serious of fiscal 
measures, and to the confirmation (and, possibly, augmentation) of the commercial 
concessions to Venice, which was aimed at attracting foreign capital into the 
empire.38 Even though the Venetians and the Byzantines did not engage in any 
conflict together until 1107, they nevertheless maintained good relations. These 
relations also manifested themselves in the presence of Greek craftsmen in Venice. 
In particular, in 1105, one of them made some considerable additions to the Pala 
d’Oro, an extremely precious altar piece that Pietro II Orseolo had ordered from 
Constantinople in the late tenth century, and which has remained in St Mark’s 
Basilica ever since – though its current aspect is the result of some later additions 
from the early thirteenth, and from the fourteenth centuries.39 
However, Venice’s main political concerns during these years were not 
directly linked either with Byzantium or with Southern Italy. They were rather the 
Hungarian conquest of Dalmatia, and the First Crusade. 
a) Venice and the Hungarians 
The end of the eleventh century witnessed the political rise of Hungary in 
Central Europe. After initially struggling to defend their lands against the ambitions 
of the German Empire, in the final decades of this century the Hungarian monarchs 
expanded their kingdom into the Balkans by annexing Croatia. As a result, at the 
turn of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Hungary became an important political 
entity in the Western Balkans, and in the Adriatic area. 
Hungarian involvement in Dalmatia began as a consequence of the wedding 
between Demeter Zvonimir (who was not yet King of Croatia), and a sister of the 
then-Hungarian duke Ladislaus, which took place in the 1060s. Since Demeter 
Zvonimir died with no issue in 1089, his brother-in-law, who had since become King 
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Ladislaus I of Hungary (1077-95) intervened to claim Croatia for himself. Ladislaus 
conquered most of the inland areas of Croatia, but did not manage to reach 
Dalmatia, as a Cuman raid forced him to return to Hungary. Yet, he nevertheless 
imposed his own nephew Álmos as the new King of Croatia.40 Since in this same 
year the Cumans had fought alongside Alexios I against the Pechenegs, the 
emperor may well have invited them to attack Hungary in order to prevent 
Ladislaus from conquering Dalmatia, which was still formally under imperial 
control.41 It is interesting to note that, even though by 1092 the Doge of Venice had 
received the investiture over Croatia from the Byzantines, the Venetians did not 
intervene against the Hungarians.42 Perhaps Doge Vitale Falier did not want to 
pursue an aggressive policy in the Adriatic area so soon after the loss of many men 
in the conflict against Robert Guiscard. Nor can we exclude the possibility that the 
Venetians would have intervened only in case of an actual Hungarian conquest of 
Dalmatia, which in the event did not take place. 
After a Croatian noble named Peter had forced Álmos out of Croatia, and 
replaced him as king, the Hungarians reacted by attacking Croatia again in 1097, 
under King Coloman (1095-1116). The Hungarians killed Peter, and managed to 
conquer Croatia; yet, they only captured a few Dalmatian cities. Amongst these, we 
can probably include Zadar, as in 1097 Busilla (Roger I of Sicily’s daughter) landed 
in this city while on her way to Hungary, where she married King Coloman.43 
This time, the Hungarian campaign in Croatia was followed by a Venetian 
intervention in Dalmatia. A Venetian fleet (possibly before reaching the Holy Land 
to join the First Crusade) stopped in Split, where the priors and the people of the 
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city recognised Doge Vitale I Michiel (1096-1101) as their lord. They also swore to 
prepare one sagina (a kind of ship that employed both oars and sails, and was 
particularly suited for piratical and commercial activities) or two galleys, ready to 
join the Venetian fleet when it arrived there. Since a similar pact appears to have 
been signed in Trogir in 1097 or 1098, it is quite likely that the Venetians stopped 
there before they reached Split.44 It was probably following this intervention in 
Dalmatia that Venice and Hungary reached an agreement (in 1098 or 1101) which 
appears to have defined their respective spheres of influence. Coloman of Hungary 
probably recognised the Venetian overlordship over Dalmatia, since he referred to 
Vitale Michiel as ‘Duke of Croatia and Dalmatia’, while Venice in return probably 
recognised the Hungarian sovereignty over the rest of Croatia.45 According to both 
Paolino da Venezia (the author of a chronicle written in the first half of the 
fourteenth century) and Andrea Dandolo, this treaty was soon followed by a joint 
Hungarian-Venetian expedition against some Apulian cities. Yet, we shall see that it 
would make much more sense to date such a campaign to 1108, and hence, this 
earlier expedition probably never happened.46 
Despite this agreement, King Coloman nevertheless annexed Dalmatia 
between 1105 and 1107.47 Yet, the Venetians decided not to intervene, probably 
mainly because they were mostly preoccupied by the situation in the Holy Land and 
in Northern Italy. Yet, another factor to take into consideration is that between 1104 
and 1105 Hungary and Byzantium had agreed on a matrimonial alliance – Alexios’s 
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son and heir-apparent John married Ladislaus’s daughter Piroska. Therefore, the 
Venetians were possibly afraid that, if they had intervened in Dalmatia against the 
Hungarians, they would have severed their ties with the Eastern Empire, as Alexios 
Komnenos would not have approved such a military action.48 
b) Venice and the First Crusade 
Even though the First Crusade was a major event for most of Western 
Europe, most scholars have suggested that Venice only reluctantly took part in it. 
The Venetians, it has been argued, were afraid that a major involvement in the 
crusade might compromise their good commercial relations with the Byzantines 
and with the Muslim world, especially in Antioch. Indeed, while it was obvious that 
the Turks and the Arabs were enemies of the crusade, not even Alexios I looked at 
this expedition in a favourable light. He was especially afraid that the actual goal of 
most of its leaders, and in particular of Guiscard’s son Bohemond, was 
Constantinople, rather than Jerusalem. Therefore, even though some Venetians 
may have joined the crusade earlier, a significant number of ships left Venice for 
the Levant only in 1099. The Venetians probably decided to intervene after 
realising that it was highly likely that the Christian expedition would achieve its 
goals, and out of fear that, if they failed to act, the Pisans and the Genoese might 
exercise a duopoly on trade with the Christian Holy Land.49 However, this view has 
been recently disputed by Pryor. He argues that if the Venetian fleet left the Adriatic 
so late, this was due to the considerable duration of the preparations. Indeed, the 
scale of the naval involvement during the First Crusade was unprecedented, and a 
considerable effort was needed to organise such an enterprise. In the case of 
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Venice – which by then did not have a strong enough navy –, this meant that it had 
to build many ships specifically for this purpose.50 
Once their fleet was ready, the Venetians stopped in Zadar and in Split 
(where the representatives of this city recognised its submission to Venice), then 
they wintered near Rhodes. There, according to the author of the Translatio Sancti 
Nicolai, the Byzantines with threats and gifts tried to dissuade them from helping 
the Frankish States in the Levant. This attempt was unsuccessful, as, following a 
persuasive speech by a cleric, the Venetians decided to continue their expedition. 
However, their first military actions were apparently not undertaken against the 
Muslims. Indeed, even though the veracity of the sources mentioning this naval 
battle have been called into question by Pryor, the Venetian fleet probably first 
fought (and prevailed over) the Pisans, who were bothering them and the Byzantine 
ships. Then, the Venetians stopped in the Anatolian town of Myra, where they 
captured those relics of St Nicholas that had not already been taken by the citizens 
of Bari in 1087, as well as the body of Nicholas’s homonymous uncle. Only after 
this did the Venetians assist the crusaders. While, despite this belated help from 
Venice, the Christians failed in their attempt to conquer Acre, the Adriatic city did 
contribute to the conquest of the small port of Haifa, and obtained one third of this 
town. The Venetians were also granted trade exemptions in Haifa itself, in Jaffa, 
and in Bohemond of Hauteville’s principality of Antioch. The ships then set sail 
towards Venice, returning there in December 1100.51 
iii) Bohemond’s Campaign in the Balkans 
a) Bohemond’s Motivations for Invading the Balkans 
In order to explain why Bohemond attacked the Byzantine Empire in 1107-
08, we need to look at the previous relations between Robert Guiscard’s son and 
Byzantium. The surviving sources disagree on whether when he joined the 
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crusade, Bohemond had already planned to attack Byzantium, both in order to 
complete his father’s unfinished business, and to exact revenge against Alexios I.52 
Bohemond initially seemed (or, more likely, pretended) to be willing to cooperate 
with the basileus, and even to serve under him: Robert’s son unsuccessfully asked 
to be appointed grand domestikos of the East, and then Alexios seems to have 
been willing to grant him an extensive appanage which was located beyond 
Antioch, and was still under Muslim control. Yet, soon afterwards, in February 
1098, during the siege of Antioch, some explicit hostility towards the Byzantines 
arose. Tatikios, the imperial general who was accompanying the crusaders, left the 
besiegers, promising to return with more armed forces. Yet, Tatikios failed to keep 
his oath, and did not return with reinforcements, but the Westerners nevertheless 
eventually managed to capture Antioch (but not its citadel) on their own.53 Relations 
with the Byzantines worsened even more after Alexios Komnenos, who was 
supposed to join the Westerners with reinforcements, eventually decided to retreat, 
and abandon them, when he found out that the crusaders were about to be 
attacked by a huge Turkish army. However, the Christians, led by Bohemond, 
managed to defeat their enemies, and also to obtain the surrender of the garrison 
that still controlled the citadel of Antioch. Bohemond then took advantage of this 
situation, and of the prestige he had acquired, to take over Antioch for himself, 
making it the centre of a principality. Since Antioch had been under direct Eastern 
imperial control until a few decades earlier, and the crusade leaders had sworn to 
hand over to Alexios all the cities that had been under eastern imperial control, the 
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Byzantines deeply resented Bohemond’s action. The Norman leader nevertheless 
refused to hand the city over to Alexios. He claimed that the emperor had not kept 
his word to provide military help to the crusaders, thus making the agreements 
concluded in Constantinople void.54 
As a result, while most of the leaders of the expedition continued their 
march, and eventually conquered Jerusalem, a conflict broke out between 
Bohemond and his nephew Tancred, and Alexios I. In addition to Antioch (which 
the emperor claimed for himself), the other disputed territories were mainly the port 
of Laodikeia, and the region of Cilicia, both extremely important for strategic and 
economic reasons.55 
After the Turkish victory at Harran in May 1104, the situation for Bohemond 
seemed to be extremely bleak, as many towns which were previously under his 
control rebelled against his authority. Furthermore, the Byzantines had recovered 
control over both Cilicia and Laodikeia (except for its citadel). The difficult situation 
that his principality was facing led Bohemond to decide to return to Western Europe 
to recruit a new army.56 He eventually arrived in Italy in the first months of 1105, 
and, according to Anna Komnene, just before the end of his voyage, whilst in Corfu, 
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he informed Alexios that he would soon attack Romania with a huge Western 
army.57 
Yet, before he began to prepare this expedition, Bohemond, accompanied 
by a papal legate, went to France, as he had made a vow while he was being kept 
imprisoned by the Turks (1100-03). He had sworn that, if he had even regained his 
freedom, he would have gone on a pilgrimage to St Leonard’s sanctuary in Noblat. 
In addition, while in France, the prince married Constance, a daughter of the 
French king Philip I, and launched an extensive campaign of anti-Byzantine 
propaganda. His aim was to recruit men for a crusade against Alexios I, whom he 
deemed to be the main responsible for the recent setbacks of the Crusader 
States.58 Bohemond had probably managed to convince Pope Paschal II (1099-
1118) of Alexios’s hostility towards the Christians by presenting to him some non-
Christian Scythian prisoners who had fought alongside the Byzantines. 
Furthermore, the prince may have convinced the pontiff that his expedition was 
aimed at replacing Alexios, a usurper, with a legitimate and pro-Western ruler: a 
man who claimed to be the son of Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes (1068-71), and 
who, according to Orderic Vitalis, had accompanied him during his French journey. 
Thus, the pontiff appears to have given his consent to Bohemond’s crusading 
plans.59 
b) Bohemond’s Invasion 
Bohemond eventually sailed eastwards from Apulia in October 1107. 
However, the Byzantine Empire was now much stronger than it had been when 
Robert invaded the Balkans in 1081. Alexios was now firmly on the Byzantine 
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throne, and was also ready to face an attack from Southern Italy: he had spent 
many months between 1105 and 1106 in Thessalonica, where he had organised 
the Byzantine forces in the Western Balkans, and appointed his nephew Alexios 
Komnenos as the new governor of Dyrrachion. Furthermore, to judge by the time of 
Guiscard’s attack, the emperor had also gained the alliance of the Hungarians, 
after his own son John had married Piroska, a Magyar princess.60 
Alexios nevertheless resorted to a defensive strategy, and thus ordered the 
commander of his fleet, Isaac Kontostephanos, to try to prevent Bohemond’s 
convoys from crossing the Strait of Otranto. However, the order was disobeyed, 
and Kontostephanos instead attacked Otranto itself, only to be defeated by the 
Normans. Isaac did not even manage to prevent Bohemond from reaching the 
Balkans, and so the prince of Antioch could easily disembark in Avlona. He 
plundered most of the coastline, besieged Dyrrachion, and conquered some of its 
neighbourhoods. However, despite a long siege, Dyrrachion did not fall to 
Bohemond, who was decisively defeated by the Byzantines in two pitched battles. 
This forced him to surrender, and to sign the Treaty of Devol in September 1108. 
Bohemond obtained the title of sebastos with a pension of 200 pounds of gold per 
year, and became a vassal of Alexios and of his son John. In addition, Bohemond 
was formally granted control of Antioch and of some of its surrounding areas as a 
personal (and not inheritable) gift from Alexios. Bohemond was also forced to 
appoint a Greek patriarch in Antioch, and to promise to wage war against his 
nephew Tancred until the latter ended his hostilities against Byzantium.61 
In addition to the timely preparations, another important aspect that made it 
possible for Alexios to prevail over Bohemond was the success of his diplomatic 
activity. While even in this case (as we shall see below) the emperor obtained 
some help from Venice, on this occasion the Byzantine agents also achieved 
significant success when they tried to stir up discord in Bohemond’s army. The 
main plan appears to have been that a Byzantine messenger approached the 
Norman leader pretending that to be a deserter. He handed over to the prince 
some letters which had been written ‘as though in reply to some of Bohemond’s 
most intimate friends’, who included Guy of Hauteville (another of Guiscard’s sons) 
and Richard of the Principate (a nephew of Robert), but were actually fraudulent. In 
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these epistles Alexios promised very generous gifts to the addressees, thus trying 
to deceive Bohemond into thinking that his main commanders were betraying him. 
However, the plan of the basileus (which has significant similarities with some 
stratagems written by Polyaenos in the mid-second century CE, and by Emperor 
Leo VI the Wise in 903-04) did not work out as well as he hoped. After Bohemond 
opened the letters, he made sure that the supposed recipients of the imperial 
letters were guarded, but in the end decided not to punish any of them.62 
Despite the failure of this plan, Alexios nonetheless managed to convince 
some of Bohemond’s commanders to desert and join his army. Among them were 
Robert of Montfort (a former vassal of King Henry I of England), Guy (who had 
already briefly joined the Byzantines some years earlier), William of Claret, and 
Marinus Neapolites, who is probably to be identified with a noble from Amalfi.63 All 
these men, together with some others from Southern Italy who had previously 
deserted to Alexios (Roger, Peter Aliphas, and Humbert, probably a son of Raoul), 
and along with Richard of the Principate (hence, he as well is likely to have 
deserted Bohemond), witnessed the signing of the Treaty of Devol as imperial 
delegates. Quite interestingly, all the signatories were Westerners (including some 
envoys from Hungary). Alexios probably felt that, by doing so, it was likelier that the 
terms of the treaty would be enforced in Western Europe. Possibly, the emperor 
also thought that Bohemond would only observe the agreement if some of his 
relatives and former allies had sworn to respect it. Finally, another reason why 
there were many Normans amongst the subscribers of the agreement was probably 
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that Alexios wanted as many signatories as possible to come from Bohemond’s kin, 
in order to humiliate his enemy.64 
c) The Military Role of Venice 
As briefly mentioned above, the Venetians helped the Byzantines also on 
this occasion, although their role was not as prominent as it had been during 
Robert Guiscard’s Balkan campaigns. For once, the Alexiad is not the main source 
on the intervention of Venice in the conflict, as Anna Komnene only mentions that 
her father asked the Venetians (as well as the Genoese and to the Pisans) not to 
join Bohemond’s Balkan campaign.65 However, the Venetian sources provide more 
details. The Annales Venetici breves mention that the doge sent a fleet against 
Bohemond, while Andrea Dandolo reports that Alexios asked for help from Venice 
when he realised that Epirus was about to be attacked. Even though no specific 
concessions appear to have been granted to Venice and despite the difficulties of 
sailing in winter, Ordelaffo Falier nevertheless sent a huge navy that joined the 
imperial one in December 1107. The allies forced Bohemond to surrender.66 
However, it is also possible that during this conflict Venice, together with the 
Hungarians, also conducted a campaign in Apulia against Bohemond. Simon of 
Kéza’s Gesta Hungarorum, written between 1282 and 1285, is the earliest source 
to mention this expedition, which, according to this chronicler, took place during 
Coloman’s reign, and under his command. According to this account, the 
Hungarians and the Venetians conquered the cities of Brindisi and Monopoli. The 
former raided Apulia for three months, and then their king sailed back to Dalmatia. 
Even though some Hungarian troops remained in Apulia under a captain, the 
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control of the cities was handed over to the Venetians, who kept them until William 
iunior rex of Sicily managed to conquer them back with the aid of the Pisans.67 
In the early fourteenth century Paolino da Venezia ‘borrowed’ Simon of 
Kéza’s account, but dated it to the reign of Emperor Henry IV (which ended in 
1105), and then Andrea Dandolo and Pseudo-Pietro Giustinian copied Paolino’s 
text into their chronicles, and placed this event at the end of Vitale I Michiel’s 
dogeship (Vitale died in 1101).68 However, it is highly unlikely that this Apulian 
expedition took place so early, just a few years after Coloman had married the 
daughter of Roger I, who thus was Bohemond’s cousin. The only possible 
explanation might be that Coloman had attacked Southern Italy to claim some of 
the lands of his father-in-law – for Roger I had died in June 1101. However, this 
explanation is hardly convincing, since Roger did not own any land in Apulia.69 In 
addition, it seems much more likely that the Hungarians took part in a military 
action against a power that was hostile to the Byzantines (even though, at this 
point, not necessarily overtly) only after reaching an alliance with Alexios, thus after 
1104-05. One might also be sceptical as to whether the Venetians actually had the 
military strength to intervene in Southern Italy in 1100 or 1101. As previously 
mentioned (see pp. 64-65), in 1099-1100 Venice was strongly involved in a 
crusading expedition. Therefore, since the men who fought for the Adriatic city were 
inhabitants recruited for the occasion, it seems rather unlikely that Venice had 
enough men to engage in another contemporary military activity, or in one taking 
place so soon afterwards.70 
However, another and more plausible dating for this expedition has been 
suggested. Some scholars have argued that it took place during the conflict 
between Bohemond and the Byzantines. The main hint is that some Hungarian 
legates witnessed the signing of the Treaty of Devol (which marked the end of 
Bohemond’s hostilities with Alexios), thus suggesting that the Hungarians as well 
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might have been involved in this conflict.71 Another point that supports the 
hypothesis that this Hungarian-Venetian campaign took place in 1107-08 (and not 
in the first half of the decade) is, as mentioned above, the sealing of a matrimonial 
alliance between Hungary and Byzantium, which had taken place a few years 
earlier. Last but not least, since Bohemond had set sail towards the Balkans from 
Brindisi (and Monopoli is not far from Brindisi), invading this area would have 
threatened Bohemond’s Apulian bases, and prevented the prince of Antioch from 
receiving supplies from Italy while he was in the Balkans.72 
However, there are other elements which make the situation slightly more 
complex. In particular, Bohemond did not rule over either Monopoli or Brindisi in the 
early twelfth century. Even though in 1107 Bohemond issued from Bari an 
extensive privilege to the monastery of St Stephen near Monopoli, this town was 
not under his rule, and we should note that the monastery did not receive from 
Bohemond any exemption or concession in Monopoli itself in the privilege, but only 
in other Apulian areas (including Oria and Taranto).73 Monopoli was under the rule 
of Robert of Conversano (the grandson of one of Guiscard’s sisters), and he 
probably also held Brindisi, even though some documentary evidence hints that his 
mother Sikelgaita had an important role in Brindisi.74 
Furthermore, when, in 1089, a dispute had arisen over whether Oria or 
Brindisi should be a bishopric, Robert of Conversano’s father Geoffrey had backed 
the case of Brindisi against Bohemond, who had supported the case of Oria.75 This 
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dispute re-emerged in the 1100s, during Robert’s rule over Brindisi. This suggests 
that Bohemond and the counts of Conversano were rivals, not allies. Despite 
Giordano’s suggestion that the Bishop of Brindisi might have moved to Oria 
because Brindisi had been occupied by the ‘Schiavoni’, there seems to be no 
evidence supporting this statement. Thus, it seems likely that the relations between 
Bohemond and Robert were quite strained in the second half of this decade. The 
extended concessions and exemptions of Bohemond’s privilege for the monastery 
near Monopoli, might also be interpreted as a challenge to Geoffrey’s authority in 
the area.76 
So, if we are to believe Simon of Kéza’s account, the Venetians and 
Hungarians actually attacked lands owned not by Bohemond, but by an adversary 
of his. Given also the problems about Simon’s dating of these events, there must 
be considerable doubt regarding the reliability of this account. In fact, Simon’s 
Gesta, written 150 years after the events, are the earliest source mentioning them. 
Despite the brevity of the Southern Italian chronicles dealing with the early twelfth 
century, and despite the scarcity of charters issued in those years in Monopoli and 
Brindisi, this seems quite suspicious. In addition, the passage from Simon of Kéza 
contains some other inaccuracies. The title of King of Sicily did not exist in the first 
decade of the twelfth century, nor had either the future William II or his father 
William I yet been born. A William who was then alive was Duke William of Apulia 
(whom Andrea Dandolo incorrectly called ‘King of Apulia’), but, since he was still a 
minor when he inherited his ducal title in 1111, he could not have led an army some 
years earlier.77 Therefore, this part of the chronicle does not seem to be reliable at 
all. This passage might have been added by Simon, who wrote his chronicle mainly 
for propagandist purposes, and whose work was mainly aimed at being read by an 
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Italian audience, in order to emphasise the rights that Hungary claimed to have 
over the Adriatic area in the late thirteenth century.78 
To conclude, if the Venetians and the Hungarians did launch an attack 
against Apulia in the first decade of the twelfth century, an 1107-08 dating of this 
campaign seems to be the likeliest. However, the inaccuracy and the lateness of 
the main source about this military expedition does not allow us to draw any 
decisive conclusion. 
iv) From 1108 to 1118 
After the signing of the Treaty of Devol, there were no more direct hostilities 
between the Byzantines and Norman Southern Italy for around forty years. Yet, it 
has been suggested that the negotiations between Alexios and Pope Paschal II in 
1112 might have also been aimed at testing the water for an attempt to try and 
regain Southern Italy for the Byzantine Empire.79 However, since he was then 
involved in conflicts in the East, it is extremely unlikely that the basileus intended to 
recover the Mezzogiorno at this time. Hence, Alexios’s negotiations with the 
Papacy are rather to be interpreted as an attempt to divert the pontiff’s attention 
from the Byzantine campaigns against the Crusader Principality of Antioch. The 
precedent of Bohemond’s campaign of 1107-08 was still a fresh wound, and the 
basileus wanted to prevent the pontiff from supporting a further anti-Byzantine 
expedition from the West.80 Until 1118 (when Alexios I died), Venice was not 
involved in any military activity against Southern Italian powers either. However, the 
Venetians did take part in some operations in the Holy Land, and fought against the 
Hungarians for control over Dalmatia.  
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a) Venice and the Frankish States in the Levant 
After their late intervention in the First Crusade, the Venetians did not 
officially send further fleets to the Levant in the following decade. Both natural 
catastrophes – Malamocco, the old centre of Venice, was submerged – and their 
involvement in the Byzantine conflict with Bohemond, as well as in some other 
disputes that had emerged in North-Eastern Italy, prevented them from doing so. 
Indeed, while in August 1108 some Venetian ships took part in an unsuccessful 
expedition against Sidon, these vessels were probably owned by private traders 
and pirates from Venice. They were ‘not organized crusading fleets’.81 
However, this situation appears to have changed in 1110, when, according 
to Andrea Dandolo, out of fear that the Pisans and the Genoese might establish a 
commercial duopoly in the area, the Venetians blockaded Sidon, and assisted in its 
conquest.82 Probably as a reward for their military help, the Venetians were granted 
some commercial and juridical concessions in Acre, where the Genoese had 
already established a colony. The Venetians probably insisted on obtaining these 
privileges in Acre, as this city was the important port of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. 
Furthermore, while most of the hinterland of Sidon is cut off by the mountains, the 
much better location of Acre facilitated commercial contact with the main Syrian 
market, Damascus, and with the spice route.83 
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b) Venice and the Hungarians 
The Venetian-Hungarian alliance did not last long. Venice probably felt that 
the advantages of directly controlling Dalmatia outweighed the benefits of an 
alliance with the country which ruled over this region. The Venetians were probably 
already planning an attack against the Hungarians in 1112. In this year, the 
Patriarch of Grado Giovanni Gradenigo (possibly together with Giovanni Morosini, 
who is referred to as a legate of the doge in a charter issued in Halmyros in 1112) 
visited Constantinople in order to obtain Alexios’s help in recovering Dalmatia.84 
The Venetians possibly hoped that the Byzantines would be willing to provide some 
military help as some sort of compensation for the concessions that the Pisans had 
obtained in the empire in the previous year. Indeed, since the Pisans had had the 
kommerkion (a tax that was paid whenever goods coming from outside the empire, 
or from different customs jurisdictions within the empire, were traded) reduced from 
ten percent to four percent, this had marked the end of the Venetian commercial 
monopoly in Romania. Therefore, it is possible that Venice hoped to receive 
support as compensation for the consequent loss of revenue and commercial 
advantage. The emperor accepted this proposal, but suggested that the military 
operation be delayed, and in the end such an expedition was never launched.85 
Alexios probably procrastinated because he did not want to break his own 
alliance with the Hungarians. Doing so would have probably had adversely affected 
his contemporary negotiations with the pope, who appeared to have recently 
recognised the Hungarian authority over Croatia at the Council of Guastalla in 
October 1106. Furthermore, undertaking a campaign in the West was hardly 
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practical since Alexios was then involved in a conflict with the Principality of 
Antioch, and the Turks were also planning to attack his empire.86 In addition, the 
relations between Byzantium and Venice may well have worsened fairly recently, 
after a Venetian had stolen the relics of St Stephen, and taken them from 
Constantinople to Venice in 1110. This incident probably had a resounding echo in 
Byzantium, since a few decades later, it inspired an ethopoeia by Michael Italikos, 
and may have led to a more cautious imperial attitude towards Venice.87 
In the end, between August 1115 and May 1116, Doge Ordelaffo Falier 
twice led naval campaigns against Dalmatia, even without Byzantine military 
assistance, and conquered the whole region. However, when the Hungarians 
counterattacked in 1117 the doge was killed in battle. Despite Falier’s death, the 
Venetians nevertheless defeated the Hungarians, thus maintaining control over 
Dalmatia.88 
v) Conclusions 
The years of Alexios I’s reign in the Byzantine Empire witnessed a great 
increase in Venetian political power in the Adriatic area. In the first half of the 1080s 
Venice played a crucial role in the Byzantine resistance to Robert Guiscard’s 
advance into the Balkans. The Venetian navy prevented the Norman duke from 
receiving supplies from Southern Italy, thus hindering Robert’s plans, and its help 
was essential for the recovery of Dyrrachion from the Normans. However, when 
Bohemond invaded the Balkans in 1107-08, the Venetians probably only played a 
marginal role, even though some later (and quite unreliable) sources suggest that, 
together with the Hungarians, they attacked Apulia. 
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In these years, Hungary also extended its influence and territorial rule, and 
started to play an important role in the Adriatic area. During the early twelfth 
century, the Hungarians annexed mainland Croatia, and briefly extended their 
dominion over Dalmatia. At first, this expansion did not bother Venice, which signed 
a treaty with Hungary, and possibly joined the Hungarians in an expedition against 
Apulia. However, the Venetians eventually reacted militarily against the Hungarian 
supremacy over Dalmatia in 1115. Not only did the Venetians manage to assume 
control over this region, but they were also able to defend it against a Hungarian 
attempt at recovering it. 
Venetian activity was not limited to the Adriatic area, for Venice also took 
part in the Latin expansion in the Levant. Some Venetian ships helped the 
Westerners in their conquest of Haifa in 1100, and of Sidon in 1110. This first 
intervention was highly praised in Venice since the Adriatic sailors returned to their 
homeland with some of St Nicholas’s relics. The second expedition proved to be 
profitable commercially, for the Venetians were granted possessions and trade 
privileges in Acre, one of the most important centres of the newly-established 
Frankish States. 
Alexios I died in 1118, and was succeeded by his son John II. The 
beginning of Alexios’s reign had been marked by a series of serious military threats 
to the empire. However, the basileus had managed to defeat his enemies, and by 
the time of his death, Byzantium was politically much stronger than it had been in 
the early 1080s. However, these military victories had been achieved mainly thanks 
to an efficient use of diplomacy. Indeed, the Venetians, Henry IV, and the Norman 
rebels, provided crucial direct or indirect help when Alexios was under attack by 
Robert Guiscard, thus preventing the duke from penetrating too deep into the 
Balkans. Despite the issues regarding Antioch, Alexios also managed to use the 
First Crusade to his advantage, as the military help of the Western armies made it 
possible for him to recover most of Western Anatolia from the Turks. When 
Bohemond attacked the Balkans, the emperor was much more prepared to face 
him than he had been when Robert Guiscard had attacked him. Yet, the success of 
this conflict was also facilitated by the ability of Alexios’s agents, who managed to 
persuade many of the key enemy commanders to desert Bohemond, and join the 
Byzantine army. 
Following the Treaty of Devol, Alexios did not have to face any threat from 
Southern Italy, where Guiscard’s heirs were struggling to keep the mainland of the 
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Mezzogiorno united, and did not have enough strength to launch a new campaign 
across the Strait of Otranto. There was nevertheless one main issue that Alexios 
had not solved, and that John II inherited from him, as the Byzantine sovereignty 
over Antioch was not to be accepted by any of the rulers or regents of the 
principality. Therefore, Antioch remained a thorn in the side of Alexios’s successor, 
and, due to the principality’s strong links with the West, both John II and, later, 
Manuel I would have to use a very extremely cautious approach whenever they 
wanted to undertake a campaign against Bohemond’s successors.  
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2) Commercial Relations 
We shall here analyse the pattern of Venetian trade between 1081 and 
1118. In particular, we shall focus on whether the commercial concessions granted 
to Venice led to an increase in the scale of mercantile operations in the Byzantine 
Empire. Despite the limited amount of data on commercial activities that we have, 
the surviving agreements suggest that Venice was nonetheless interested in 
acquiring a privileged commercial position not only in the Byzantine Empire, but 
also in the Crusader States. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Alexios issued his chrysobull for 
Venice in 1092, although the commercial privileges contained therein had probably 
already been granted in the previous decade. Amongst the different clauses, the 
Venetian merchants were exempted from paying the kommerkion whenever they 
traded in many cities of the Byzantine Empire. The cities mentioned in the bull are 
Laodikeia, Antioch, Mamistra, Adana, Tarsus, Antalya (which are in Syria, Cilicia 
and Pamphylia); Strobilos, Chios, Ephesus, Phocaea (in the Eastern Aegean, or on 
the Western coast of Anatolia); Dyrrachion, Valona, Corfu, Bonitza, Methoni, 
Coron, Nauplia, Corinth, Thebes, Athens, Negroponte, Demetrias (in central and 
Southern Greece; the final city would however lose its importance at the expense of 
the nearby Halmyros, where agricultural goods were often bought to be resold in 
Constantinople); Thessaloniki, Chrysoupolis (in Macedonia); Peritheorion, Abydos, 
Rodostos, Adrianople, Aprus, Heraclea, Selymbria (in Chersonesos and Thrace); 
and Constantinople.89 
Even though most of the cities mentioned in the charter were ports, and a 
majority of them were in the European part of the empire, some inland cities were 
also included in this list. The most important of these was probably Thebes, where 
the Venetians were already involved in trade before 1081 (see p. 45). Silk and 
pottery were produced in Thebes, and this city was efficiently connected with the 
main trading towns of Southern Greece and of the Peloponnese. In addition, 
Corinth was an extremely important commercial centre, mainly exporting cotton, 
olive oil, and glazed pottery, and so was Athens. Furthermore, after the export of 
grain became quite common in the twelfth century, Halmyros and Rodostos were 
two of the main imperial markets of this commodity. The inclusion of Chrysoupolis 
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and Peritheorion might be linked to their vicinity to the estates of the monastery of 
the Theotokos, an important agricultural centre, which probably commercialised 
part of the goods that it produced.90 On the other hand, Smyrna, most of the 
Aegean islands, Cyprus, and Crete were not included in this list, mainly for geo-
political reasons. In addition, no city by the Black Sea was mentioned either, 
probably because the Byzantines did not want to lose their monopoly on the grain 
trade of this region. Finally, another town that was excluded from the list is 
Monemvasia, possibly because of its centuries-long autonomy within the empire, 
and due to its great engagement in seafaring.91 Finally, another interesting aspect 
is that the Amalfitans who had a workshop in Constantinople were subjected to 
Venice, as they had to pay a tribute to St Mark’s church. This measure is probably 
to be linked with Amalfi’s submission to the Normans (in 1073), which had made its 
inhabitants subjects of Robert Guiscard.92 
The number of surviving commercial documents providing evidence of trade 
in the Mediterranean and Adriatic areas during this period is extremely limited. 
However, most of these charters (thirteen out of sixteen) record Venetian trade 
taking place in the Byzantine Empire.93 This seems to suggest that the preferred 
external maritime markets of Venice were probably the ones under imperial control. 
Furthermore, amongst the cities under Byzantine control, Constantinople seems to 
have been the main centre of Venetian activity, as eight documents either were 
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issued, or refer to trade, in this city.94 The charters provide evidence that Corinth 
too was an important commercial destination for the Venetian merchants. This is 
not entirely surprising, as the great number of stray copper coins from the eleventh 
and twelfth century that have been found in Corinth suggests that it was an 
extremely prosperous city in this period.95 Yet, the Venetians were also active in 
areas in which they had to pay the kommerkion: a quittance issued in March 1111, 
for example, records trade taking place in Crete. Since open sea sailing from Crete 
to Egypt was not yet practised in the early twelfth century, this document seems to 
suggest that the Venetians were indeed interested in this market, and not just using 
Crete as a mere stop towards Alexandria or Damietta.96 
Another aspect to be taken into consideration is that there is very little 
evidence of Venetian trade in the years in which Venice was involved in major 
conflicts. This is mainly because, as was pointed out by William of Apulia, the men 
serving in the navy were not professionals, but ordinary Venetian inhabitants, 
including merchants, who had to serve in the navy when needed. Indeed, in the 
following decades, the Venetian government would often issue a decree ordering 
its traders to return to their homeland to fight for Venice.97 Thus, only one charter 
per conflict was issued when Venice was, respectively, fighting alongside the 
Byzantines against Robert Guiscard, and involved in the First Crusade.98 
Furthermore, there is no direct surviving evidence for commercial activity either 
during Bohemond’s Balkan campaign, or at the time of Ordelaffo Falier’s Dalmatian 
campaigns.99 One exception to this pattern can be made for the Venetian 
involvement in the Levant in 1110. Indeed, around this time, the relics of St 
Stephen were transferred from Constantinople to Venice on a Venetian mercantile 
ship full of young Venetian nobles who were probably there to trade. In addition, 
there is also some direct evidence of the involvement of Venetians in trade in 
Byzantium in the form of private charters (one of which was issued by a man who 
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had been aboard the ship transporting the relics). This appears to confirm that 
Venice took part in this expedition with fairly limited forces, and not with anywhere 
near as many as the one hundred ships suggested by Andrea Dandolo.100 
However, the Venetians did not only trade in Byzantine cities. Some other 
destinations were under Muslim control: there is indeed evidence of Venetian 
commerce in Tripoli in 1083, in Antioch in 1095, and in Damietta in 1111.101 Thus, 
Venice was still involved in trade with the Muslims, both before and after the First 
Crusade. 
The Venetians also obtained trading privileges in the newly-born Frankish 
States in the Levant. In 1098-99, they obtained some concessions in Antioch. 
However, the text of this document has not survived, so we do not know what 
exactly Venice obtained.102 The Venetians were also granted properties in the 
Crusader States. More precisely, they obtained half of Tripoli, and one third of Acre, 
while the Venetian church of St Mark obtained limited properties in Tripoli. In Acre, 
the Venetian merchants were also granted freedom and immunity from the 
authorities of the kingdom.103 
Despite the numerous concessions obtained in this area, only one charter, 
which was issued in early 1104, records evidence of an actual Venetian 
involvement in trade in the Crusader States. It refers to the transport of food 
(victualia) from Otranto to Antioch.104 This charter is interesting for two other 
reasons. It suggests the existence of a commercial network linking the Italian and 
the Eastern possessions of the Hautevilles. Furthermore, it is one of a series of 
documents suggesting that, even though Venice fought against the rulers of 
Southern Italy, its merchants nevertheless conducted trade in the Mezzogiorno. 
Thus, in 1089, a Venetian merchant, Domenico Mastroscoli, was involved in 
commerce with both Constantinople and Lombardia (i.e. Southern Italy), while in 
1118 one Viviano da Molin conducted some trade in both Sicily and 
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Constantinople.105 Despite the frequent conflicts with the rulers of the Mezzogiorno, 
merchants from Southern Italy, and especially from Amalfi, nevertheless continued 
to trade in the Byzantine Empire. This is suggested by the clause in Alexios’s 
chrysobull which, in Constantinople, subjected the Amalfitan traders to the 
Venetians, and also by a series of charters. In particular, a document refers to a 
Venetian merchant attempting to travel from Halmyros to Constantinople on an 
Amalfitan vessel, and failing to do so because of a shipwreck. Further evidence can 
be found in three documents issued between 1089 and the following decade, which 
appear to record the presence of Amalfitan traders in Constantinople.106 
We also have evidence that some Venetian merchants were involved in 
commerce in regions geographically closer to their homeland. For instance, 
members of the Tiepolo family conducted trade in Sclavinia in the second half of 
the 1080s. In addition, a charter issued in 1095 refers to two Venetian merchants 
trading in the Colfo (i.e. in the Adriatic).107 Although neither document mentions 
what goods these merchants traded, we cannot exclude that they might have been 
slaves. Both contemporary and slightly later charters attest to the presence of 
Dalmatian servi in Venice.108 Yet, Venetian involvement in the slave trade is hard to 
demonstrate unequivocally since very few charters mention what goods were 
traded by the Venetian charters. The document issued in 1104, which refers to the 
transport of food from Apulia to Syria, is almost an exception.109 The only other 
charter mentioning what goods were traded was issued in August 1111. It records 
an agreement between a Venetian and a Greek merchant. The former was 
entrusted with some silk cloths in Constantinople that he was to sell in Damietta for 
an expected profit of 125 hyperperoi. We may recall that, according to Liudprand of 
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Cremona, in the mid-tenth century there was a ban on the export of purple silk from 
Constantinople. Since this charter records a Venetian merchant exporting silk to 
Egypt around 150 years later, we can assume either that this ban was no longer 
enforced, or that on this occasion the trader exported lesser quality silk.110 Despite 
the paucity of documentation regarding the goods traded, some further 
assumptions have been made. It has been suggested that the Venetians mainly 
exported raw materials (timber, copper, iron, gold, furs, and leather) into the 
Byzantine Empire. These goods had originally reached Venice from the Alps and 
from Germany.111  
Whilst not directly concerning traded goods, four charters, all issued in the 
1090s, quite interestingly record the loan of part of an anchor for undertaking 
voyages in various Adriatic and Mediterranean cities. At a first glance these 
documents might suggest the limited wealth of some of the merchants who traded 
in the Byzantine Empire in this period. However, this is not necessarily the case, as 
anchors were extremely valuable goods back then, and were even included in 
dowries, as can be inferred from a charter also issued in the 1090s.112 
This consideration leads us to ask ourselves whether we can point out 
people or families that were particularly active in trade. Unfortunately, the paucity of 
the documentation makes it extremely difficult do so. Yet, one exception can be 
made in the case of the Mastroscoli family. Between 1088 and 1112, two members 
of this family, both named Domenico (probably father and son), conducted five 
commercial operations in an area stretching from Southern Italy to Constantinople, 
but they were mainly active in Corinth. Even though they mainly acted as socii 
procertantes, the last of these documents records Domenico junior acting as the 
socius stans.113 Furthermore, a certain Matteo Mastroscoli (probably a relative of 
the two Domenicos) was also active in trade a few years later, in 1119. While in 
Bari, Matteo rented, together with other two Venetians, an anchor, in order to sail to 
Damietta and to Constantinople.114 
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Not all the relevant Venetian charters record mercantile activity, that is 
people importing and exporting goods; some other documents refer to properties 
within the Byzantine Empire that had been granted to the inhabitants of Venice. 
Even though we know that the Venetians also obtained land in the provinces – 
Alexios’s chrysobull explicitly mentions Dyrrachion –, we are best informed about 
the Constantinopolitan properties. These were areas that Alexios I had confiscated 
from private individuals and, probably, also from religious institutions, to donate 
them to Venice. Such confiscations were probably legitimate by Byzantine 
standards, as they were officially done in order to ‘protect the empire from external 
enemies’.115 Through these concessions, the Venetians had obtained lands located 
in the North of Constantinople, by the lower Golden Horn, close to Perama (the 
embarkation point for the suburb of Pera), and near the Saracen quarter. Amongst 
these donations, there was also a wharf named the scala maior or scala communis. 
The Venetians were granted land in an area which since Late Antiquity had only 
been of marginal importance, hence its value was limited. Furthermore, the 
basileus may have hoped that the arrival of foreign merchants would have led to an 
economic revival of the lower Golden Horn and of its quays. Yet, we must notice 
that, despite these concessions, the Venetian properties in Constantinople were 
probably not particularly extensive, and their size increased noticeably in 1148, 
following Manuel’s second chrysobull for Venice.116 
Unfortunately, even though a series of internal problems which struck 
Venice between 1106 and 1120 probably persuaded a significant number of its 
inhabitants to move to Romania, the surviving documentation regarding these 
properties is too sparse to allow us to make any estimate of the number of 
Venetians who lived in the Byzantine Empire in these years.117 Indeed, in the 
                                                          
115 I trattati con Bisanzio…, no. 2, p. 40; Kostis Smyrlis, ’Private Properties and State 
Finances: The Emperor’s Right to Donate His Subjects’ Land in the Comnenian 
Period’, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 33 (2009), 115-32 (p. 129); Penna, The 
Byzantine Imperial Acts…, p. 31; Paul Magdalino, ‘The Maritime Neighborhoods of 
Constantinople: Commercial and Residential Functions, Sixth to Twelfth Centuries’, 
DOP, 54 (2000), 209-26 (pp. 220, 223). 
116 I trattati con Bisanzio…, no. 2, p. 39; Jacoby, ‘The Expansion...’, pp. 75-76, 78-79; 
Borsari, ‘L’organizzazione…’, pp. 191, 193 fn. 4; Magdalino, ‘The Maritime 
Neighborhoods…’, pp. 211-21. Yet, it is unlikely, as suggested by Martin, ‘The 
Chrysobull of Alexius I Comnenus…’, pp. 22-23, that the properties donated by Alexios 
were not adjacent to each other, and that we cannot properly refer to a Venetian 
quarter until 1148. 
117 Chryssa A. Maltézou, ‘Venetian habitatores, burgenses and Merchants in 
Constantinople and Its Hinterland (Twelfth-Thirteenth Centuries)’, in Constantinople 
and Its Hinterland: Papers from the Twenty-Seventh Spring Symposium of Byzantine 
Studies, Oxford, April 1993, ed. by Cyril Mango, Gilbert Dagron, and Geoffrey Greatrex 
88 
 
period taken into consideration here, most of the charters referring to Venetian 
properties in Byzantium record the concession of some of these to a religious 
institution. The earliest surviving document records the donation of some properties 
in Constantinople to the Venetian monastery of San Giorgio Maggiore, issued by 
Doge Vitale Falier in July 1090. Yet, this was not the first donation of Byzantine 
land to a Venetian monastery, as this charter mentions that some properties had 
been previously donated to San Nicolò del Lido. The doge had received these 
areas from Alexios I, probably as part of the concessions granted in the 1080s, and 
mentioned by Anna Komnene.118 The doges believed that granting properties and 
wealth to such a prestigious institution as the monastery of San Giorgio Maggiore 
was profitable for the interests of Venice. Indeed, religious institutions could still 
indirectly represent the authority of the Venetian State, which did not yet have 
direct diplomatic representation in the Byzantine Empire, and perhaps also take 
better care of the administration of these estates. Furthermore, all the notaries from 
Venice were actually secular clerics, and it was much more likely that they would 
preserve any written documentation. Moreover, since, by law, ecclesiastical 
properties could not be alienated, donating land to a religious institution should 
have prevented Venice from losing control over it. For all these reasons, it was 
fairly common and practical to donate land to the ecclesiastical institutions: indeed, 
a similar measure was taken in 1107 by Doge Ordelaffo Falier, who granted the 
church of St Akindynos in Constantinople to the Patriarchate of Grado.119 
To sum up, the commercial concessions that Venice obtained from Alexios I 
led the Venetian merchants to trade mainly in the Byzantine Empire. Indeed, even 
though the Adriatic city also obtained privileges in the Crusader States, its actual 
mercantile involvement here was minimal. Therefore, the concessions obtained in 
the Levant can probably be interpreted not so much as an attempt by Venice to 
exploit new markets, but more as a way to weaken its Italian commercial rivals 
(Genoa and Pisa), which had obtained generous privileges in Syria and in 
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Neighborhoods…’, pp. 225-26. 
118 SGM, II, no. 69, pp. 168-75; Alexias, bk 4, ch. 2, p. 124; Alexiad, p. 113; Frankopan, 
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Palestine.120 Yet, even in the Byzantine Empire, between 1081 and 1118 there was 
only a limited increase in the scale of Venetian commerce, compared to the 
previous three decades. This was probably due to the many conflicts in which the 
Adriatic city was involved, which necessarily slowed down mercantile activities (as 
the men that Venice recruited for its navy were its own inhabitants), and to the 
limited economic strength of most of its population. Thus, the limited Venetian 
involvement in trade with Byzantium leads us to reconsider whether the refusal by 
John II Komnenos (1118-43) to confirm his father’s charter was the only reason that 
led to a conflict between Byzantium and Venice at the beginning of his reign. 
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V. A Chameleon Relationship: Venice and Byzantium, 1118-56 
1) Political Outline 
i) The Conflict between Venice and John II Komnenos (1119-26) 
After the death of Alexios I, the apparent harmony between Venice and 
Byzantium was to be short-lived. However, there had already been some hints that 
the collaboration between these powers was not as solid as it seemed. In 1112, the 
imperial request to postpone a campaign to recover Dalmatia from Hungary that the 
Venetians were planning to undertake, might suggest that Alexios valued his 
alliance with Hungary as much as (if not even more than) the one with Venice. As 
previously mentioned, the Venetians eventually conducted an autonomous and 
successful campaign in Dalmatia a few years later. Yet, even though this military 
action led to no reaction from Byzantium, it is quite likely that it was not seen 
favourably by Alexios and his son (and soon-to-be successor) John. 
This is possibly one of the reasons why John II (1118-43) refused to renew 
his father’s chrysobull for Venice when, soon after he had become sole emperor, 
the Venetians sent an embassy to Constantinople to have the concessions 
confirmed. Furthermore, the Venetians had already caused some internal problems 
in Constantinople (they had stolen the relics of St Stephen in 1110), and the 
presence of an increasing number of merchants from Venice was possibly no 
longer felt necessary after the revival of the Byzantine economy. Finally, a military 
alliance with Venice was not considered crucial considering that in Southern Italy 
there were no potential threats for Byzantium. After Bohemond’s death in March 
1111, in Apulia there was no strong leader who might launch a campaign into the 
Balkans. Furthermore, many nobles had managed to obtain autonomy in this region. 
They had taken advantage of the minority of Bohemond’s namesake son and heir, 
and of the lack of interest in Apulia shown by William, who had succeeded his 
father Roger Borsa as duke of Apulia upon his death in February 1111.1 Therefore, 
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with Southern Italy increasingly divided, the potential threat to the Byzantine Empire 
from this region had correspondingly diminished. 
Yet, John II’s refusal to confirm the chrysobull does not appear to have had 
immediate negative consequences for relations between Venice and Byzantium. 
Indeed, even though merchants from Venice now had to pay the kommerkion 
throughout the whole empire, whereas until 1118 they were exempted from it in 
most imperial cities, the surviving charters show their continuous presence in 
Constantinople until 1121.2 However, the situation radically changed in this year. In 
1119, in the Holy Land, the Frankish States had suffered a crushing defeat in the 
battle of the Ager sanguinis (1119), near Sarmada, in Syria. The outcome of this 
battle posed a serious threat to the survival of the Crusader States and in particular 
of the Principality of Antioch, due to the death of its acting ruler Roger of Salerno in 
the military confrontation, and to the ensuing succession crisis. Therefore, in 1121, 
a new crusade was launched by Pope Calixtus II, and Doge Domenico Michiel 
decided that Venice should join it. Since many men were needed to conduct this 
campaign, the doge ordered all his subjects who were in the Byzantine Empire and 
‘elsewhere’, to return to Venice by Easter of 1121. The subjects who failed to obey 
this order, and did not return to their homeland by the deadline, had all their goods 
confiscated, as happened to Enrico Zusto. He had remained in Romania, and thus 
in November 1121 he was the recipient of this punishment.3 
Yet, most of the Venetians apparently returned to their homeland. Therefore, 
a fleet could leave for the Holy Land in the summer of 1122. The Venetians briefly 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Evo, 1922), p. 28; ‘Papst-, Kaiser- und Normannenurkunden aus Unteritalien’, ed. by 
Walter Holtzmann, Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und 
Bibliotheken, 36 (1956), 1-85 (‘S. Elia di Carbone’, no. 6, pp. 55-56). They contradict 
the suggestion made by Anitra R. Gadolin, ‘Prince Bohemond’s Death and Apotheosis 
in the Church of San Sabino, Canosa di Puglia’, Byzantion, 52 (1982), 124-53 (pp. 125-
30), according to whom Bohemond might have died in 1109. 
2 DCV, nos. 41-42, 45-46, pp. 43-45, 47-49. 
3 FZ, nos. 8, 21, pp. 25-27, 48-50; ‘Historia ducum...’, ch. 3, p. 4; Dandolo, Chronica 
extensa, bk 9, ch. 12, pp. 231-33; Cerbano Cerbani, ‘Translatio mirifici martyris Isidori a 
Chio insula in civitatem Venetam (Jun. 1125)’, in RHC, Historiens occidentaux, vol. 5, 
ed. by Paul Riant and François Delaborde (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1895), ch. 1, pp. 
322-23; Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana, bk 3, ch. 3, pp. 620-24; Albert of 
Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana, bk 12, ch. 33, p. 880; Martin da Canal, ‘Estoires de 
Venise’, part 1, ch. 17 [accessed 10 October 2016]; Marin, ‘Venice, Byzantium…’, p. 
200; Thomas S. Asbridge, ‘The Significance and Causes of the Battle of the Field of 
Blood’, Journal of Medieval History, 23 (1997), 301-16 (pp. 301-08); Jonathan Riley-
Smith, ‘The Venetian Crusade of 1122-1124’, in I comuni italiani nel Regno Crociato di 
Gerusalemme. Atti del Colloquio "The Italian Communes in the Crusading Kingdom of 
Jerusalem" (Jerusalem, May 24 - May 28, 1984), ed. by Gabriella Airaldi and Benjamin 
Z. Kedar (Genoa: Brigati-Carucci, 1986), pp. 337-50 (pp. 340-42). 
92 
 
stopped in Dalmatia in order to enforce their control over this region, and then in 
Corfu, which they ended up putting under siege. Since the Venetian chronicles, 
which are the main sources on these events, do not mention any Byzantine refusal 
to allow the crusaders to disembark on Corfu, this was probably a premeditated 
attack, aimed at punishing John II after his refusal to grant commercial privileges to 
Venice, and, arguably, at forcing him to issue a new chrysobull. Since Corfu 
resisted the siege, the Venetians eventually wintered there, and only left the island 
in March 1123, after the news of the capture of King Baldwin II of Jerusalem had 
reached them. Even though some sources suggest that the Venetians also raided 
other Byzantine possessions (mainly islands) on their way to the Holy Land, it is 
more probable that these incidents took place when the Venetians were on their 
way back towards the Upper Adriatic.4 
The crusaders eventually reached Acre in May 1123. Over the course of 
around a year, they destroyed the Egyptian fleet off Ascalon, and helped the 
Kingdom of Jerusalem to conquer Tyre. As a reward for their help, they obtained 
one third of this city, as had been agreed in the treaty known as Pactum Warmundi. 
On their way back, the Venetians wanted to winter in Rhodes, and thus stopped 
there in October 1124. However, the population of this Byzantine island refused to 
sell food to the Venetians. This led the Venetians not only to attack and sack 
Cyprus, but also to raid several other islands in the Aegean (notably Kos, Samos, 
and Chios), probably in order to destroy the shipbuilding facilities of the empire, and 
to disrupt the commercial communications between Constantinople and the 
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Eastern and South-Eastern Mediterranean. The Venetians ended up wintering in 
Chios, and used this island as a base for new attacks on Lesbos and Andros. The 
Venetians left Chios in March 1125, taking with them the relics of St Isidore the 
Martyr. Probably after a naval defeat in Lemnos (only mentioned by the Byzantine 
writer Prodromos in a poem that celebrated John’s triumph in 1133), the Venetians 
decided not to continue their attacks in the Aegean, but instead to sail westwards. 
Before the fleet returned to Venice in June 1125, its crew also raided the 
strategically important Byzantine city of Methoni, in the Western Peloponnese, and 
defeated the Hungarians in Dalmatia. Indeed, King Stephen II of Hungary had 
briefly recovered this region, taking advantage of the Venetian involvement in the 
East, and of its consequent lack of focus on Dalmatia.5 The success of the 
Venetian attacks is often thought to have been helped by John’s negligence 
towards the imperial navy following his naval reform. However, this was probably 
not the case. Indeed, despite Niketas Choniates’s unfavourable judgement 
concerning this measure, the reform actually made the Byzantine navy much more 
efficient and successful. However, this naval reform, which centralised the 
organisation of the Byzantine navy, rather than keeping it organised by themata, as 
it had been, was probably enacted after this conflict, which was when its ‘architect’, 
John of Poutze, was appointed protonotarios tou dromou. And while the existing 
structure of the navy may have contributed to the success of these Venetian raids, 
this was mainly due to Emperor John devoting little attention and few resources to 
countering to these hostile Venetian actions. Indeed, at the time as these attacks, 
the Byzantines were involved in military actions in two other border areas, following 
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John’s decision to support the claims to power of, respectively, the deposed Sultan 
of Konya, and of the dethroned ruler of Duklja.6 
Since John kept refusing to renew the privileges to Venice, and may have 
reacted to the raids by setting fire to the Venetian quarter in Constantinople, the 
conflict continued.7 A new fleet left Venice, and it was only after a raid on 
Kephalonia that John II eventually decided to arrange for peace with the Venetians, 
and issued a new chrysobull for them in August 1126. Even though John might 
have been influenced by economic factors (the absence of Venetian traders in the 
empire could have had a negative impact), it seems quite likely that he realised that 
renewing the privileges for Venice was the only way to prevent further raids. 
Furthermore, the basileus could not afford to continue this conflict since new 
threats had arisen in other areas of the empire, both a rebellion in Trebizond, and 
trouble on the Balkan borders. John therefore confirmed the privileges that were 
included in his father’s charter, and only added one clause to its text, which clarified 
that even the Byzantines who were trading with the Venetians were exempted from 
paying the kommerkion.8 
                                                          
6 Niketas Choniates, Historia, ‘Βασιλεια Μανουηλ του Κομνηνου, 1’, pp. 55-56; Annals, 
pp. 32-33; Lau, ‘The Naval Reform…’, pp. 116-17, 119-21; Lau, ‘Rewriting the 1120s…’, 
p. 94; Hélène Ahrweiler, Byzance et la mer: La Marine de guerre, la politique et les 
institutions maritimes de Byzance aux VIIe-XVe siècles (Paris: Presses universitaires 
de France, 1966), pp. 228-31; Dionysios Stathakopoulos, ‘John II Komnenos: A 
Historiographical Essay’, in John II Komnenos, Emperor of Byzantium: In the Shadow 
of Father and Son, ed. by Alessandra Bucossi and Alex Rodríguez Sánchez (London: 
Routledge, 2016), pp. 1-10 (p. 2). Angeliki Papageorgiou, ‘The Political Ideology of 
John II Komnenos’, in John II Komnenos…, pp. 37-52 (p. 40) suggests that, when in 
these years the Byzantines engaged in negotiations with the Papacy, these might have 
also been aimed at convincing the pontiffs to persuade the Venetians to stop their raids. 
However, these two letters, ‘Die Auslandsschreiben der byzantinischen Kaiser des 11. 
und 12. Jahrhunderts: Specimen einer kritischen Ausgabe’, ed. by Otto Kresten and 
Andreas E. Müller, BZ, 86-87 (1993-94), 402-29 (no. 4, pp. 422-29); ‘Αυτοκρατόρων 
του Βυζαντίου Χρυσόβουλλα και χρυσά γράμματα: Αναφερόμενα εις την ένωσιν των 
εκκλησιών’, ed. by Spyridon Paulou Lampros, Νέος Ελληνομνήμων, 11 (1914), 94-128 
(nos. 3-4, pp. 109-12), which are only dated after the indiction year, were probably 
written, respectively, in 1139 and 1141, as suggested by Alessandra Bucossi, ‘Seeking 
a Way out of the Impasse: The Filioque Controversy during John’s Reign’, in John II 
Komnenos…, pp. 121-34 (pp. 124-25), and not, respectively, in 1124 and 1126. 
7 Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 12, p. 236. Yet, Dandolo might be misdating a 
fire that took place in 1130, and which was recorded by Moses of Bergamo, ‘Mosè del 
Brolo e la sua lettera da Costantinopoli’, ed. by Filippomaria Pontani, Aevum: 
Rassegna di scienze storiche, linguistiche e filosofiche, 72 (1998), 143-75 (p. 148). 
8 ‘Historia ducum...’, ch. 6, p. 10; I trattati con Bisanzio..., no. 3, pp. 51-56; Kinnamos, 
bk 6, ch. 10, p. 281; Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 12, p. 237; Marin, ‘Venice, 
Byzantium…’, pp. 201-02; Lau, ‘The Naval Reform…’, p. 120; Lau, ‘Rewriting the 
1120s...‘, pp. 96-102. 
95 
 
To sum up, this conflict between Venice and Byzantium had negligible 
political consequences, as it ended with a return to the status quo ante. The 
Venetians re-obtained the same conditions that Alexios I had granted to them, and 
their merchants were able once again to trade in the imperial cities. What this war 
did do, however, was to make the Venetians aware of the strength of their navy, as 
not only had they conducted many successful raids on Byzantine land, but they had 
also destroyed the Egyptian fleet. In addition, the Venetians realised that they could 
influence the economic policy of the empire to their own advantage. Furthermore, 
even though, according to one of the two surviving texts of John II’s chrysobull, the 
Venetians were still imperial subjects (the charter refers to them as duli – a 
Latinisation of δοῦλοι, the Greek word for ‘slaves’), this conflict in practice set 
Venice free from its nominal centuries-long subordination towards Byzantium. This 
can be seen from the titles which the doges employed. Until the dogeship of 
Ordelaffo Falier, every ruler of Venice had used their Byzantine rank in all their 
charters – and in the 1080s Domenico Silvio was referred to as protosebastos even 
after he was deposed. Yet, neither Domenico Michiel nor any of his successors 
ever used the title of protosebastos, although that had been granted to them once 
more both by John II and by his successors.9 That such a victory was extremely 
significant for Venice can also be inferred from Domenico Michiel’s epitaph, which 
celebrates his victories in the Holy Land and against the Hungarians, and refers to 
him as terror Graecorum.10  
Another interesting aspect to consider is the possible involvement in this 
conflict of one of the local rulers from Southern Italy. An oath sworn by the 
Venetians, who in May 1122 promised to defend the citizens of Bari, might indeed 
suggest that one part of the Mezzogiorno was involved in this war.11 At first sight, 
considering the role that Venice had had in the Balkan campaigns of both Robert 
Guiscard and Bohemond, this agreement seems to suggest a radical shift of 
allegiances in the Adriatic area. However, this was not the case, as in the early 
1120s Bari was no longer under Hauteville control. In 1085, Bari had been inherited 
by Roger Borsa, but he soon ceded it to his half-brother Bohemond, who appointed 
a catepan who would govern it. However, the almost contemporary deaths of Roger 
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Borsa and of Bohemond, and the minority of their respective surviving sons, 
created a power vacuum in most of mainland Southern Italy, including Bari. This 
city was formally under the regency of Constance, the widow of Bohemond and 
mother of Bohemond II, but neither she nor the ducal Hautevilles managed to keep 
the situation under control, and, as a result, a civil war broke out between the main 
pre-Norman aristocratic families.12 If we believe the words written by Archbishop 
Riso of Bari in a charter, the problems began to arise in May 1113, but the situation 
had become even more serious by 1117. In September of this year, Riso was killed 
by Argyrus, a member of the pro-Norman faction of Bari, who had escaped after 
being held prisoner by Grimoald Alfaranites, the leader of the opposing group. 
Grimoald tried to avenge the death of the archbishop by launching an attack on 
Bari, in which his men destroyed two city towers.13 The sudden ending of the 
chronicle of the Anonymus Barensis makes it impossible to follow the later events 
in detail. However, the documentary evidence makes it clear that Grimoald 
managed to obtain control over Bari between November 1118 and June 1119, as 
suggested by two charters from, respectively, June and November 1123, which 
were both issued during the fifth year of Grimoald’s rule as dominus of Bari. 
Furthermore, we can infer that Grimoald was not an ally of the Hauteville because, 
for around a year from August 1119, Grimoald kept Constance of France 
imprisoned. Therefore, the Venetians signed an agreement with a city that was 
opposing the Hauteville, and thus we can safely argue that there was not a 
complete turnaround in the alliances in the Adriatic area.14 
As already mentioned, only the oath of the Venetians survives. Yet, it is very 
probable that the original agreement also included the obligations and concessions 
                                                          
12 Loud, The Age of Robert Guiscard..., pp. 255-59; Russo, Boemondo..., pp. 45-47; 
Martin, La Pouille..., pp. 742-43, 745-46; Paul Oldfield, City and Community in Norman 
Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 29-31; Vera von 
Falkenhausen, ‘I ceti dirigenti prenormanni al tempo della costituzione degli stati 
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Italia nel Medioevo, ed. by Gabriella Rossetti (Bologna: Il mulino, 1977), pp. 321-77 (pp. 
342-44). 
13 Le pergamene di Bari…, 5, no. 59, p. 105; Anonymus Barensis, ‘Chronicon’, aa. 
1115-18, pp. 155-56; Falco of Benevento, Chronicon Beneventanum, ed. and trans. by 
Edoardo D’Angelo (Impruneta: SISMEL – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 1998), a. 1117, p. 34; 
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14 Romuald, Annales, p. 210; ‘Annales Ceccanenses’, ed. by Georg Heinrich Pertz, in 
MGH SS, 19 (Hanover: Hahn, 1866), a. 1120, p. 282; Le pergamene di Bari…, nos. 67, 
69, 71, pp. 115-16, 121-24; Jean-Marie Martin, ‘Les Communautés d’habitants de la 
Pouille et leur rapports avec Roger II’, in Società, potere e popolo nell’età di Ruggero II. 
Atti delle terze giornate normanno-sveve: Bari, 23-25 maggio 1977 (Bari: Dedalo, 
1979), pp. 73-98 (p. 83, fn. 74); Oldfield, City and Community..., pp. 47-49; Abulafia, 
The Two Italies…, pp. 77-78. 
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of the citizens of Bari towards the Venetians, but that this part has not survived. 
Indeed, one would expect Venice to take advantage of the signing of this 
agreement to obtain some commercial concessions, especially considering the 
significant increase of agricultural production in the Bari region in the twelfth 
century. Amongst these products, we can include wine and cereals. Yet, olives 
were the crop that was expanding at the largest scale at this time, and, as a result, 
the Terra di Bari became a major exporter of olive oil. This probably led to a 
Venetian interest in trade in this area, resulting in a moderate increase in 
commerce there. Furthermore, the (very limited) documentary evidence suggests 
that the merchants from Venice were mostly interested in acquiring the expanding 
crops, specifically food – victualia – and wine. Yet, Southern Italy never replaced 
Byzantium as the favourite commercial location for Venice. This was mainly due to 
the better commercial conditions applied in Romania, to the Venetians being more 
interested in trading the luxury goods that they could find in the Eastern Empire, 
rather than agricultural products, and to the almost constant warfare that affected 
Southern Italy for around a decade following the death of Duke William of Apulia in 
1127.15 
In addition to the commercial privileges that the Venetians might have 
obtained in Bari, it is probable that there were also some logistical and military 
conventions amongst the concessions granted to them. It does not seem unlikely 
that the Venetians obtained advantages similar to those that they had gained when 
Split had submitted to them in the late eleventh century, or, even more appositely, 
similar to those contained in the pact later made with Fano in 1141 – since Fano, 
like Bari, formally became an ally, rather than submitting to Venice. Both cities were 
to provide Venice with some limited naval help in case the Venetians were involved 
                                                          
15 DCV, nos. 31, 449, pp. 33-34, 440; Martin, La Pouille..., pp. 90, 331, 345-47, 356-65; 
Gherardo Ortalli, ‘Il Mezzogiorno normanno-svevo visto da Venezia’, in Il Mezzogiorno 
normanno-svevo visto dall’Europa e dal mondo mediterraneo: Atti delle tredicesime 
giornate normanno-sveve, Bari, 21-24 ottobre 1997, ed. by Giosuè Musca (Bari: 
Dedalo, 1999), pp. 53-74 (pp. 69-70, 73); Abulafia, The Two Italies..., p. 35; Graham A. 
Loud, Roger II and the Making of the Kingdom of Sicily (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2012), pp. 13-19, 26-36; Hubert Houben, Roger II of Sicily: A Ruler 
between East and West, trans. by Graham A. Loud and Diane Milburn (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 41-73.  
The only charters referring to trade in Southern Italy issued between 1126 and 1136 
are DCV, nos. 50, 63, pp. 52, 66-67. To these, we might add FZ, no. 10, pp. 29-31 if, 
as suggested by Chryssa A. Maltézou, ‘Les Italiens propriétaires “terrarum et casarum” 
à Byzance’, Byzantinische Forschungen, 22 (1996), 177-91 (p. 179), the Palormus 
mentioned in the charter is actually Palermo. 
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in sea warfare in the Adriatic.16 Furthermore, Bari’s proximity to the Balkans would 
have also made its port a helpful base for the Venetians to retreat following raids 
against the Byzantine possessions in the Adriatic and Ionian seas. These 
considerations suggest, therefore, that the agreement with Bari was a militarily and 
economically strategic move made by Venice shortly before the beginning of its 
open conflict against Byzantium. 
Another interesting aspect to take into consideration is whether the 
Dalmatian campaign by the Hungarians might be connected with the conflict 
between Venice and John II. The main counter-argument against this is that a 
Hungarian-Byzantine war broke out in 1127, just a year after John II had come to 
terms with the Venetians. The conflict was a consequence of the basileus providing 
shelter to the Hungarian duke Álmos following his failed attempt to secure the 
Magyar throne. Yet, while Álmos’s flight is generally thought to have taken place in 
1125, the exact chronology of the events is quite uncertain. Thus, considering that 
hosting a rebel like Álmos was an extremely hostile act, it would be strange for 
Hungary to react not earlier than two years later after the duke had received shelter 
in Byzantium. This leads us to question whether we might postpone the dating of 
Álmos’s flight, and, consequently, the end of the good relations between Byzantium 
and Hungary. Indeed, before the trouble originating from John granting shelter to 
Álmos, both countries were concerned over the restlessness of the Serbs in the 
Balkans, and had a mutual enemy/rival in Venice.17 Thus, we cannot exclude that, 
while the Hungarians were still his allies, John Komnenos might have reached them, 
and suggested that they should attack Dalmatia in order to loosen the Venetian 
pressure over the Byzantine islands. This would have also meant restoring the 
territorial situation of 1115, before the Venetians had recovered Dalmatia despite 
Alexios’s refusal to assist them. 
A final element that we need to take into consideration is whether the 
sources that suggest an involvement in the conflict of nobles from Southern Italy 
through a series of matrimonial alliances, are reliable. The first of these sources, 
the ‘Life of Calixtus II’, in the Liber Pontificialis, written a few decades after this 
                                                          
16 Tafel-Thomas, no. 26, pp. 63-64; Il patto con Fano, ed. by Attilio Bartoli Langeli, 
Pacta Veneta, 3 (Venice: Il Cardo, 1993), p. 46. 
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Venetian-Byzantine conflict, mentions a wedding between Duke William and a 
daughter of the late Alexios Komnenos, which apparently took place in the early 
1120s. This information is clearly unreliable. William had actually married 
Gaitelgrima, daughter of Count Robert of Caiazzo in 1116, and she outlived him.18 
Another such marriage may perhaps have taken place in the early 1120s, for, 
according to the fourteenth-century Magyar Chronicon pictum, King Stephen II of 
Hungary had married a noblewoman from the Mezzogiorno, namely the daughter of 
rex Robertus Viscardus de Apulia.19 Yet, this information is also extremely 
problematic, since no Southern Italian ruler possessed a royal title before 1130. In 
addition, since Robert Guiscard had died in 1085, when all his offspring had 
reached an adult age, Stephen’s wife cannot have been one of Robert’s daughters. 
If any of these had survived into the 1120s, they would have been well into middle 
age, and surely too old for such a marriage. 
However, what if the woman mentioned in the Chronicon pictum was the 
daughter of another nobleman from Southern Italy, also named Robert? The first 
possible candidate would be Robert Guiscard’s son Robert, who was of age by 
1086, when he signed the first of two charters issued by his brother Roger Borsa, 
and around a decade later, in 1095 or 1096, he himself issued a charter which 
granted a privilege to a Calabrian abbey.20 What is extremely interesting is that 
three charters (issued between 1090 and 1102 or 1103) refer to him as ‘Robert 
Guiscard’.21 We do not know the date of Robert’s death, as the information that he 
                                                          
18 Le Liber Pontificalis, ed. by Louis Duchesne, 2nd edn, 3 vols (Paris: Boccard, 1955-
57), II, 322; Romuald, Annales, p. 207; ‘Testament du Duc Guillaume en faveur du 
Monastère de Cava’, ed. by Paul Guillaume, in Essai historique sur l’abbaye de Cava 
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18. 
21Antiquitates Italicae Medii Aevi, ed. by Ludovico Antonio Muratori, 6 vols (Milan: 
Typographia societatis palatinae in regia curia, 1738-42), I, 899-900; Archivio della 
badia della Santissima Trinità, Cava dei Tirreni, Arm. Mag. C.42; ‘Urkunden und 
Regesten (1041-1297)’, ed. by Hubert Houben, in Die Abtei Venosa und das 
Mönchtum im normannisch-staufischen Süditalien (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1995), no. 81, 
pp. 315-16. The 1090 charter is not included in the recent edition of the parchments 
from the Archivio Diocesano di Salerno. See Le pergamene dell’Archivio Diocesano di 
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died in 1110 that can be found in one of the codices of the Annales Beneventani 
(which has probably led Bünemann to suggest that Robert died in this year) is 
clearly wrong. The copyists of the manuscripts erroneously wrote Robert’s name 
instead of Roger Borsa (the third manuscript correctly indicates the death of the 
latter in 1111).22 Regardless of this fragmentary information, since Robert, the son 
of Robert Guiscard, was an adult in the second half of the 1080s, and still alive in 
1102, he could have well had a daughter who was of the appropriate age to be 
married in the early 1120s. Another possibility is that the wife of Stephen II was 
actually the daughter of Guiscard, a son of Roger Borsa, who is indicated as co-
duke in some charters issued in the first decade of the twelfth century, but who died, 
probably at a fairly young age, in 1108.23 Since he was referred to as co-ruler as 
early as 1102, this probably means that in this year he was not a minor any more. 
Therefore, although this is perhaps unlikely, we cannot completely exclude the 
possibility that he might have had a daughter, who would have been a teenager in 
the early 1120s. A further possibility, suggested by Makk, is that Robert might 
actually be Robert I, who was Prince of Capua from 1106 until 1120.24 Finally, we 
cannot entirely exclude that this Robert might be the Robertus miles de Apulia 
mentioned by Albert of Aachen, a participant of the First Crusade who is probably 
to be identified with either Robert of Anzi or Robert of Courceval. Robert of 
Courceval probably briefly returned to Southern Italy to ‘collect his family and bring 
them back to the East’, but we cannot entirely exclude the far-fetched possibility 
that a daughter of his stayed in Southern Italy, and ended up marrying Stephen II of 
Hungary.25 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Salerno (841-1193), ed. by Anna Giordano (Battipaglia: Laveglia & Carlone, 2014). 
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However, all these hypotheses would seem to be extremely unlikely for a 
series of reasons. The main argument against them is that no Southern Italian 
source (and furthermore no text written within two centuries of this event) mentions 
such a prestigious wedding by a noblewoman from the Mezzogiorno. In addition, 
none of these men named Robert was so important to justify the chronicler’s 
mistake of referring to him as king, and the one who held the most prestigious title 
(the Prince of Capua) was not nicknamed ‘Guiscard’, nor was he based in Apulia.  
For all these reasons, therefore, a matrimonial alliance between the Kingdom of 
Hungary and a lord of the Mezzogiorno seems extremely unlikely actually to have 
occurred. 
Despite its limited political consequences, the brief war in the early 1120s is 
not to be regarded as a minor event, as it was the first open conflict between the 
Venetians and the Byzantines. Additionally, the evidence appears to suggest that 
the hostilities were not limited just to the two main enemies, but that they also 
involved Hungary, and, indirectly, the autonomous city of Bari. This is not the first 
time that we can actually refer to the existence of an ‘Adriatic network’. Such was 
the case during both Robert’s and Bohemond’s Balkan campaigns – with the 
involvement of Venice in both, of Duklja in the former, and, possibly, of Hungary in 
the latter. 
ii) The Creation of the Kingdom of Sicily (1127-39) 
In July 1127, about a year after the end of the Byzantine-Venetian conflict, 
Duke William died in Southern Italy. Since William died childless, his distant cousin 
Roger II of Sicily claimed to be the legitimate heir to the mainland Mezzogiorno, 
and tried to conquer it. The 1130s are also characterised by a schism in Rome: 
after Honorius II’s death, two candidates claimed the Papal See. Roger tried to take 
advantage of this situation in order to obtain a regal title. We shall here analyse 
these events in detail, paying particular attention to how Venice and the Byzantines 
reacted to them, and to why they might have considered Roger II as a threat. 
The years that immediately followed 1126 were a period of relative quiet for 
Venice. The Venetian sources seem to suggest that the Adriatic city did not pursue 
an aggressive external policy during these years. The only chronicler mentioning 
the involvement of Venice in foreign affairs is Falco of Benevento, who writes that 
he had ‘heard’ that, in 1133, the Venetians were willing to help Robert of Capua 
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against Roger II.26 However, no other source mentions the actual direct 
involvement of Venice in this stage of the South Italian civil war. Despite this, some 
further evidence might nevertheless suggest that Venice actually played an indirect 
role in this conflict. Indeed, Margetić has suggested that the Saracens that, 
according to the Vita beati Ioannis, destroyed the city of Trogir in the first half of the 
twelfth century had been recruited by Roger. His men might have undertaken this 
campaign as an act of reprisal for hosting Count Alexander of Conversano, who 
had fled to ‘Dalmatia’ in 1133 before he ended up deserting to the ‘emperor’. 
Though Margetić believes that Trogir was then under Hungarian control, he also 
notices that there is no reliable information about this city between 1125 (when 
Venice recovered it after a brief period of Hungarian rule) and 1151. Thus, we 
cannot exclude that Trogir was then under Venetian (and not Hungarian) control.27 
This possibility is supported by the (few) surviving private charters. They suggest 
that, until around 1136, Venice had maintained all its possessions in the area. 
Furthermore, we cannot exclude that it was the Venetians (and not the Hungarians, 
as suggested by Archdeacon Thomas) who appointed Peter, the local prior of 
Zadar, as comes, for around a decade later the Venetians would back him after he 
obtained control of some islands in Dalmatia. Furthermore, the earliest document 
clearly indicating a Hungarian conquest of central Dalmatia (more specifically, Split) 
was issued only in 1142, as the charters that were apparently written in 1138 and 
1141 are actually forgeries.28 
After around a decade of turmoil due to a series of conflicts against the 
Pechenegs, the Serbs, the Hungarians, and (of course) Venice, the situation on the 
Western border of the Byzantine Empire was also quite calm from around 1129 
until 1134, and John II does not seem to have been interested in acquiring new 
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lands in Europe.29 The basileus could thus concentrate on the Eastern frontier of 
his empire, conducting a series of campaigns against the Turks in Anatolia.30 
Finally, following the death of Duke William in July 1127, the next eight 
years were marred by a series of conflicts in Southern Italy. Count Roger II of Sicily 
(Roger I’s son and successor) laid claim to William’s lands in 1127. In addition to 
his kinship with the deceased duke, Roger II’s case was strengthened by the 
possessions that he already had in Calabria and Basilicata, which he had obtained 
partly by inheritance from his father, partly from William himself and from other 
nobles. Yet, Roger’s claims were opposed by the Prince of Capua, by many other 
Southern Italian nobles, and by Pope Honorius II, who were, amongst other 
reasons, afraid that, by obtaining the ducal title, the count might become too 
powerful. Despite this, Roger II managed to be invested as Duke of Apulia by the 
pope in 1128 after a successful military campaign, and diplomatic agreements. 
After he had temporarily overcome most of the nobility of Southern Italy (including 
the Prince of Capua), Roger managed to become King of Sicily in 1130, using to 
his advantage the papal schism which took place after Honorius II had died earlier 
in the same year. He secured the consent of one of the rival claimants to the papal 
throne, Anacletus II, to his promotion to be King of Sicily – in return for his 
recognition of Anacletus as the rightful pope. Unfortunately, the pope whom he 
recognised ultimately lost the schism.31 
Roger’s promotion as king inflamed the already unstable situation in 
Southern Italy, leading to a civil war. Furthermore, by 1133 Roger’s opponents, 
backed by Innocent II, and led by Rainulf of Caiazzo (Roger’s brother-in-law), the 
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Prince of Capua, Grimoald of Bari, Count Alexander of Conversano, and his brother 
Tancred, had managed to obtain the support of some external powers. The main 
ones were the German Emperor Lothar III, who promised the other pope, Innocent 
II, that he would invade Southern Italy, and of the Pisans, who provided military aid 
to Robert II of Capua. Yet, despite the number of his enemies, by 1134 Roger had 
managed to defeat most of his revolting nobles.32 
Despite all these internal problems, Roger still attempted to conduct an 
aggressive Mediterranean policy, and this probably alarmed Venice and, even 
more, John II. According to William of Tyre, after the death of Prince Bohemond II 
early in 1130, Roger laid claim to the Principality of Antioch for himself, but 
eventually Raymond of Poitiers was preferred to him, both because of Roger’s 
need to focus his attention on the domestic situation in Southern Italy, and of his 
long-standing tense relations with the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Yet, even when his 
candidacy had become a blatant failure, the King of Sicily was unwillingly to allow 
Raymond to rule over Antioch. Indeed, in late 1135 or early 1136, Roger 
unsuccessfully tried to have Raymond of Poitiers captured when the latter was 
sailing by the shores of Southern Italy on his way to the Levant.33 
Furthermore, Roger also conducted an aggressive policy in the region to the 
South of Sicily, recovering Malta in the 1120s, and conquering Jerba (an island off 
the coast of Tunisia) in 1135, thanks to the deeds of his trusted commander 
George of Antioch. Jerba was a notorious lair of pirates, and, if we are to trust Ibn 
al-Athīr’s words, these pirates appear to have continued their activity after Roger’s 
conquest, possibly being authorised to do so by the Sicilians.34 
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These foreign military enterprises were received negatively by both the 
Venetians and the Byzantines, both of whom sought the support of the German 
Emperor, Lothar III. Both John II and Doge Pietro Polani (1130-48) sent envoys to 
Merseburg in 1135, asking for Lothar III’s help against Roger II. The Byzantines 
complained that Roger had, with the help of pagans, taken Africa, ‘the third part of 
the world’, from them, and that he had usurped the title of king. On the other hand, 
the Venetians complained that Roger’s men had plundered the goods of their 
merchants, to the value of 40,000 talents. Lothar, meanwhile, was unhappy with 
Roger, because he had ‘subtracted Apulia and Calabria’ from the German Empire – 
that is, he refused to recognise the claims of the Western emperor to be the 
overlord of Southern Italy. Should a German campaign on Southern Italy take place, 
the Byzantines were willing to help Lothar by providing him with an army and a fleet, 
and with great amounts of money. This Byzantine-German agreement (the so-
called ‘Treaty of Merseburg’) was probably finalised in 1136, when the German 
legate Anselm of Havelberg was sent to Constantinople. John II probably had no 
offensive aims, and may have sought this alliance in order to allow him to conduct a 
campaign against the Principality of Antioch with no fear of having to face a 
contemporary Balkan attack.35 John’s renewal of the chrysobull that his father had 
granted to Pisa, in 1136, was probably a further diplomatic move to isolate the King 
of Sicily in order to prevent him from attacking Romania.36 
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However, while analysing the Byzantine hostility towards Roger II, we 
should ask ourselves whether Roger II was really a threat to the Byzantines in 1135. 
The main German sources (the so-called Annalista Saxo and the Annals of Erfurt) 
suggest so, but both written after 1147, when Roger attacked the Balkans, and may 
therefore have assumed with hindsight that this was always his intention, and 
indeed within his power to accomplish.37 Despite this cautionary observation, this 
does not necessarily mean that all the information that we can find in these two 
annals is unreliable. As we have seen, according to these texts, John’s envoys 
were complaining that the King of Sicily had usurped his royal title, and that he had 
taken Africa from the Byzantines. The former aspect makes perfect sense as a 
motivation for John’s enmity towards Roger. Part of Southern Italy had been under 
Byzantine control until less than a century earlier, and the Eastern imperial rhetoric 
would not recognise the Hautevilles as the rightful rulers of Southern Italy until the 
signing of a peace treaty between Manuel I and William I in 1158. However, the 
other complaint seems to be quite specious, as by this stage the Sicilians had only 
conquered a small island off the coast of Tunisia, and, furthermore, it had been 
many centuries since the Byzantines had lost control over Africa. However, the 
conquest of Jerba did show that Roger now had a strong fleet, and hence he had, 
potentially, the means to attack the Byzantine Balkans, something which may well 
have concerned John II.38 That Roger already had the ambition of following in 
Robert Guiscard’s and Bohemond’s footsteps can also be suggested by his taste 
for Byzantine culture and ideology, and by his desire to emulate it. This went so far 
as Roger being referred to as basileus (the title of the Eastern emperor) by a 
Greek-speaking preacher, probably in 1131.39 However, while all this was true, the 
civil war in Southern Italy was not yet over in 1135, and even if Roger could afford 
to launch an expedition to North Africa, this was actually quite a minor campaign. It 
is unlikely, therefore, that the Sicilian king as yet had the means to attack 
Byzantium. Yet, especially considering the good relations between John and the 
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Western emperor, Roger was nevertheless still probably the main Western threat to 
the Byzantine Empire. 
As we have seen, according to the Annales Erphesfurdenses, the Venetian 
hostility towards Roger II was mainly motivated by the piratical activities of men 
acting on his behalf. However, the value of the goods that the Venetians lost seems 
to suggest that the actions of these corsairs were not only linked to Roger’s 
conquest of Jerba, but had been lasting for quite a long time. It is indeed possible 
that the Venetian complaints were mostly related to the destruction of Trogir by 
Roger’s Saracens, if we are to trust the words and the suggested interpretations of 
the Vita beati Stefani. Furthermore, Roger and Venice also supported opposite 
sides in the papal schism. Yet, the Venetian decision to back Innocent II was 
probably not a further reason for hostility with Roger II, but a mere consequence of 
this enmity. Indeed, in the papal conclave the Venetian cardinals had actually voted 
for Anacletus, but the doge had eventually decided to support Innocent II, mostly 
due to his discontent over Anacletus’s decision to appoint Roger as king.40 Yet, not 
even the Venetians were interested in undertaking an expedition against the King 
of Sicily, and their choice seems to have paid off. Indeed, in October 1136 Lothar 
nevertheless confirmed the pacts that his predecessors had granted to them. 
Furthermore, probably in 1139, the Venetians were also granted commercial 
concessions in the Kingdom of Sicily, possibly as a reward for their neutrality during 
the German invasion of the Mezzogiorno.41 
When Lothar did eventually launch a campaign against Southern Italy in 
1137, he initially had the military support of the Pisans – however, this collaboration 
soon came to an end after a series of disagreements that took place during the 
siege of Salerno.42 During this expedition, which lasted for about five months, 
Lothar achieved some apparent success thanks to the help of some of the rebel 
nobles of Southern Italy, in particular of Robert II of Capua (who re-obtained his 
principality), and of Rainulf of Caiazzo, who was appointed as anti-duke of Apulia. 
Yet, after Lothar’s withdrawal from the Mezzogiorno, and following the death of 
Rainulf in early 1139, the rebels were no longer able to counter Roger, who 
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managed to suppress the revolt later in the same year. His success was complete, 
as in July 1139, after the Hauteville had captured Innocent II (by now the generally 
recognised pope), the pontiff had been forced to recognise Roger as King of 
Sicily.43 
The Byzantines had not helped Lothar III in Southern Italy, and had instead 
launched a campaign against the Armenian Prince of Cilicia, and against the 
Principality of Antioch. John had previously tried to incorporate the latter entity into 
the Byzantine orbit. He had attempted to arrange a marriage between his youngest 
son Manuel and Constance, the infant daughter of Bohemond II, who had become 
the titular Princess of Antioch following her father’s premature death. If John had 
succeeded in these matrimonial negotiations, Antioch would have actually been 
ruled by the son of the Byzantine emperor, and later by a son of his. However, 
John’s proposal was not accepted, and Constance ended up marrying Raymond of 
Poitiers, who wanted to rule autonomously from Constantinople. Thus, John 
decided to undertake a military expedition. This campaign was successful, as the 
basileus defeated the Cilicians, and forced Raymond to surrender, and to accept 
the Byzantine formal sovereignty over his principality. The emperor then turned to 
fighting against the Turks, but did not manage to complete the siege of Shaizar due 
to difficulties with provisions, and to the Latin reluctance in taking part in this 
campaign. John nevertheless celebrated a triumph in Antioch, but, according to 
William of Tyre, after he asked to be granted the citadel of this city for himself, was 
forced to leave Antioch after an anti-Byzantine riot. Thus, John left for 
Constantinople in May or June 1138.44 
The emperor’s decision to retreat was probably also a consequence of the 
fear that Roger II might take advantage of the death of Lothar III to attack the 
Balkans. That the basileus was following the development of the situation of 
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Southern Italy is also confirmed by John’s order to have a fleet built in Cyprus in 
order to prevent any attacks by Roger II. This measure is mentioned in an oration 
written by Nikephoros Basilakes sometime after 1138, when Roger was recovering 
ground in the Mezzogiorno, and thus becoming once more a threat to Byzantium.45 
To sum up, both Venice and the Byzantines were quite worried by Roger’s 
unification of Southern Italy, and by his Mediterranean policy. The Venetians were 
particularly worried by the piratical actions of the Sicilian fleet, which resulted in a 
substantial loss of commercial revenues for their merchants. Therefore, even 
though Venice was probably not involved in the civil war in Southern Italy, the 
Adriatic city nevertheless sided with Roger’s opponents at least until 1136. Yet, 
after this year, the Venetians maintained an absolute neutrality, possibly because 
Roger was no longer a threat to them, and because they were sceptical regarding 
the outcome of Lothar’s expedition. This attitude seems to have been rewarded by 
Roger, who, probably in 1139, granted some commercial privileges to Venice. 
The unification of Southern Italy, and Roger’s minor achievements in the 
Mediterranean, led John II to worry that the Sicilian fleet might launch raids on the 
Western Balkans while most of his army was fighting in the East. Therefore, he 
convinced the German emperor Lothar III to intervene militarily in Southern Italy. 
This prevented Roger from attacking the Balkans, and also made it possible for the 
Byzantines to obtain some important success in Cilicia, and the recognition of some 
form of overlordship over Antioch. 
iii) 1139-46 
We shall now analyse the events that took place in the period after Roger’s 
coronation by Pope Innocent II, and before Roger’s Balkan campaign and the 
Second Crusade in 1147-48. We shall examine the reason why Roger decided to 
launch this campaign, and why the Venetians once more decided to back the 
Byzantines. We shall also see whether the foreign policy of Byzantium towards 
Roger II and Antioch changed after Manuel I succeeded his father John II in 1143. 
The agreements signed with both John II and Roger II led to a brief period in 
which the foreign policy of the Venetian doge Pietro Polani could focus on the 
Adriatic area. However, these years were also crucial for the internal political 
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evolution of Venice, which, during Polani’s dogeship, transformed into a 
commune.46 
A strong new involvement of Venice in the Adriatic area began in early 1141, 
with the signing of an agreement with the town of Fano. The citizens of Fano were 
involved in a conflict with the neighbouring towns of Ravenna, Pesaro, and 
Senigallia, and obtained Venetian help in this war in exchange for a yearly tribute of 
oil and cash; the Venetians were also exempted from paying any dues when they 
traded there. Thus, we can rightfully state that, even though the pact between 
Venice and Fano was formally a reciprocal one, its actual consequence was the 
submission of Fano to the Venetians. Such situations had become quite common in 
the communal Northern and Central Italy, and indeed the structure of this 
agreement is very similar to other contemporary charters which formalised the 
submission of one Italian commune to another. The commercial conditions of this 
agreement also meant that Fano became a significant commercial base for Venice 
in Central Italy, especially for the acquisition of agricultural products.47 
Venetian involvement in the Adriatic area included military activity in Istria 
and, possibly, lower Dalmatia. The latter campaign is only mentioned by the 
fifteenth-century Annales Ragusini, according to which the Venetians 
unsuccessfully intervened alongside the city of Dubrovnik in its conflict against the 
Bosnians. The sources are much more reliable regarding the Istrian campaign, 
which took place in December 1143, and led to the submission of Pula and Koper. 
The inhabitants of Pula swore obedience to both the doge, and totum Venetie 
comune; this is one of the earliest pieces of evidence that Venice had formally 
become a commune.48 
Despite the text of the submission of Pula, the transformation into a 
commune did not mean that the whole population of Venice was involved in the 
government of the city, but rather that it formally became an oligarchy. Indeed, the 
power was to be held permanently by a restricted group of Venetian families, 
amongst whom the members of the council of sapientes were elected. This change 
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was also aimed at preventing the formation of ducal dynasties, and at restricting the 
power of both the doge and the clergy.49 
Although the foreign policy of Venice in this period mostly focused on the 
Adriatic area, Doge Pietro Polani nonetheless did not neglect wider international 
affairs either. He appears to have maintained good relations with both Roger II and 
his enemies. Indeed, after signing a treaty with Venice, in 1144 the Sicilian king 
allowed the Venetians to rebuild a Greek church in Palermo, and to name it after St 
Mark. This move was probably part of Roger II’s diplomatic campaign to gain 
international legitimacy. He may have also hoped that maintaining good relations 
with the Venetians would increase his chances of having successful peace talks 
with their allies, the Byzantines. These negotiations had started in the final years of 
John’s reign, and were still continuing at the beginning of Manuel’s rule over 
Byzantium in 1143.50 The King of Sicily was probably aware that the Venetians 
were continuing to act as a mediator between the two empires, as can be seen in 
the correspondence exchanged by King Conrad III of Germany and John II 
between 1140 and 1142 (or 1143), which was also aimed at renewing an alliance in 
order to prevent any hostile action by Roger II.51 
Meanwhile, John II felt that he still had unfinished business to deal with in 
the East, against both the Turks and Antioch. However, before conducting any 
further activity in the East, he had to secure his Western borders against a possible 
attack by Roger II. Therefore, in order to forestall such a threat, the basileus agreed 
on an alliance with Conrad of Germany, and engaged in negotiations with Innocent 
II. John and the German king agreed that the former’s son Manuel would marry 
Bertha, Conrad’s sister-in-law, while the latter confirmed his intention of conducting 
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a campaign in Southern Italy.52 The Byzantine negotiations with the Papacy were 
probably triggered by Innocent’s recognition of Roger’s royal title, and by a bull that 
the pontiff had issued a year earlier, in 1138, for the Latins fighting in the Eastern 
imperial army. This bull had referred to the Byzantines as schismatics, and was 
aimed at dissuading the Latins of the Kingdom of Jerusalem from allying with them. 
Thus, John probably felt the need to persuade the pope of his own friendly attitude 
towards the Crusader States. He was perhaps afraid too that, should he fail to do 
so, Innocent might have encouraged the Sicilians (whom he wrongly deemed to 
have become the pope’s allies) to attack the Western Balkans in order to prevent 
John from achieving his Eastern military aims.53 
John’s successful negotiations with Conrad and with Innocent allowed him 
to march into Cilicia with no need of worrying over the safety of his Western 
borders. However, this expedition had to be abandoned after John’s death, officially 
in a hunting accident, in the spring of 1143. The final deathbed decision of the 
emperor was to appoint as his successor his youngest son Manuel, who had 
accompanied him on this final expedition. Manuel could not continue the campaign 
as he had to leave for Constantinople in order to prevent any attempt by his elder 
brother Isaac to depose him.54 Yet, once he had dealt with these urgent matters in 
Constantinople, Manuel returned to his Eastern domains, conducting campaigns 
against Antioch and the Turks, thus following in his father’s footsteps. However, his 
policy differed in that, while John had secured his Western border thanks to a 
series of negotiations with the Germans, Manuel was prepared to enter into talks 
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with Roger II. It is possible that these discussions, which were aimed at reaching a 
matrimonial alliance, had begun under John II. Possibly as early as in 1139, Roger 
had sent envoys to the basileus, asking for an imperial bride for his son, but without 
success. During the first years of Manuel’s reign, the negotiations resumed, for 
Roger hoped that the new Byzantine emperor might recognise his royal title. 
However, even though the imperial envoy probably granted Roger’s request, this 
recognition was not confirmed by Manuel. Even though both Romuald and 
Kinnamos depicted the initial granting of Roger’s request as an autonomous 
decision by the legate, this was a probably a subtle move by the emperor. Indeed, it 
is quite likely that he pretended to accept Roger’s claims in order to prevent the 
Sicilian king from attacking the Balkans while most of the Byzantine army and navy 
was still involved in conflicts in the East. However, attempts to link these 
negotiations and an attempted coup led by John Dalassenos-Roger (a second-
generation émigré from Southern Italy, and Manuel’s brother-in-law), and backed 
by Robert II, the former Prince of Capua, which took place around the same time in 
Byzantium, seem rather far-fetched.55 The presence of Robert in Constantinople is 
not surprising, as, following his suppression of the revolts in Southern Italy, Roger II 
had (directly or indirectly) forced many of his rebel noblemen to flee. In the years 
following their departure from the Mezzogiorno, some of them, among whom we 
can mention Alexander of Conversano – who had already left in 1133 –, Roger of 
Ariano, and, indeed, Robert of Capua, played an important role as mediators 
between the two empires. Being aware of the emperors’ hostility towards Roger, 
they tried to lobby them to conduct an expedition into Southern Italy. They clearly 
hoped that they would have been generously rewarded for their diplomatic activity, 
and, even more, that a successful campaign would have allowed them to have their 
former possessions restored.56 
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That Manuel initially continued following his father’s policy is also suggested 
by his decision to launch a new campaign to obtain sovereignty over the Principality 
of Antioch in 1144. This expedition was a success, as it ended in the following year 
with a new submission to Byzantium by Raymond. However, this campaign also 
had consequences in other areas of the Levant, as the prince’s inability to assist 
Edessa had led to the attack and conquest of this city by Zengi, the ruler of Mosul 
and Aleppo. Manuel also engaged in warfare in Anatolia against the Turkish Emir of 
Konya: he destroyed Philomelion, and put Konya under siege, but then accepted a 
Turkish peace offer, and left for Constantinople. This decision might have been due 
to Manuel’s desire to focus on the West due to the spreading of rumours that Pope 
Eugenius III had called a new crusade following the fall of Edessa.57 
In the West, Manuel was also active in diplomatic talks with Conrad III; in 
1144 or 1145, a Byzantine envoy asked for the assistance of five hundred knights, 
in exchange for ‘precious gifts’. In addition, according to Otto of Freising’s Chronica, 
the two rulers also agreed to form a confederatio against Roger II. Conrad replied 
by offering to Manuel two thousand knights led by himself, by sending to Byzantium 
some legates, most of whom were nobles from the Mezzogiorno, and by finalising 
the details of Manuel’s wedding to Bertha, whom Conrad had decided to adopt as 
his daughter. The German princess had been in Constantinople since 1142, but 
had not yet married Manuel probably because, whereas she might have been a 
suitable spouse for a younger son, she was not considered a worthy wife for the 
emperor of Byzantium, and also because Manuel wanted a richer dowry. If we can 
trust a passage by Kinnamos, this dowry might have eventually included the rights 
to parts of Italy. According to the chronicler, when Manuel and Conrad met in 
Thessalonica in 1148, the former reminded the latter that Bertha had been given 
Italia as a marriage-gift. Not long after this embassy, in early 1146, Manuel did 
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indeed marry Bertha. However, he did not, at this stage, plan any military 
intervention in the Mezzogiorno.58 
The agreements between the two empires meant that Roger II could not 
conduct any campaign against the Byzantine Empire. Furthermore, even though he 
had been crowned king by Innocent II, Roger’s relations with the Papacy remained 
troublesome until he signed a seven-year truce with Lucius II in September 1144, 
and they worsened again in the following year after Lucius was succeeded by 
Eugenius III.59 Thus, Roger chose to concentrate his attention on the Maghreb, 
sending several naval expeditions to the region. In the end, his men conquered 
Tripoli and some minor neighbouring centres in the mid-1140s.60 
Thus, the period after Roger’s royal investiture by Innocent II was a time of 
change, both for Venice and the Byzantines. At Venice, the formation of the 
commune meant that the doge could no longer take the most important decisions 
unilaterally, but had to rely on the support of the sapientes, who were in most cases 
members of the Venetian wealthy mercantile families. Yet, Venice nevertheless 
conducted an active foreign policy, obtaining the submission of Fano, Pula, and 
Koper, and maintaining its role as a mediator between Byzantium and the Western 
Empire. 
In Byzantium, the death of John II did not result in any dramatic change of 
foreign policy, as Manuel followed in his father’s footsteps in dealing with Antioch. 
However, if we can trust Kinnamos, the emperor’s approach towards Southern Italy 
was more aggressive, as, even though Manuel did not plan any campaign against 
the Mezzogiorno, he nevertheless claimed his rights over parts of this region.61 
Finally, Roger II’s political isolation in the West meant that he could not pursue an 
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aggressive policy towards the Byzantine Empire. Since he could not defeat Manuel, 
the king tried to obtain his support, and engaged in matrimonial negotiations with 
the emperor, but these were eventually unsuccessful. However, Roger still 
managed to obtain some military success in Northern Africa, with the conquest of 
Tripoli, al-Mahdiyya and other coastal ports. 
iv) 1146-49: The Second Crusade and Roger’s Balkan Attack 
The calling of the Second Crusade by Pope Eugenius III in late 1145, and 
Conrad’s participation in this enterprise, gave Roger II the chance to launch a 
campaign in the Balkans. We shall here analyse Roger’s plan, and why it 
eventually failed. We shall also try to understand the military importance of Venice 
in this conflict. 
Roger II realised that the Second Crusade could be a new opportunity for 
him to try to free himself from the international isolation to which he had been 
confined, and to expand his power in the Mediterranean area. Roger offered his 
own ships and provisions to transport the army that the French king Louis VII was 
raising to rescue the Holy Land. However, when the legates of the main leaders of 
the crusade, of the Byzantine Empire, and of the Kingdom of Sicily met in Étampes 
in February 1147, Roger’s proposal was not accepted. The main reason for this 
refusal is that, for the crusaders, accepting Roger’s assistance would have meant 
obtaining no help from Manuel. However, Louis realised that the support of the 
Byzantine Empire was essential in order for the expedition to achieve some 
success. Furthermore, Louis was probably afraid that, due to Roger’s tense 
relations with both Eugenius III and Raymond of Antioch, a Sicilian intervention in 
the crusade might have eventually worsened his own highly-valued good relations 
with the Papacy and with the Antiochenes. Finally, as mentioned by Odo of Deuil, 
the King of France was obsessed with literally following in the footsteps of the men 
who had taken part in the First Crusade. Hence, he was probably not willing to sail 
towards the Levant with the Sicilian navy, as this would have meant not following 
the original path that had been taken by the holy warriors who had conquered 
Jerusalem.62 
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After the failure of this plan, Roger II realised that he could still take 
advantage of the Second Crusade for his own personal goals, even without directly 
taking part in the enterprise. The Byzantine need to dispatch their army to escort 
the crusaders on their passage across Romania meant that the Western Balkans 
had to be left relatively unguarded, and this would have made it easier for the 
Sicilians to try to conquer and plunder parts of this region (in particular, Corfu and 
the Ionian coast of Greece). In addition, the massive German participation in the 
crusade also rid Roger of the threat of having his kingdom invaded by Conrad’s 
army.63 Furthermore, Roger may have perhaps hoped that Conrad’s participation in 
the Second Crusade would lead to the end of the Byzantine-German alliance due 
to the deep-rooted Eastern imperial mistrust towards such expeditions. If this was 
so, his expectations partially came true. The German crusade went on as intended 
despite some possible attempts made by Manuel to persuade Conrad to change 
his plans, and when the two armies came into contact in Romania, there were 
some minor skirmishes (although the fighting was probably not as severe as 
Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates depict it).64 
While the passage of the Second Crusade was undoubtedly the occasion 
that led Roger to launch an attack on Byzantium, some other factors need to be 
taken into consideration in order to understand the actual reasons for this 
expedition. According to Kinnamos, Romuald of Salerno, and to the continuator of 
Sigebert of Gembloux’s chronicle, Roger had felt humiliated after the failure of his 
negotiations with Manuel, and thus decided to attack him in revenge.65 However, 
the failure of these negotiations was probably nothing but the last straw, and 
Roger’s actual motivations are better described by the Venetian sources. The 
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Historia ducum Veneticorum mentions Roger’s hatred towards Manuel and the 
‘Greeks’, while Andrea Dandolo refers to the King of Sicily as Manuel’s emulus 
(emulator and/or rival).66 Indeed, we have previously mentioned that the Byzantines 
seem to have been worried about the possibility of an attack by Roger for over a 
decade. Therefore, it seems quite probable that the conquest of some Balkan lands 
had long been projected, as part of his aggressive Mediterranean policy. Robert 
Guiscard’s and Bohemond I’s legacy, coupled with a desire to reach a goal that his 
relatives had failed to achieve, was probably another important factor.67 
Finally, the suggestion that Roger’s attack was a counteroffensive move to 
prevent the Byzantines and/or the Germans from attacking his kingdom is not 
entirely convincing.68 Indeed, most sources suggest that, by 1147, the Byzantine 
emperors were not interested in acquiring or restoring any Western land. Both 
Romuald and the so-called ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ suggest that Manuel’s later 
aggressive policy towards Southern Italy was conducted as a reprisal following 
Roger’s raids in 1147-48. Furthermore, while Otto of Freising mentions the 
existence of a confederatio against Roger, this term probably referred to a 
defensive alliance, rather than to an offensive one. Thus, the only writer who 
claimed that Manuel had already set his eyes on Southern Italy before 1147 is 
Kinnamos, who refers to Italia as the dowry obtained by the basileus. Yet, since 
Kinnamos’s account was written over thirty years later, and was intended as an 
encomium of Manuel, it ought to be taken with a pinch of salt. Nor can we exclude 
that this passage was added to give the emperor a further legal claim over the 
Italian peninsula.69 
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It is by no means easy to determine exactly when Roger’s Balkan campaign 
started, as not all the evidence from the narrative sources is entirely reliable. For 
instance, a passage in the Annales Cavenses, according to which Roger’s navy 
captured Neapolis in 1146, might be interpreted as referring to Nauplion, thus 
suggesting that the Balkan expedition began in this year. However, the annalist 
clearly miswrote Neapolim instead of Tripolim, and was thus referring to the Libyan 
city of Tripoli, which was indeed conquered in 1146.70 Another possibility, based on 
a passage by Kinnamos according to which a newly-built imperial fleet left 
Constantinople ‘in spring’, is that Roger’s Balkan campaign started in early 1147. 
However, considering how both Kinnamos and Choniates refer to an extremely 
high number of new ships built by Manuel, it is difficult to believe that this fleet 
could be ready in just a few months.71 Therefore, this passage is most likely to refer 
to the following year. 
Yet, some other sources provide more reliable details on the chronology of 
this expedition, leading us to be certain that the campaign had begun by the late 
summer of 1147. The chrysobull that Manuel issued for Venice in October 1147, 
according to which the Venetians were to protect the empire from its enemies, 
suggests that a state of open war with Roger II already existed. Furthermore, a 
Venetian private charter mentions that in September 1147 Domenico Morosini and 
Andrea Zeno were acting as ducal legates at Manuel’s court. Since these 
negotiations had started as a consequence of Roger’s raids, the Sicilian attacks 
must have already begun before September 1147. Furthermore, Odo of Deuil wrote 
that Roger’s navy had already attacked the Byzantines when the French crusaders 
were approaching Constantinople, which they reached on 4 October 1147.72 
In the early stages of the campaign, Roger’s men, led by George of Antioch, 
conquered Corfu thanks to the treachery of the local population, after a series of 
raids on different locations. Almost all the chronicles which extensively cover these 
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attacks mention raids on Corinth, Euboea, and Thebes (from where silk workers – 
mostly Jews – were taken as captives). According to some sources, Kephalonia, 
Monemvasia, Methoni, and Athens were also attacked. Manuel himself marched to 
recover Corfu, but, while he was on his way towards the Western Balkans, he was 
forced to change his plans, as he was needed to counter the Cumans, who had 
recently crossed the Danube. Stephen Kontostephanos was left in charge of the 
siege of Corfu, but was killed by a stone thrown by the Sicilian defenders. The 
Byzantine counterattack was also hampered by tensions between the imperial army 
and the Venetians, who had been asked for military help. Yet, following Manuel’s 
arrival on the battlefield, Corfu was nevertheless recovered in 1149 after a long 
resistance by the Sicilians. In the meantime, Roger’s men had also been also 
active in other parts of the Byzantine Empire. Indeed, if the accounts by Choniates 
and by Andrea Dandolo are reliable, and do not misdate a raid led by Maio of Bari 
around a decade later (and narrated in detail by the Pisan chronicler Bernardo 
Maragone), some ships from the Mezzogiorno reached the surroundings of 
Constantinople, and set fire to some of the wharves of Damalis. Even though the 
Byzantine sources make it difficult to understand the exact succession of the 
events that took place during this part of the campaign, this raid might have 
preceded a naval battle fought at Cape Malea near the south-eastern tip of 
Peloponnese. However, our sources disagree about its outcome, with Kinnamos 
and the Venetian chronicles referring to a Byzantine victory, and Romuald to a 
Sicilian success. Considering that, after this battle, some Sicilian ships probably 
intercepted a Byzantine fleet that was heading for Constantinople from Crete with 
the imperial tax revenue of the island, and then sailed towards Southern Italy full of 
booty, it is quite likely that Roger’s men were in fact victorious. 73 
These raids and the probable Sicilian victory at Cape Malea are a testament 
to the strength of Roger’s navy (which in the meantime also conquered some 
Northern African cities), but also to the weakness of Manuel’s fleet. The numerous 
raids on the Western Balkan coast found little resistance from the Byzantine navy, 
which some years earlier had unsuccessfully tried to blockade Antioch. The 
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explanation provided by Michael the Rhetor that this was due to the Sicilian ships 
sailing quite far from the shore, which was closely guarded by Manuel’s vessels, is 
unconvincing. After this fiasco, as can be interpreted from the text of a chrysobull 
issued for all his bishoprics, Manuel was extremely worried by the success of 
Roger’s men, and he was thus forced to build a new fleet, and to ask for external 
support.74 
Manuel obtained this support from the Venetians, who intervened against 
the Sicilians. Yet, there was no unanimous consensus over this decision. It was 
opposed by the Patriarch of Grado, Enrico Dandolo, whose relations with Doge 
Polani were already tense. According to Andrea Dandolo, the patriarch 
excommunicated the doge, and placed an interdict on Venice, due to its 
participation in the conflict alongside the ‘schismatics’.75 The internal dissension 
over the military intervention in the Balkans was also extended to the Venetian 
merchants. We indeed know that Pietro Polani had to order his men who were in 
Romania to serve in the navy, which meant putting a halt to trade in this region. 
Venetian reluctance in joining this conflict is further suggested by the fact that they 
only agreed to take part in this campaign after they obtained a new chrysobull from 
Manuel in September 1147. The Venetians, whose treaty with Byzantium had not 
been renewed by Manuel since his imperial coronation, obtained the rights of 
trading without paying any dues in Cyprus and Crete, two islands which had not 
been included in the previous chrysobulls.76 Yet, even after this charter was issued, 
the Venetians still did not set sail to Corfu, possibly because of internal dissension 
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over the necessity of such a military intervention. They only joined battle after 
Manuel issued, probably at their insistence, a new chrysobull for them in March 
1148. The Italian commune obtained an agreement that their military involvement 
would be time-limited, only until the following September, and it also received an 
extension of its quarter in Constantinople.77 
Despite this chrysobull, some tension nevertheless arose between the 
Venetians and the Byzantines during their joint siege of Corfu. This was probably 
caused by the limited progress in the military operation, which meant that the 
Venetians were forced to prolong their cooperation until over the agreed time-limit, 
and possibly despite the reluctance of most of their men. The decision by the 
Venetians to continue fighting against Roger may have been taken after some 
further negotiations with the Byzantines. A letter written by King Conrad’s notary 
between the end of 1148 and May 1149 recalls the presence of some Byzantine 
legates in Venice around this time. It is quite likely that this is to be associated with 
discussions over the military partnership against Roger. Unfortunately, the 
circumstances that led to the incidents are unclear, especially because neither 
Kinnamos, who only briefly mentions them, nor Choniates, the only chronicler 
writing in detail about these events, provides any dating. We cannot even be sure 
about how serious this incident was, because Choniates, who wrote his chronicle 
almost sixty years later, after the Venetian-led Fourth Crusade, might over-
emphasise its relevance. He nevertheless describes a fierce brawl taking place 
between the Venetians and the Byzantines outside Corfu. The commanders of both 
armies tried to pacify their men, but to no avail, so the imperial commander, John 
Axouch, attacked the Venetians, who fled to their ships, and set sail towards the 
Aegean. There, they attacked the Byzantine fleet that was lying at anchor in 
Euboea, setting many of these vessels on fire, and capturing the imperial flagship. 
The Venetians then adorned this vessel with imperial decorations, and mocked 
Manuel and his dark complexion by placing a coloured Ethiopian on board of the 
ship, and by acclaiming him as emperor. The incident ended after Manuel himself 
decided to grant an amnesty to the Venetians. However, Choniates concludes his 
account by adding that the basileus did not forgive the Venetians, but merely 
nursed his rancour until a fitting occasion to take revenge should occur.78 
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In addition to the Venetians, the French were also approached for help by 
both Manuel and Roger. Odo of Deuil is the only source briefly mentioning the 
failed negotiations between the Byzantines and Louis.79 We are better informed by 
the Sicilian attempt to persuade the French to join their side. It is once again Odo of 
Deuil who informs us that, when the French army was crossing Romania, a faction 
of Louis’s men, led by the Bishop of Langres, insisted on writing to Roger, and on 
letting him know that the French would have joined the Sicilian fleet in an attack on 
Constantinople. Apparently, the Byzantines became aware of this plan, as they 
grew suspicious towards the French. Eventually, King Louis decided not to follow 
the advice of the bishop and of his supporters.80 It is quite likely that this proposal 
for a French-Sicilian military alliance came from Roger’s men themselves. Indeed, 
the King of Sicily, whose father was born in Normandy, and to whom Odo of Deuil 
referred as nostrarum partium oriundus, had maintained good relationships with the 
French. Although he would intensify his contacts after the end of the Balkan 
campaign, he was already in correspondence with Abbot Suger of St Denis during 
the course of the Second Crusade. Suger was one of Louis’s most trusted advisors, 
and his regent while the king and his wife were leading the crusade. While the 
letters exchanged by Roger and Suger do not mention any military alliance, we 
cannot exclude the possibility that the King of Sicily was nevertheless trying to use 
the abbot as a means to persuade Louis to side with the anti-Byzantine faction of 
his army.81 
Despite Roger’s inability to convince the French to travel to the Holy Land 
on his ships, and to join his men in the conflict against Manuel, the King of France 
eventually returned from Palestine on a Sicilian vessel. However, he was 
intercepted by a Byzantine fleet, which had already captured his wife Eleanor. 
Louis only managed not to be taken as a prisoner himself by raising a banner of an 
ally of the Eastern Empire. Louis and Eleanor (who had in the meantime been 
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released by the Byzantines) were eventually taken to Southern Italy, where they 
were treated honourably, and possibly engaged in discussions on a joint expedition 
against Manuel.82 
Roger’s aim was to take advantage of the logistic difficulties that the Second 
Crusade brought to the Byzantine Empire in order to obtain control over the 
strategic island of Corfu, and to acquire as much booty as possible following his 
raids. Initially, the King of Sicily was successful; however, the lack of external 
support, the reorganisation of the fleet by Emperor Manuel, and the Venetian 
intervention alongside the basileus eventually led to his defeat. The Venetians 
seem to have joined this expedition quite grudgingly. Some of Venice’s leaders 
were probably unwilling to worsen the recently-improved relations between their 
city and the Kingdom of Sicily, and probably only agreed to intervene in the conflict 
in exchange for considerable commercial concessions. Yet, the Venetians, mindful 
of the casualties that they had suffered in the four-year-long conflict against Robert 
Guiscard in the 1080s, only agreed to be involved in this new war for a limited six-
month period. However, the strong resistance by the Sicilians meant that the 
conflict was not over by six months. Even though the Venetians nevertheless 
continued fighting after this time-limit had expired, this probably caused discontent 
amongst their army, eventually leading to the Venetian-Byzantine incidents in Corfu 
and in Euboea. 
v) 1148-56: The Treaty of Thessalonica, and the Byzantine Attempts to 
Recover Part of Southern Italy 
The Second Crusade was an utter failure, in particular for Conrad, who 
struggled to reach Asia Minor, only to be defeated by the Turks at Dorylaion. The 
lack of success of his expedition led the German king to accept Manuel’s proposal 
to return to the Byzantine Empire, and to spend the 1147-48 winter there. However, 
to add insult to injury, while in Ephesus, Conrad also fell sick. Manuel heard of this, 
and, together with his wife, joined him there; the imperial family then convinced 
Conrad to leave for Constantinople with them. Manuel personally took care of the 
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king, and the alliance between the two monarchs was renewed with the marriage 
between a niece of the basileus, Theodora, and Conrad’s half-brother Henry of 
Babenberg. The German king stayed in Constantinople until March 1148, when he 
boarded a Byzantine ship, on which he reached the Holy Land. He did not stay 
there for very long, and, after the failure of the siege of Damascus, he boarded 
another Greek ship, which took him to Thessalonica, near the place where Manuel 
was wintering. There, before Conrad returned to Germany, the two monarchs 
agreed on a new anti-Sicilian pact, the ‘Treaty of Thessalonica’. According to 
Kinnamos, it was at this meeting that Manuel reminded Conrad that Italia had to be 
restored to the basileus’s wife as her dowry.83 
However, this statement by Kinnamos is quite problematic. Firstly, the term 
Italia may be interpreted in different ways. The likeliest explanation seems to be 
that Kinnamos was using this term with the same connotation as the eleventh-
century sources, as a synonym for Longobardia, the part of Apulia south of the 
Gargano peninsula. However, Kinnamos also refers to Robert of Capua as to an 
Ἰταλιῶτης, thus implying that Capua was also part of Italia. This would mean that, 
when he mentioned Manuel’s claims, Kinnamos might have used this expression to 
mean the area that in the late tenth and early eleventh centuries used to form the 
Katepanate of Italia (roughly today’s Apulia, Basilicata, and Calabria), or even the 
whole of Southern Italy.84 
If we are to take what Kinnamos wrote at face value, therefore, this means 
that Manuel implicitly accepted either the current German claims to suzerainty over 
part of the Mezzogiorno, or a previous German suzerainty over the whole of 
Southern Italy (depending upon which interpretation we give to the word Italia). 
Furthermore, Manuel’s claim over (part of) Southern Italy clearly differentiates his 
policy from that of his father. John II had no ambition for territorial conquests in the 
West (and especially in Italy), and his conflicts in this area were always defensive, 
and aimed at restoring the status quo ante.85 
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However, many scholars have considered it extremely unlikely that Conrad 
might agree to concede Byzantine suzerainty over a region that he considered to 
be formally his own. Yet, as we shall see in more detail below, Conrad might have 
done something similar with regard to Ancona, which he claimed as part of the 
Western Empire, even if it was formally part of the patrimony of the Church. Despite 
this, the Byzantines obtained control over this city, which would soon become 
Manuel’s base in Adriatic Italy. Therefore, it is not entirely implausible that the 
German king might have been prepared to cede nominal control over parts of the 
Mezzogiorno to the Eastern Empire. Alternatively, Conrad might simply have 
agreed not to oppose, and maybe even to help, a possible later Byzantine conquest 
of a portion of Southern Italy.86 Finally, neither Kinnamos’s words, nor the Eastern 
imperial rhetoric, suggest that Manuel’s plans for Southern Italy were similar to 
those that he and his father had for Hungary and Serbia, where the main Byzantine 
aim was to install vassal monarchs who would formally be subject to the 
Constantinopolitan throne. Indeed, not only does Kinnamos seem to suggest that 
Italia would actually be under direct Byzantine control, but, in contrast to Hungary 
and Serbia, after Michael VII no Eastern emperor had ever actually recognised the 
legitimacy of any Norman ruler of Southern Italy. 
Diplomatic talks between the two empires continued in the following years. 
In early 1150, Conrad tried to persuade Empress Irene to broker a marriage 
between his son Henry and a niece of Manuel. However, Henry’s death later in this 
year prevented the marriage from taking place. Conrad himself might have then 
tried to marry the Byzantine princess, but his death in 1152 led to the failure of this 
plan. While these negotiations clearly had the aim of strengthening the bonds 
between the two empires, it cannot be excluded that Conrad also had a second end. 
Indeed, he might have had the aim of re-obtaining, as a ‘counterdowry’, nominal 
control over the lands that he had granted to Manuel when the two rulers had met 
in Thessalonica.87 
After the surrender of Corfu, Roger, who was probably aware of the alliance 
concluded by Manuel and Conrad against him, tried to prevent the two rulers from 
undertaking any military activity in Southern Italy. The King of Sicily attempted to 
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stir up trouble in Germany by hosting Duke Welf VI (the brother of Conrad’s sister-
in-law, who had led a rebellion against the German ruler in the early 1140s), and 
granting gifts to him while Conrad was on his way back from the crusade. 
According to Wibald, Roger also gave Welf letters addressed to Frederick of 
Swabia (Conrad’s nephew and eventual successor as Frederick I) and to some of 
most prominent German nobles in the hope of persuading them to rebel as well. 
Welf did eventually start a revolt against Conrad, which was only suppressed in 
early 1150.88 Around this year, Roger may have also conducted unsuccessful 
peace talks with Manuel, if the dating of John Tzetzes’s letter to Manuel’s doctor 
Basil Megistos (1150) suggested by the editors of the Prosopography of the 
Byzantine World is correct.89 
Conrad’s plans for a joint expedition together with Manuel in the 
Mezzogiorno were also hindered by Pope Eugenius III, who may have been 
worried that a Byzantine intervention in Italy would also mean the restoration of the 
Constantinopolitan jurisdiction over the Southern Italian dioceses. Thus, the pope 
tried to bridge his differences with Roger by asking him, rather than Conrad, for 
help against the communal movement that was then trying to obtain political control 
over Rome. This Sicilian intervention was quite significant, leading to the 
destruction of the city of Rieti, probably in 1149. Furthermore, the pontiff 
unsuccessfully tried to dissuade the German king from remaining allied to the 
Byzantines, and to mediate between Roger and Conrad, hoping that the two would 
arrange a peace.90 
However, Eugenius’s hostility towards Byzantium was probably only limited 
to opposing Manuel’s plans to set foot on Italy. Indeed, the pontiff seems not to 
have supported the Franco-Sicilian plan (if there ever was such a project) of an 
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expedition against Manuel, probably because he did not want to face Conrad’s 
hostility. Rumours of this plot against Byzantium, which was probably originally 
planned by Peter the Venerable, were heard by Conrad, who passed them on to 
Manuel’s wife Bertha. However, it is quite doubtful that King Louis of France was 
really keen on making this project come true. Indeed, while it is a fact that Roger’s 
relations with the Kingdom of France intensified after the Second Crusade, the 
French may not all have had such a negative opinion of Byzantium as Odo of 
Deuil’s account seems to suggest, and were probably unwilling to engage in 
another extremely expensive campaign just after the failure of the Second 
Crusade.91 
Thus, a joint Byzantine-German expedition against the Mezzogiorno 
immediately after Conrad’s return to Germany from the Second Crusade was 
unfeasible. However, things changed in 1151, when Roger II enraged Eugenius by 
crowning his son William as co-king without consulting the Papacy. This meant that 
Pope Eugenius was now prepared to back Conrad’s plan for an invasion of the 
Mezzogiorno. Therefore, the German king started planning an Italian campaign, 
aimed both at being crowned emperor by the pope, and, later, at attacking the 
Kingdom of Sicily. Conrad obtained the support of the higher ecclesiastical and lay 
aristocracy in Würzburg in September 1151, and also asked the Pisans for naval 
assistance. However, his project never materialised, as he died in February 1152 
before he could leave Germany.92 In the end, therefore, Conrad did not actually 
contribute to the alliance against Roger. indeed, even the German troops that were 
installed in Corfu after this island was reconquered by the Byzantines in 1149 were 
probably mercenary forces, rather than troops sent by the emperor-elect.93 
Manuel’s plans for an invasion of Southern Italy were initially frustrated not 
only by Conrad’s problems. A storm which sank the ships that were attempting to 
cross the Adriatic, and, according to Kinnamos, the Venetian opposition to the 
project, were two key events that prevented a Byzantine counterattack soon after 
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they had re-obtained control over Corfu.94 To Venice, Manuel’s plans were as 
threatening as were those of Roger, especially following the incidents that had 
occurred during the siege of Corfu. If hostilities with Byzantium had restarted, a 
Greek conquest of part of the Eastern Italian coast would have had serious 
consequences for Venice. Holding these new territories would not have been 
possible without frequent naval communications with the Balkans. The Byzantine 
fleet would have thus become a major rival of the Venetian ships, and, in case of 
the beginning of a conflict, this would have prevented the Venetians from sailing 
into the Ionian and Mediterranean seas. Such a threat may have seemed even 
more serious, as in 1149 the Byzantines had probably already obtained a form of 
protectorate over the city-state of Ancona. Formal control over this city might have 
been ceded to Manuel by the Germans, or, more likely, the Byzantines might have 
autonomously reached an agreement with the commune of Ancona. Considering 
the events from c. 1150 until 1180 (when this protectorate ended), the bond 
between Constantinople and Ancona was probably quite loose. The Byzantines 
were probably allowed military access into the city in order to use it as a 
bridgehead for an Italian campaign. Indeed, if we trust Kinnamos, Manuel planned 
to use Ancona both as the base for an imperial penetration into the Mezzogiorno, 
and to keep the Venetians in check. On the other hand, the Byzantines were 
probably expected to provide military help to Ancona whenever this city was under 
attack. However, the Anconitans were probably free to undertake any measure of 
internal and external policy as long as it was not hostile towards Byzantium.95 
What also prevented Manuel from attacking the Mezzogiorno around 1150 
was a series of attacks by the Serbs and the Hungarians. The Byzantine panegyrist 
Prodromos suggests that their attacks were part of a plan orchestrated by Roger II, 
while Kinnamos also includes the ‘Germans’ (the Welfs?) in this anti-Byzantine 
scheme. Their suggestions make sense: Roger probably incited the Welfs against 
Conrad, and the Serbs and the Hungarians against Manuel, in order to divert the 
two rulers from their South Italian projects. The participation of the Serbs of Raška 
in this entente was probably a consequence of their alliance with the Hungarians, 
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after the daughter of the Serbian ruler Uroš I had married the Kng Béla II of 
Hungary (1131-41). The Serbs of Raška were indeed the first to attack the 
Byzantine domains, but Manuel faced them with success, conducting some raids 
on the Serbian towns, and eventually forcing their king to submit to him.96 
This Hungarian hostility towards Byzantium was a consequence of Manuel’s 
decision to shelter Boris, a son of King Coloman, and claimant to St Stephen’s 
throne, who had been previously hosted by Conrad. King Géza II reacted by 
financing Welf’s rebellion against Conrad, and by approaching Louis VII of France 
and Roger, joining their anti-Byzantine entente. The agreements between Roger 
and Géza were probably brokered by Gentile, the chancellor of the King of Hungary, 
who, subsequently, in 1154, became Bishop of Agrigento. The Hungarians attacked 
the Byzantines in 1150, but were defeated. Yet, this prevented Manuel from 
launching an attack on Southern Italy soon after the recovery of Corfu. Two minor 
naval victories (one in 1151 or 1152, and the other one in 1154) are the only 
concrete results that the Eastern Empire could achieve against the Sicilians. 
However, since these battles are only mentioned in two contemporary panegyrics 
(and not by Manuel’s ‘official’ historian, John Kinnamos), they can probably be 
downgraded to petty skirmishes.97 The timing of these battles may have been 
linked to Conrad’s contemporary plans to enter Italy, although we have no concrete 
evidence that a concerted attack was envisaged. Furthermore, Manuel probably did 
not launch a full-scale attack on Southern Italy because he was unwilling to leave 
the Balkans unprotected, as he did not entirely trust the Serbs and the Hungarians. 
In particular, the strong bonds between Dessa, the brother of the Serbian ruler 
(who would later briefly depose him thanks to the support of Hungary), and the 
Mezzogiorno might have scared Manuel. In 1151 the Serbian noble, who then ruled 
over some land in Southern Dalmatia, donated the island of Mljet (near Dubrovnik) 
to the monastery of Santa Maria di Pulsano, in the Gargano.98 Of course this is not 
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clear evidence of an entente between Dessa and Roger, but Manuel might have 
made this connection. 
The plans to invade Southern Italy had to remain on hold in the following 
years too, due to the political situation in other border areas. In the East, Manuel 
tried to recover Cilicia (which had been taken by the Armenians), and, following the 
death of Raymond of Antioch, also tried to install a Byzantine regent in this 
principality. However, this project did not come to fruition since Raymond’s widow 
chose to marry Raynald of Châtillon, rather than Manuel’s candidate (the kaisar 
John Dalassenos-Roger).99 In the West, the emperor had to face the Hungarians in 
a series of intermittent conflicts which only ended in the spring of 1155. The 
Hungarians had probably been supported by Roger until his death in 1154, and 
later by Manuel’s renegade cousin Andronikos.100 
In addition, Manuel’s plans for a joint expedition together with the Germans 
had to be rearranged after the death of Conrad III. Indeed, the attitude of his 
nephew and successor, Frederick I, towards Byzantium was not as favourable as 
Conrad’s. Evidence of this can be found in a clause of the Treaty of Constance, 
signed in March 1153 between Barbarossa and Pope Eugenius. Frederick swore to 
the pontiff not to allow the ‘Greeks’ to obtain control of any land in Italy, and to try to 
make them flee the peninsula in case they might invade it. Frederick also swore not 
to sign a truce or a peace treaty with the King of Sicily without the consent and 
willingness of the Papacy, and promised to subjugate this kingdom to the pope and 
to the Roman Church. Frederick renewed his oath to the new pope, Adrian IV, in 
January 1155.101 However, under Barbarossa the exchange of correspondence 
between the two empires did resume, as did the talks about a matrimonial alliance 
(Frederick had recently separated from his first wife on the grounds of 
consanguinity). In the first of these letters, Frederick announced his intention of 
attacking ‘Apulia and Sicily’, but he did not appear to be willing to undertake any 
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plan for a joint expedition in the Mezzogiorno with the Byzantines. However, the 
narrative sources recording the negotiations appear to depict a different picture. 
Otto of Freising suggests that the negotiations were also aimed at ‘annihilating’ the 
King of Sicily, while, according to Kinnamos, Frederick promised to fulfil all the 
agreements previously arranged between Conrad and Manuel, which perhaps 
included recognition of Manuel’s rights over parts of Southern Italy.102 The most 
plausible interpretation of this evidence is that Barbarossa was probably being 
intentionally duplicitous, probably because he needed the temporary support of 
both the Papacy and the Byzantines in order to obtain the imperial crown, to isolate 
the Kingdom of Sicily diplomatically, and, possibly, to receive military assistance in 
the Mezzogiorno. Yet, if Frederick had succeeded in conducting a military 
expedition in Southern Italy, it is extremely unlikely that he would have ceded 
control of this region to the pope, or any part of it to the Byzantines. 
Barbarossa’s later negative reaction when Manuel attacked Apulia in 1155-
56 shows that he did not intend to accept an Eastern imperial presence in the area. 
In 1154-55 Frederick conducted his first Italian campaign, during which he had a 
chance to attempt the conquest of the Mezzogiorno. According to Otto of Freising, 
Barbarossa even tried to get in touch with the Pisans in order to obtain their naval 
help against the new King of Sicily, William I. Yet, despite Frederick’s wishes to be 
crowned as emperor only after a successful expedition in Southern Italy, the 
opposition of his princes forced him to head back to the North.103 In late July or 
early August 1155, after Barbarossa had left Rome for Ancona, he was approached 
with gifts by some Byzantine envoys, who hoped that he would change his mind, 
and invade Southern Italy. In case of a refusal by Frederick, the men of the 
basileus would have begun a campaign without the Germans. Otto of Freising 
mentions that, after receiving this legation, Barbarossa did indeed try, once more, 
to persuade his men to attack the Mezzogiorno. He did so because there seemed 
to be favourable premises for a successful campaign: Prince Robert of Capua, who 
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had joined Barbarossa together with Manuel’s envoys, had easily recovered his 
former lands. This had happened because Robert’s former subjects had opened 
their gates to him as they thought that a German invasion was imminent (Robert 
was at this time acting as an envoy of Frederick). However, according to Otto, even 
given this seemingly favourable opportunity, Barbarossa was unable to convince 
his men to proceed southwards. Many of them were sick or wounded, and they 
wanted to return to Germany as soon as possible. Furthermore, Frederick must 
also have realised that a summer invasion of the Mezzogiorno with a relatively 
small army was extremely unlikely to succeed. Eventually, the Kaiser only sent his 
secretary, Wibald, to Constantinople as an envoy, while Manuel decided to attack 
Southern Italy on his own, despite the lack of support from Frederick.104 
Meanwhile in Southern Italy, Barbarossa’s plan had prevented William I 
(1154-66) from conducting a policy as aggressive as his father’s – Roger II had 
slightly extended his African possessions as late as 1153.105 Indeed, the new king 
(or, possibly, his extremely powerful admiral, Maio of Bari) strengthened his 
defences in Apulia by assigning them to his newly-appointed chancellor Asclettin, 
and to Count Simon ‘of Policastro’.106 In addition, William tried to end the diplomatic 
isolation that had characterised most of Roger’s reign. He eventually managed to 
sign a treaty with Venice, either in the final days of 1154 or in early 1155 (as we 
shall see below in more detail).107 William also unsuccessfully attempted to arrange 
for peace with Adrian IV, but initially the pontiff was not interested. However, the 
pope attempted an approach shortly later, but this failed as the king sent back the 
papal envoy once he found out that Adrian’s letters referred to himself as dominus 
of Sicily (instead of as rex). The pontiff was infuriated, and excommunicated 
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William, who then sought revenge by having the papal city of Benevento besieged. 
Adrian reacted by recruiting the Southern Italian émigrés Robert of Capua and 
Andrew of Rupecanina to fight back against the Sicilians. The pope was also 
approached by the Byzantines. He apparently received a letter from Michael 
Palaiologos, who was acting as Manuel’s agent in Ancona. Palaiologos offered his 
help in the form of a large distribution of gold, and of a Byzantine expedition that 
would annihilate William, and grant his lands to the Papacy. In return, Manuel’s 
agent asked for three coastal cities in Apulia (two of them probably being Bari and 
Brindisi) to be handed over to the Eastern Empire. However, Adrian did not accept 
this offer, as he was unwilling to see parts of Southern Italy outside the jurisdiction 
of the Roman Church. Hence, there was an exchange of embassies concerning the 
reunification of the Churches, but the negotiations eventually failed due to the 
emperor’s refusal to recognise the primacy of the Roman See, and to his insistence 
on the supremacy of the Constantinopolitan one. The Byzantine-Papal talks 
nevertheless alarmed William, who tried to submit to the Church, and to be forgiven 
by Adrian. However, these initial diplomatic efforts by the king were not successful 
(the Treaty of Benevento was only signed in June 1156).108 
At the same time, William also started negotiations with Manuel I, but these 
fared no better than the ones with Adrian. Even though the King of Sicily proposed 
to restore to the Byzantines all the goods and properties that Roger had taken 
during his raids in 1147-49, the basileus refused this offer, probably because he 
wanted to take advantage of the difficulties of the new King of Sicily. Indeed, the 
Byzantine navy engaged, successfully, in naval warfare with the Sicilians during 
1154.109 
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In the following year, Manuel could finally put his plans to invade Southern 
Italy into practice. Before he launched his invasion against William, the basileus 
tried to obtain naval support from the two maritime powers of Venice and Genoa. 
Palaiologos was put in charge of the negotiations with both cities; he first went to 
Venice, probably in late 1154 (or in early 1155). Even though no source mentions 
that he negotiated an alliance with the commune, this was probably Palaiologos’s 
main aim. However, for several reasons, he was unsuccessful, and only ended up 
recruiting a mercenary army. This decision at first sight might seem quite strange, 
considering the involvement of the commune in the anti-Sicilian entente. Indeed, a 
charter issued in October 1151 mentions that the Venetians ships were still being 
harassed by the Sicilian navy, while in the second half of December 1154 
Barbarossa had granted to Venice a confirmation of the privileges that most of his 
predecessors had issued for the Adriatic city.110 However, Venice had sided with 
the Byzantines in the previous conflicts with the rulers of the Mezzogiorno mainly 
out of fear that the same political power would control both shores of the Southern 
Adriatic. Now the Venetians were afraid that a similar situation could take place if 
the Byzantines were to conquer Adriatic Southern Italy. A Byzantine expansion in 
the Adriatic area was especially dreaded as the Venetians had shown renewed 
interest in this area in the late 1140s and the early 1150s. Venice had once more 
obtained control of Poreč, Pula, and Umag (the first two cities had briefly rebelled), 
and had managed to strengthened its positions in Dalmatia despite the loss of 
some cities to Hungary. A sign of this increased Venetian control over Dalmatia 
was that the see of Zadar was incorporated into the metropolitan province of Grado 
in 1155. Furthermore, the agreement that Venice signed with Ancona in 1152 
outlined a Venetian determination to try to extend its commercial influence over the 
Western mid-Adriatic. According to the terms of this agreement, the Anconitans 
were allowed to trade in Venice and in all the places under Venetian control, in 
exchange for a promise of providing military help. The signing of this treaty meant 
that the rivalry between the two cities, which had been particularly strong in 1141 
(when Venice had helped Fano against Ancona), had been temporarily put aside. 
The signing of this agreement was rather unproblematic in 1152, when Manuel had 
temporarily put aside his project of attacking Southern Italy. However, it is 
extremely likely that the different political scenario of 1155, when Ancona was used 
by the Byzantine armies as a base for their campaign in the Mezzogiorno, and 
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Venice had signed an alliance with William I of Sicily, meant that this agreement 
only lasted a few years before its military terms were no longer acceptable.111 
Yet, Venice did not merely choose to remain neutral during the conflict, as 
the Adriatic commune signed an agreement that can be clearly interpreted as a 
radical political volte-face. We have seen how, except for the time of the brief war in 
the 1120s, the Venetians had been one of the main allies of Byzantium since the 
beginning of the reign of Alexios I, and had opposed any Southern Italian attempt to 
invade Southern Italy. Yet, in the mid-1150s, they clearly showed their opposition to 
the aggressive foreign policy of the Eastern Empire by signing a treaty with William 
I, the ruler against whom Manuel I was organising a military campaign. This 
agreement did not lead to the beginning of hostilities between Venice and 
Byzantium, but it can nevertheless be considered as a milestone in later relations 
between these two political entities. 
The exact dating of the Venetian-Sicilian treaty is disputed, as the original 
charter has not survived.112 However, the narrative sources from Venice suggest 
that this agreement was reached before the beginning of Manuel’s campaign in 
Southern Italy. While the earliest of these texts, the Historia ducum Veneticorum, 
provides extremely vague information, later works provide more details. Andrea 
Dandolo and Marino Sanudo wrote that the agreement was issued after Frederick’s 
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charter to Venice (therefore, after 22 December 1154), but during Domenico 
Morosini’s dogeship. In addition, Morosini’s epitaph, included in the chronicles of 
both pseudo-Pietro Giustinian (written in the fourteenth century) and Sanudo, 
recalls that the doge had reached an agreement with the Sicilians, who, according 
to the former text, were then ruled by William. Pseudo-Giustinian also mentions that 
Morosini reached this agreement in the text of his chronicle, and adds that this pact 
was later renewed with some additions by his successor Vitale II Michiel. All this 
evidence seems therefore to suggest that the original treaty was signed by Morosini 
between 22 December 1154 and his death, and that it was renewed (possibly with 
some changes) by Michiel. However, the date of Morosini’s death is problematic. 
Dandolo dated it to February 1156, but we should note that the doge-chronicler 
post-dated the beginning of the dogeship of Vitale II Michiel. Documentary 
evidence shows that Michiel was already doge in July 1155, and this, combined 
with Dandolo’s information according to which Morosini died in February, suggests 
that the death took place in February 1155. This dating is also suggested by both 
epitaphs, which, however, misdate the indiction (February 1155 was in the third 
indiction, not in the fourth one).113 Hence, we may deduce that the treaty between 
Venice and William was concluded either in the final days of 1154, or in early 1155. 
The negotiations between Venice and William are also mentioned by 
Pseudo-Hugo Falcandus, according to whom Robert of San Giovanni was sent as 
an ambassador to Venice while Peter of Castronuovo was capitaneus in Apulia. 
Falcandus characteristically does not provide any dating for this embassy, although 
we know that Robert was in Sicily at some point in 1156, before September, when 
he witnessed a donation. Jamison suggested that this embassy might have taken 
place between April 1156 and autumn 1157. However, her suggestion is not 
particularly convincing, as it is based on three rather fragile hypotheses: that the 
title of capitaneus mentioned by Falcandus was actually that of magister capitaneus, 
that a charter issued in late 1157 or early 1158 might refer to Peter of Castronuovo 
as such, and that Peter must have obtained this title after the imprisonment of 
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Chancellor Asclettin.114 Even if we accept Jamison’s argument, this does not clash 
with the evidence from the Venetian sources. Falcandus could indeed be referring 
to the second round of negotiations, which took place between William I and Doge 
Vitale II Michiel after Manuel’s men had been expelled from Southern Italy, and 
which can also be interpreted as a reaction to the signing of an agreement between 
Genoa and Byzantium (see below). 
Therefore, the Venetian sources seem to provide the likeliest dating of the 
treaty between Venice and William I, which had probably already been finalised by 
the time Palaiologos had reached Venice. This was, then, a further reason for the 
Venetian refusal to assist Manuel’s men in their expedition, as the agreement might 
well have included a neutrality clause in case of a conflict between William and the 
Byzantines. This dating also suggests that the Venetians did not think that the 
plans of either Barbarossa or Manuel to invade Southern Italy would be successful, 
and possibly that they were not even expecting Frederick to invade the 
Mezzogiorno (otherwise they risked the Western emperor punishing them for their 
duplicity on his way back to Germany). 
After failing to gain Venice’s support, Manuel’s men still tried to obtain some 
naval help from Genoa, offering in exchange some advantageous trade 
concessions. The ensuing agreement, which was concluded in October 1155 by 
Demetrios Makrembolites, was probably reached because the Byzantines wanted 
to obtain naval support, to block William’s Mediterranean supply line, and to 
diminish the Genoese commercial role in the Principality of Antioch. Yet, it is also 
clear that Manuel also wanted to punish Venice for its refusal to be involved in the 
conflict in Southern Italy. Indeed, the pact made Genoa a new commercial rival to 
the Venetians in Constantinople and in the rest of the empire, for the Ligurian city 
obtained a reduction of the kommerkion to four percent, instead of the usual ten 
percent (the same amount paid by the Pisans). In addition, the Byzantine agent 
slyly swore that the Genoese would obtain from Manuel a quarter in Constantinople 
near the Venetian and Pisan ones as long as also Palaiologos and Doukas (the 
Byzantine commanders) were willing to promise this. In exchange, the Genoese 
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swore not to ally with any power that was hostile towards Byzantium, and that their 
merchants residing in Romania would defend the Eastern Empire in case of an 
enemy attack. In addition to the advantageous conditions offered by the emperor’s 
legates, the Genoese decision to side with Manuel was also a consequence of 
Barbarossa’s plans of controlling Italy, and, even more importantly, of a shift in the 
commercial politics of the city (with a new emphasis on foreign trade) undertaken 
by the pro-Byzantine consuls in office in 1154.115 Furthermore, the entente was 
facilitated by the good relations, dating back from the 1130s, between Genoa and 
Prince Robert of Capua, who was trying to recover his lands, and by the long-
lasting bad relations between Genoa and the Sicilian monarchs.116 Yet, despite this 
agreement, the Genoese were still much involved in commerce with Southern Italy, 
and continued trading there after the signing of the alliance with Byzantium, 
although they had never signed any formal treaty with the Kingdom of Sicily. 
Therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility that signing a treaty with the Eastern 
Empire was a sly move by Genoa to force William to grant it commercial 
advantages in the Kingdom of Sicily.117 
As we have previously seen, Frederick I was unable to continue his Italian 
campaign, and, instead, returned to Germany. Despite this, the negotiations 
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between Manuel and Barbarossa had not stopped, with Wibald being sent to 
Constantinople. However, relations between the Germans and the Byzantines soon 
worsened. Otto of Freising mentions that, upon Wibald’s return, Frederick refused 
to receive Manuel’s envoys, allegedly because they had stolen some of his letters, 
which had his own seal. The envoys had then forged these letters, which seemed 
to prove that Barbarossa had granted the whole coastline to the Byzantines, so that 
the Eastern Empire would obtain nominal control of cities in Campania and in 
Apulia.118 Even though this is not entirely clear from Otto’s account, it seems quite 
likely that the German emperor was more upset about the Byzantine claim to obtain 
land that he felt that was nominally his own, rather than about the trickery itself. 
Frederick’s concern regarding a Byzantine penetration into Southern Italy is further 
evidenced by his plan to undertake an expedition there in order to drive Manuel’s 
men out of the Mezzogiorno as soon as he heard of their ephemeral conquests.119 
These elements seem to provide some evidence for the theory, mentioned above, 
that Frederick was only concerned to maintain his alliance with Manuel insofar as it 
served his own interests and ambition, and that he would have been unwilling to 
divide Southern Italy with the Byzantines after a hypothetical victorious joint 
campaign. 
However, a second interpretation regarding Barbarossa’s non-involvement 
in this campaign has recently been suggested. It has been argued that it was 
Frederick’s return to Germany which led to an eventual Byzantine intervention in 
Southern Italy. Tolstoy-Miloslavsky suggests that Manuel did not want to divide this 
region with the Western Empire, especially since this would have meant replacing 
the Hautevilles with an even more powerful neighbour, and that, for this same 
reason, any nominal Byzantine support towards the previous German interventions 
in Southern Italy was not at all wholehearted.120 Thus, rather than being a 
complicating factor for the Byzantines, the lack of support from the Western Empire 
might well have been the decisive element that led Manuel to launch his campaign. 
Despite the lack of support from either Venice or Barbarossa, Manuel could 
rely on some help from within the Mezzogiorno itself, where two rebellions had 
broken out. One had taken place in south-eastern Sicily, while the other one had 
been started by Robert of Bassonville, a cousin of William I. Robert had been a 
favourite of Roger II, who, following the death of his two elder sons, had apparently 
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made him second-in-line (after William) to the succession of the kingdom. Robert 
had also been granted the important County of Loritello by William, who had 
probably followed Roger’s recommendation to do so. However, in the months 
following this, relations between William and Robert had soon worsened. The new 
king had decided to deprive Robert of much of his power by entrusting the 
government of the kingdom to Maio of Bari (recently appointed as ‘admiral of 
admirals’), and then by dismissing the count from the command of the men that he 
had raised from his feudum. This had probably been a reaction to Robert’s refusal 
to besiege Benevento (a papal enclave), as the king had ordered him to do. Thus, 
Bassonville decided to rebel with the support of other disgruntled Apulian nobles, 
and to try (albeit unsuccessfully) to obtain Barbarossa’s backing. In addition to 
these rebellions, and to the Byzantine and German threats, William also had to face 
another danger, in the form of the return of two of the main nobles of Southern Italy, 
Robert of Capua, and Andrew of Rupecanina (the nephew of Rainulf of Caiazzo, 
who had become Duke of Apulia during Lothar’s invasion in 1133). These two men 
managed to obtain the support of the Papacy since Adrian IV preferred not to have 
a strong Kingdom of Sicily as his neighbour. Finally, the situation was even more 
critical as all these events took place simultaneously, and at a time when King 
William was stricken by a serious illness, which led to rumours of his death 
spreading throughout the kingdom.121 
Despite their failure to obtain any external support, the Byzantines tried to 
take advantage of their centuries-long ties with Southern Italy to attempt to 
undertake a successful campaign in the Mezzogiorno. More specifically, Manuel 
was aware of the rebellion of Robert of Bassonville. Robert was met by a Byzantine 
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envoy, Alexander, the former Count of Conversano, who had unsuccessfully 
approached Barbarossa, and now offered Manuel’s support for this rebellion. Then, 
in Vieste, Robert finalised this agreement with Palaiologos: according to the 
Chronicle of Carpineto, the count agreed that coastal Apulia would be handed over 
to the Byzantines. The conflict was initially successful for Manuel’s men, who 
quickly conquered most of the coastal towns of Northern Apulia: Vieste, San 
Flaviano (modern Giulianova), Bari, Andria, and Trani (although this last was soon 
recovered by the Sicilians). The Byzantines then took advantage of the 
reinforcements sent by Manuel and led by John Angelos to penetrate into the 
interior, and capture Montepeloso and Gravina. Even if their achievements were 
soon afterwards marred by some minor misunderstandings with Robert of 
Bassonville, and by Palaiologos’s illness and death, John Doukas, who had now 
become the commander of the invading army, still managed to penetrate into 
Southern Apulia, and to conquer Mottola, Massafra, Monopoli (after quite a long 
siege), and Ostuni. Then, in April 1156, he besieged and captured Brindisi (apart 
for its citadel). While they also achieved a naval victory over the Sicilians, the 
Byzantines continued to focus their resources on their land army. Further 
reinforcements arrived, led by Anna Komnene’s son Alexios Komnenos Bryennios. 
Yet, William, who had in the meantime recovered from his illness, and suppressed 
the Sicilian revolt, could now face the Byzantines with a strong army. Despite their 
numerical inferiority, and Robert of Bassonville’s late arrival in Brindisi (which may 
have been deliberate), the Eastern imperial commanders, Alexios Komnenos 
Bryennios and John Doukas, unwisely decided to join battle with the Sicilians in late 
May 1156. They were routed and captured. William quickly recovered all his cities 
that the Byzantines had briefly held. Thus, with the exception of the imperial 
protectorate over Ancona, Manuel did not manage to retain any possession in 
Italy.122 
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Therefore, Manuel’s military invasion of Southern Italy, despite some initial 
ephemeral successes, ended up as an utter failure. The sources describing this 
campaign advance some explanations as to why the expedition was unsuccessful. 
Niketas Choniates merely suggested that bad ‘Fortune’ was the actual cause of the 
imperial defeat. Kinnamos, who is the most detailed source for this campaign, 
blamed the imperial generals for deciding to fight a pitched battle even though they 
were outnumbered. Pseudo-Falcandus, however, suggested that the Byzantine 
invaders had no other choice but to engage in this battle.123 This seems to suggest 
that Manuel’s men were defeated mainly due to a lack of manpower. Moreover, 
Kinnamos probably only blamed the commanders of the imperial army because his 
role as Manuel’s ‘official historian’ prevented him from criticising the basileus 
himself for not sending enough men to Italy. 
In addition, the Byzantines were unsuccessful because the rebel front 
lacked cohesion and common motivation, and thus failed to unite under a strong 
leadership. More specifically, the key potential local ally, Robert of Bassonville, 
failed to unite his forces with theirs at Brindisi, and instead went to Benevento to 
support Pope Adrian, and failed to reach his Greek allies in Brindisi. Furthermore, 
Manuel’s troops probably obtained little backing from the local Italo-Greek 
population.124 Yet, the main issue that the Byzantines had to face was arguably 
their lack of external support, and in particular of naval help. Not only were the 
Venetians not involved in the conflict, but the alliance with the Genoese was not 
particularly fruitful. None of the sources mentions any involvement of Genoa in this 
conflict, or any attempt by its ships to prevent William from landing on mainland 
Italy. Genoa’s reluctance to be involved in this conflict might be a consequence of it 
not obtaining the quarter in Constantinople which it had been promised – we know 
that three Genoese brothers, the Della Cortes, went to the Bosporus as envoys in 
1156, probably in order to press Manuel to hand this quarter over to their city. In 
addition, William I might have dissuaded the Genoese from intervening in the 
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conflict by promising to grant some commercial concessions himself in exchange 
for their neutrality, as he eventually did in November 1156. The Genoese part of the 
agreement (which was extremely generous towards the Ligurian city) included a 
clause according to which the citizens of Genoa were not allowed to fight against 
the Sicilians alongside the Byzantines.125 Barbarossa also failed to provide any 
military help, and once he received the news of the initial Byzantine success in the 
Mezzogiorno he showed hostility towards it. Indeed, he started to plan a new 
expedition to expel them from Italy.126 
This analysis assumes that Manuel either wanted to obtain some permanent 
conquests in Southern Italy, or to make it a client state. However, there is also the 
possibility, suggested by Tolstoy-Miloslavsky, that Manuel was only interested in a 
retaliatory attack against the Kingdom of Sicily after Roger’s raids in the late 
1140s.127 While the Byzantine lack of manpower and siege engines during the 
campaign might make this theory superficially attractive, there are many elements 
that remain unconvincing. Tolstoy-Miloslavsky’s substantial degree of scepticism 
towards the chronicles that analyse Manuel’s motives is probably exaggerated, and 
other aspects also need to be taken into consideration. To begin with, why would 
the Byzantine commanders engage in a pitched battle in Brindisi when they were 
outnumbered, if the aim of their campaign was simply to retaliate after Roger’s 
raids? We must remember that, according to Kinnamos, the Greek army leaders 
chose to engage in combat with William despite their numerical inferiority. There 
are three possible answers to this question. Kinnamos’s account might not be 
accurate, or the Byzantine commanders might have been trapped by the Sicilians, 
and have had no choice but to fight against their enemies – as was suggested by 
Falcandus. However, even if most of the Byzantine fleet had probably returned to 
the Balkans to seek reinforcements, Brindisi had not been blockaded by William’s 
ships, and Manuel’s men probably still had an available maritime escape route. 
Alternatively, they might have disobeyed Manuel’s orders – thus making the 
emperor ‘angry’, and not only because of the defeat of his men. This second 
hypothesis should not be completely discredited, especially considering the high 
lineage of one of the commanders, Alexios Komnenos Bryennios. He was Anna 
                                                          
125 Giovanni Scriba, Cartolare, I, no. 84, p. 45; William I, Diplomata, nos. 17-18, pp. 47-
53; CDRG, I, no. 282, pp. 344-49; Abulafia, The Two Italies…, pp. 85-99; Day, Genoa’s 
Response…, pp. 89, 105 fn. 94; Ravegnani, ‘Tra i due imperi...’, p. 43; Nicol, 
Byzantium and Venice…, p. 94; Pistarino, ‘I Normanni...’, pp. 251-52. 
126 Otto of Freising and Rahewin, Gesta Friderici…, bk 2, ch. 52, p. 384. 
127 Tolstoy-Miloslavsky, ‘Manuel I Komnenos and Italy...’, pp. 111-23. 
145 
 
Komnene’s son, and thus, if we trust Niketas Choniates’s account of his mother’s 
attempted coup in 1118, he might have overtried to achieve a glorious victory in 
order to earn some popularity amongst the army, which he could have later 
exploited in case of a dynastic crisis.128 Thus, Alexios might have insisted on 
fighting against William’s army even though he was outnumbered. Finally, the 
easiest explanation is that the Byzantine commanders might have decided to 
engage in a battle even though they were outnumbered due to their overconfidence 
in the arrival of the reinforcements promised by Robert of Bassonville – as was 
suggested by Kinnamos.129 None of these factors nevertheless explain Manuel’s 
decision to send reinforcements to John Doukas if his aim was just that of 
conducting raids. 
We also need to take into consideration a charter, which incidentally 
Tolstoy-Miloslavsky misdates, issued in Siponto in October 1155, and dated 
according to the regnal year of the Byzantine emperor. This indicates that Siponto 
was then under Eastern imperial control, and that the Byzantine domination over 
this town was considered not to be temporary.130 For all these various reasons, 
Tolstoy-Miloslavsky’s hypothesis that the Byzantine campaign in Southern Italy was 
only aimed at raiding the Mezzogiorno, and that it is thus not to be regarded as 
unsuccessful, is quite far-fetched. 
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vi) Conclusions 
The years between the death of Alexios I in 1118, and the Byzantine defeat 
in Brindisi in 1156 are characterised by an independent and quite opportunist 
Venetian attitude towards the Eastern Empire. Venice was still willing to help 
Byzantium when Roger II was threatening to invade the Balkans, but refused to be 
involved in Manuel’s attempt to restore Byzantine control over part of Southern Italy. 
The Adriatic city had even attacked some imperial possessions when John II had 
refused to renew their commercial privileges. Thus, it is quite clear that, for the 
years 1118-56, we cannot assume that there was a long-standing alliance between 
these two powers, as the Venetians were only willing to help the Byzantines in 
exchange for the granting of new trade concessions, or if their assistance was also 
advantageous to their own geo-political strategy. This is why, after being granted 
two privileges from Manuel I, Venice provided its fleet to the emperor when Roger 
had conquered Corfu, but refused to do so during the Byzantine expedition into 
Italy in 1155-56: if Manuel had managed to control Apulia, the Venetians would 
have faced the same risk of having their ships bottlenecked in the Adriatic as they 
would have done if Roger II had controlled both shores of the narrow Strait of 
Otranto. Therefore, Venice signed an agreement with William I, and remained 
neutral during the Byzantine invasion of Southern Italy. The lack of Venetian 
assistance forced the Eastern Empire, which still needed naval help for its 
campaign, to ask for Genoa’s support. The Byzantines managed to reach an 
agreement with the Ligurian city by granting to it extensive commercial privileges, 
but in the event the Genoese failed to provide them with any meaningful military 
assistance during this conflict. Furthermore, this decision upset the Venetians, 
since it created a new commercial rival to them at Constantinople. This would lead 
to a deterioration of the relations between Venice and the Byzantine Empire.  
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2) Trade 
The mid-twelfth century is characterised by a considerable increase in the 
commercial documentation of Venice. Was this due merely to the survival of more 
charters, or does this in fact suggest that there was an increase in the scale of 
trade? In addition, we shall try to see whether the worsened relations with 
Byzantium led the Venetians to prefer to trade in other areas, such as the Adriatic 
coast. 
i) Trade within the Adriatic and Ionian Areas 
There is only little evidence regarding the involvement of Venetian 
merchants in Southern Italy, but an analysis of the surviving data can nevertheless 
be made. Some Venetians traded with fellow countrymen in the Mezzogiorno, as 
was the case with three of them who were engaged in commerce in Bari in 1134.131 
Some families were particularly active in trade there, and amongst them we can 
mention the da Molins, who had already been involved with commerce in the Ionian 
area for several decades. In 1119, Viviano da Molin, was amongst the people who, 
while in Bari, rented an anchor so that they could sail to Damietta and to 
Constantinople. Viviano, who had already conducted business between Sicily and 
Constantinople as a socius stans in 1118, was still active in the early 1130s, when 
he was involved in trade at Acre in the Holy Land.132 In addition, two other 
members of this family (Bonifacio and Bonfiglio) are recorded as being active in 
commerce with Sicily in 1127, and another in commerce with Arta, in Epirus, in 
1131.133 Yet, Bonifacio’s activity does not seem to have been particularly 
successful, as a document issued in 1139 records his insolvency after he had been 
given a loan of twenty pounds of denarii by Pietro Morosini to trade in Alexandria in 
1134. Despite this financial setback, the da Molins once again resumed their 
mercantile activity in the early 1150s. Yet, even though a charter suggests that a 
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few years earlier they had been active in Corinth, by this time they do not seem to 
have maintained their specialisation in commerce with the Ionian area.134 
As had already been the case before 1118, Corinth was a centre of great 
commercial importance to the Venetians, probably due to its role in silk 
manufacture.135 Dobramiro Dalmatino Stagnario, a Croat servus who had been 
freed by the Stagnarios in late 1125, and who died not before 1150, seems to have 
settled there in the mid-1130s. Even though one charter issued in 1140 records 
Dobramiro’s insolvency for a loan that he had negotiated in 1132, he nevertheless 
seems to have conducted a considerable amount of trade, albeit with a limited 
budget, in both Sparta and Constantinople in the Byzantine Empire, and in 
Alexandria in Egypt. His son Pangrazio was also active in Corinth in the 1140s and 
1150s.136 Dobramiro’s case is interesting since it provides evidence of the presence 
of Dalmatian servants in Venice – another one is probably the Dragomiro that 
Giovanni Badoer freed him in his will, written in 1148. Furthermore, Dobramiro 
exemplifies that even people who did not originate from Venice could integrate well 
in this city. Nor were Dobramiro and his son an isolated case, as, from the 1140s 
onwards, there are quite a few records of men from the Eastern Adriatic, and from 
Central and Southern Italy who were involved in trade together with Venetians. 
Moreover, even before this decade, a certain Bonsignore from Zadar, an inhabitant 
of the confinium of San Provolo, in Venice, seems to have taken part in the siege of 
Tyre alongside with the Venetians. A charter records that, on this occasion, in 1125, 
he negotiated a loan with a man from Venice.137 
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These few examples comprise what evidence we have for Venetian trade in 
the Adriatic and Ionian trade at this period. Even though the problem of the survival 
of commercial charters in Venice cannot be underestimated, there is a major 
reason to explain this. Commerce with Southern Italy was probably limited, as 
Venice and Roger II only seldom had good relations (for instance, in 1144, when 
the Venetians were granted the concession of the church of St Mark in Palermo, 
following the granting of some commercial privileges). Both around the mid-1130s 
and then for some years following the Sicilian raids in the Balkans – probably due 
to the Venetian involvement in the conflict alongside Byzantium –, the Venetians 
complained about the loss of revenues due to the piratical deeds of men acting on 
Roger’s behalf. It seems, therefore, quite unlikely that the Venetians would be very 
active in commerce in Southern Italy when the political relations between these two 
powers were so strained.138 Yet, the agreements signed by Venice in the first half 
and middle of the twelfth century with Bari, and more importantly, with Fano, 
Ancona, and the Kingdom of Sicily, nevertheless suggest that the Venetians were 
significantly involved in trade in the Adriatic region of Central and Southern Italy. 
The aim of Venice seems to have been to obtain tax exemptions in these areas, so 
that the foodstuffs and cotton that were produced there could be imported at a 
lower price. However, due to the limited amount of money involved in such 
transactions, very little documentation about them has survived. The increasing 
importance of the mid- and lower Adriatic region is probably to be linked not only 
with the demographic and economic growth of Venice, but also with a decrease in 
agricultural production in the Po basin, and with the protectionist measures taken 
by its cities in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. This led to a need to import grain, 
wine, and olive oil from other areas, specifically the Marche, coastal Greece, and 
Southern Italy. Here, in particular, in the twelfth century there was a large-scale 
development of the production of olive oil (in the Terra di Bari), and of wheat (in the 
Capitanata).139 
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Venice also seems to have been heavily involved in mercantile activity in 
Istria. The agreements concluded in 1145, and especially the one with Pula, which 
led to the establishment of a permanent Venetian representative there, signified the 
de facto conquest of Istria by Venice. The Venetians had thus secured a 
commercial monopoly in this region, which gave them easy access not only to the 
Istrian agricultural products, especially wine, but also to its woods – the timber of 
which was used for shipbuilding – and quarries.140 
The presence in Southern Italy of quite a few Venetian merchants whose 
final destination was the Eastern Mediterranean, such as Viviano da Molin in 1118-
19, might suggest that these traders could also have been exporting goods from 
the Mezzogiorno to Constantinople (where already in the mid-eleventh century 
there is evidence of an import of Apulian olive oil, and of Southern Italian wine), to 
the Holy Land, or to Egypt.141 However, since many of the goods originating from 
Southern Italy could also be found within the Byzantine Empire, Constantinople 
probably obtained most of them from its provinces, and thus what was imported 
from Southern Italy was only a relatively small additional supply. In some cases, the 
role of middlemen was conducted by Italian merchants, who thus became 
commercial rivals of the Greek landowners. An example can be found in two 
charters from the early 1150s which mention the involvement of Venetians in the 
transport to Constantinople of olive oil that they had bought in Sparta from the local 
archontes. Yet, since very little is known about the goods that the Venetian 
merchants traded, and about the scale of internal commerce in the Eastern 
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Mediterranean, we cannot exclude that some of the imports did indeed come from 
Southern Italy.142 
ii) Trade in the Mediterranean 
Despite the increasing importance of the Adriatic trade, most of the recorded 
Venetian commercial activity continued to take place in the Byzantine Empire. Why 
was there such an increase in the trade documentation in this period, and was this 
linked with the new properties acquired by the Venetians following Manuel’s 
chrysobull issued in 1148? 
Documentation regarding Venetian trade with Byzantium is extremely 
sparse in the early years of John II’s reign (until the end of the 1120s). 
Constantinople often acted as a mercantile base for some traders, rather than as a 
market itself: many charters were issued there, but referred to commerce to Acre, 
which was, numerically, the most represented trade destination, or to Alexandria. 
Two reasons in particular, related to the political and diplomatic relationship 
between the two powers, suggest why so little mercantile documentation regarding 
trade in the Byzantine Empire has survived. First, John’s refusal to renew the 
commercial privileges which his father had granted to Venice may have led most 
merchants to prefer to trade in other areas where their conditions were more 
advantageous. In addition, and more importantly, most of this commerce came to a 
halt after the Venetians were involved in two major conflicts: the crusade, and the 
war against John II. Indeed, we know that the merchants were asked to return to 
Venice to take part in the crusade, and that similar measures were taken whenever 
a major conflict broke out, since the Venetians lacked any professional navy crews. 
Furthermore, it makes even more sense that the Venetians would not be involved 
in trade in Byzantium when they were at war with John II.143 One charter provides 
specific evidence for this. Three merchants had negotiated a compagnia contract to 
trade in Romania and in Syria before the outbreak of the war. However, the conflict 
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had forced them to delay their commercial activity, until the compagnia was 
eventually dissolved in 1129.144 
Even though the Venetian charters can only hint at the scale of trade with 
the Eastern Empire in the 1120s, we can nevertheless advance one hypothesis. 
The concessions granted in 1126 by John II through his chrysobull to Venice were 
made not only so that John could focus on other theatres of war, but also both out 
of fear that the Byzantine Empire might lose its commercial prominence in favour of 
the Crusader States, and in order to revive the economy of the empire following 
some years of stagnation. The very wide commercial concessions that the 
Venetians had obtained in return for their help in the conquest of Tyre in 1124 
probably alarmed the Byzantines. They were probably afraid that the Venetians 
would start to exploit massively the markets of Outremer, and that they would no 
longer trade in their territory. This would have had financial consequences for 
Byzantium since, even though the Venetians had not directly contributed to the 
imperial treasury (as they had been exempted from paying the kommerkion), they 
had done so indirectly via their (albeit financially limited) investments in Romania. 
Furthermore, John’s decision to exempt from the kommerkion his subjects who 
engaged in commerce with the Venetians (and not just the Venetians themselves, 
as had been the case in the previous decades) suggests that the Byzantines were 
the main trading partners of the lagoon merchants.145 Yet, despite the renewal of 
the commercial privileges, we have no surviving evidence of Venetian mercantile 
activity within the Byzantine Empire until March 1129, and the Crusader States 
seem to have remained the main commercial destination until 1130. While this 
might be the result of a mere loss of charters, we must also take into consideration 
some possible doubts as to the wisdom of trade in the Eastern Empire, as this had 
been enemy territory until a little while earlier, and even more towards conducting 
commerce with Byzantine merchants. Furthermore, some sources suggest that 
John II had set fire to the Venetian properties in Constantinople. The Venetians 
may, therefore, have had to make some significant repairs to their warehouses 
before they could once again use them for commercial operations.146 
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Trade with Byzantium seems to have resumed on a reasonable scale in the 
1130s, even though the Venetians were still involved in trade with both Egypt and 
the Frankish States in the Levant, where they could take advantage of the 
commercial privileges which they had obtained following the conquest of Tyre.147 
There are, however, some interesting aspects of this trade that need to be 
considered. The Venetians were now also involved in commerce in cities and areas 
in which they had not been exempted from paying the kommerkion, notably at Arta 
and Sparta (the latter seems to have become an important commercial centre since 
the late ninth century) in mainland Greece, in Crete, and at Limassol in Cyprus. 
This last might, indeed, have been used as a base to trade in Damietta, and in 
Crete. However, one charter suggests that Crete might have been a forced stop for 
the merchant (Ottone Falier) since his final destination was intended to be Syria. 
Alternatively, he might have stopped in Crete to buy local products (possibly 
cheese or wine), and export them to the Crusader States.148 These new 
destinations might mean either that the list of cities within the chrysobull was 
incomplete (as Alexios’s decree explicitly added that the concessions were also 
valid in omnes partes sub potestate nostre), or that the Venetians were involved in 
trade in many Byzantine cities regardless of whether they were exempted from the 
kommerkion. The latter seems to be the likelier explanation, as, otherwise, it would 
be difficult to justify why, on the request of the Venetians, Crete, Cyprus, and other 
cities were added in later confirmations of the chrysobull.149 Another curious aspect 
is that only three charters issued during this decade record any trade with 
Constantinople. This paucity of documentation is difficult to explain, as Moses of 
Bergamo informs us that, already in 1130, there were regular communications 
between Venice and Constantinople: a ship would sail from the lagoon to the 
Bosporus every August. Thus, the easiest explanation is that very little 
documentation regarding commerce in Constantinople has survived. However, it 
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cannot be excluded that in the 1130s most of the Venetian quarter that had been 
damaged or destroyed by the (new?) fire in January 1130 was still being rebuilt.150 
The 1140s are marked by a slight increase in the commercial 
documentation, as some twenty charters referring to trade and financial operations 
in the Eastern Mediterranean survive. During this decade, the Byzantine Empire 
seems to have become the main commercial centre, with only a minority of charters 
recording trade in the Frankish States and in Egypt.151 Even though Constantinople 
is the most represented city, it seems to have mainly acted as a financial centre 
and base, as few charters refer directly to trade taking place here. Most of the 
documents are loan contracts (or ensuing quittances) which do not explicitly 
mention how the money was being, or had been, used. The other principal city 
mentioned in these documents was Corinth, a major commercial and financial 
market at the time thanks to its geographic position, and to its developing silk 
industry.152 
The surviving documentation suggests a major change in the scale and 
pattern of Venetian commerce from the late 1140s onwards. As mentioned before, 
trade almost came to a halt in 1148-49, when Venice was involved in the conflict 
between Roger II and Manuel I, as the doge summoned all his citizens to serve in 
the navy.153 However, despite this temporary interruption in the trade, the 
Venetians were very advantageously rewarded by Manuel I for their decision to 
side with him against Roger II. In 1147, Crete and Cyprus were added to the places 
where the Venetians were exempted from the kommerkion, while in the following 
year Manuel granted further properties and land to the Venetians, thus extending 
their quarter in Constantinople.154 While the former concession does not seem to 
have had major consequences (only one charter records trade in Cyprus between 
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1140 and 1147, while none at all survive for 1148-56),155 the latter seems to have 
been extremely relevant. Indeed, in 1150-56 there is no evidence of trade taking 
place in Egypt, and very little (only two charters) in the Crusader States.156 
However, by contrast, despite the minor but perceptible political drift emerging 
between Venice and Byzantium, this same period is marked by a considerable 
increase in the surviving charters referring to Venetian commercial or financial 
operations in the Eastern Empire (over thirty). Most of the evidence comes from 
Constantinople itself, which was undisputedly the predominant centre for the 
Venetian merchants, both as a commercial destination, and as a financial base. We 
also have some evidence of what the Venetian merchants imported into the 
Byzantine capital. The commerce of oil from Sparta is mentioned twice (although in 
one case its transport could not be finalised because of piratical acts by the 
Sicilians), and the Venetians may also have had an important role in the trade of 
this commodity in Rodostos. Furthermore, one charter records the export of timber 
from Venice, and we also have evidence of pepper and alum being exported from 
Constantinople to the lagoon.157 The import of oil from Sparta is not the only 
evidence of Venetian trade in Greece. The surviving evidence suggests that it was 
fairly common for Venetian merchants to be involved in some imports from this 
region to Constantinople, or in commerce in Greece after they had concluded some 
preliminary financial agreements in the imperial capital.158 This kind of commercial 
activity was not necessarily conducted by sea; some of the contracts include 
specific clauses that forced the merchants to travel by land, possibly out of fear that 
the ships and their cargo could be intercepted by the Sicilians.159 
Beginning in 1147, there is also an increase in the documentation regarding 
Venetian properties within the Byzantine Empire. Some were located in 
Constantinople, and were ceded by the commune to private individuals or to 
churches, while other were situated in cities in which Venice had not been granted 
any property by the emperors. For instance, a Venetian was referred to as a citizen 
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of Halmyros as early as 1129, and we know that a considerable number of 
Venetians owned properties throughout this town.160 Only in a few cases do we 
know the name of the previous owner of these houses and lands, but the few 
surviving charters mention that some houses in Halmyros had been bought from 
two Greeks, and that the Venetians owned adjacent properties here. It is quite likely 
that this was quite a common pattern, especially considering that al-Idrisi records 
that this city was used as a base by many Christian merchants.161 In addition, we 
have evidence of some Venetians renting properties that the commune had 
received from the emperors. In particular, shortly after Manuel’s first chrysobull, 
Doge Polani conceded some of the lands within the Venetian quarter to seven 
Venetians. This concession was later confirmed by the two immediate successors 
of this doge.162 A pattern that had already begun under Alexios I, and which 
continued in the following decades, was that of granting properties to religious 
institutions. By 1148, there were four churches in the Venetian quarter in 
Constantinople (three of them were probably built after 1092, while one, St 
Akindynos, would become a parish church by 1150). Venice also owned churches 
in other cities. However, despite the importance of Constantinople for the Venetians, 
the attempt to organise these churches into a single diocese (under the 
Patriarchate of Grado) was unsuccessful, and in the end no religious hierarchy was 
formed. Most of these churches in the empire were under the jurisdiction of the 
Venetian monastery of St George: notably those of St George and St Mary in 
Rodostos; St Blaise in Lemnos; and St George in Halmyros.163 In addition to 
replacing the commune in the direct administration of the properties of Venetian in 
Romania (a task that the churches had already undertaken during the reign of 
Alexios I), these religious institutions had a variety of other different functions, 
including holding the weights and measures that all the Venetians living in a 
specific city were to use (we know this in the case of Rodostos), and acting as 
depots.164 Furthermore, the notaries who wrote the Venetian charters issued in the 
Byzantine Empire were almost always clerics from Venice. Since some of them 
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issued charters in different years, it is highly likely that they were the clerics of the 
Venetian churches in Romania (only in the case of one notary do we know that he 
was the priest of a local church, St Akindynos).165 Amongst the recurring names of 
Venetian clergymen acting as notaries, we can mention Vitale Vitaliano and the 
priest Giovanni Pascasi (both active in Corinth in the second half of the 1130s), and, 
in Constantinople, a subdeacon Giovanni da Noale (active from 1146 to 1169) and 
a priest Giovanni Toscano (active from 1150 to 1161).166 Yet, these clerics did not 
have any judicial authority, nor was there until 1198 a juridical or administrative 
structure for the Venetian inhabitants in Romania. Therefore, in the case of any 
legal controversy, it was either solved locally by boni homines, or by the legates of 
the doge whenever they were in the Byzantine Empire (as happened in 1147 and 
1150).167 
iii) Conclusions 
The surviving commercial documentation allows us to draw some 
conclusions regarding Venetian trade in this era of political transition. Whereas 
since the late 1140s the political relations with Constantinople slightly worsened, 
Romania became the main Venetian commercial and financial market, and 
remained such until the end of the period here taken into consideration. While this 
might also be the consequence of a higher survival rate of the charters, and of a 
demographic and economic growth of the Eastern Empire, Manuel I’s chrysobulls 
nevertheless had a crucial impact. The significant extension of the Venetian quarter 
in Constantinople, together with an improvement in economic conditions in both 
Venice and the Byzantine Empire, led to an increasing number of traders in the 
Bosporus, and to a decline of commercial contact with areas outside the empire.168  
The years from 1119 until around 1140 seem to have witnessed an increase 
in Venetian trade in the Adriatic region; however, this area lost most of its 
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importance in the late 1140s. Yet, the Adriatic region, despite this lack of 
documentation, was not completely neglected. Indeed, there was probably still a 
significant Venetian activity in this area, as was suggested by the three agreements 
signed with Fano, Ancona, and the Kingdom of Sicily. However, the few surviving 
documents suggest that until the mid-1150s Venice did not take full advantage of 
the commercial advantages deriving from these pacts. Regardless of this, these 
agreements were nevertheless extremely important, as they enabled the Venetians 
to obtain access to alternative markets, which were also geographically closer to 
their homeland. 
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VI. The Increasing Political Distance between Venice and 
Byzantium, 1156-97 
1) Political Outline 
We have seen that the Venetians signed a treaty with the Sicilians in the 
mid-1150s, and that they did not support Manuel’s Italian campaign. In the following 
decades, the foreign policy of Venice and Byzantium mostly differed, but these two 
entities sometimes reconciled. We shall now analyse this relationship, together with 
the role of Southern Italy, from 1156 until the end of political unity in the 
Mezzogiorno. 
i) The Aftermath of Manuel’s First Italian Campaign, and His Second Italian 
Expedition (1156-58) 
The outcome of the Battle of Brindisi led to a sudden change in the system 
of alliances that had preceded the Byzantine campaign in Southern Italy. The battle 
was soon followed by the Treaty of Benevento, which marked the beginning of a 
period of alliance between the Papacy and Sicily, and, consequently, of hostility 
between Rome and Barbarossa. Furthermore, after another unsuccessful military 
campaign in Italy, Manuel also came to terms with William I, and this resulted in the 
end of the decennial plans for a joint Byzantine-German intervention in Southern 
Italy. 
We have already seen that the German Empire had not taken part in the 
1155-56 Byzantine campaign in Southern Italy. Yet, this did not lead to lengthy 
tensions between Frederick and Manuel. Barbarossa had indeed accused the 
Greeks of stealing his seal in order to convince the cities from Southern Italy of an 
existing entente between the two empires, and had even planned to intervene 
militarily in Southern Italy against the Byzantines following their initial successes in 
this region.1 However, following the outcome of the Battle of Brindisi, relations 
became friendly again, and attempts were even made to try to resume 
collaborations between the Byzantines and the Germans. First, in July 1156, 
Manuel once more attempted to convince Barbarossa to marry his niece Maria (he 
was probably unaware of Frederick’s recent wedding with Beatrice of Burgundy), 
and to help him militarily against the Hungarians. However, the wedding proposal 
could not be accepted, as the German emperor had indeed already remarried. 
Furthermore, Barbarossa replied that he could not assemble an army to fight the 
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Hungarians as quickly as Manuel was asking him. Yet, Frederick would later show 
his hostility towards the Magyar King Géza by hosting his exiled brother, who had 
unsuccessfully claimed the Hungarian crown, and by helping him to reach 
Constantinople via Venice. A new legation was sent by Manuel to the German 
emperor in September 1157, but Barbarossa was initially unwilling to receive the 
Byzantine agents, officially because of matters of etiquette. However, it is quite 
likely that Frederick actually took this decision after he was asked to take part in a 
joint Italian expedition, and reacted angrily when Manuel’s legates started making 
territorial claims over part of this region. Yet, the Byzantine agents were eventually 
allowed to meet Barbarossa, and they witnessed the knighting of the son of Conrad 
III.2 
By contrast, Manuel’s relations with the Italian powers worsened soon after 
his defeat in Apulia. Following the Battle of Brindisi, William’s men began a 
successful counterattack against Pope Adrian, which led them to put Benevento 
under siege. The pontiff was thus forced to settle for peace with William, and in 
June 1156, with the Treaty of Benevento, recognised him as King of Sicily. This 
pact finally gave legitimacy to the Sicilian ruler, and made him an ally of the pontiff. 
On the other hand, despite Adrian’s efforts to remain on good terms with Frederick, 
the treaty also marked the worsening of tensions between the Western Empire and 
the Papacy. These relations would reach a point of no return in September 1157, 
following the Besançon incident, when Adrian used the word beneficium to refer to 
the imperial title in a letter to Frederick. After the imperial chancellor translated the 
word to Barbarossa as if Adrian meant that the empire was a papal fief, a riot 
resulted. Yet, Frederick must already have been aware that the agreement 
between the pontiff and William signed a year earlier meant that the pope would 
oppose any German attempt to conquer the Mezzogiorno. Frederick was even 
more upset because he also felt that, by concluding peace with William, Adrian IV 
had not respected the terms of the Treaty of Constance.3 The agreement with 
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Adrian was not William’s only diplomatic success, as it was soon followed by pacts 
with both Genoa and Venice, which granted further international recognition and 
political stability to the king.4 
Even though William was gaining allies, Manuel Komnenos nevertheless 
decided to try to launch a new Italian expedition, and thus in late 1157 sent some 
men led by Alexios Axouch to Ancona. The Byzantines, once more using this city 
as their base, started recruiting mercenaries in the neighbourhoods, and bought the 
loyalty of the citizens of Ravenna. It is unclear why Axouch, whose apparent goal 
was to conduct a campaign in the Mezzogiorno, went North to recruit mercenaries. 
Choniates and Rahewin even suggest that Axouch’s expedition was not aimed at 
making conquests in Southern Italy, but that his main goal was that of forcing 
William to sign an agreement. In this case, Axouch’s actions north of Ancona may 
be explained as an attempt to create a base to oppose Frederick’s plans to 
subjugate Lombardy. And indeed, this move did end up upsetting the German 
legates who had been sent ahead to prepare Frederick’s new Italian campaign. 
Barbarossa’s men questioned the activity of Manuel’s legates in Ravenna, and 
accused Axouch of having obtained Ancona’s loyalty through bribery. The situation 
became tense, as the two empires almost entered into an open conflict when 
Barbarossa’s men started besieging Ancona. However, after the Anconitans swore 
not to take up arms against the Western Empire, the Germans and Axouch 
eventually managed to reach an agreement. This prevented the beginning of a war 
between the two empires, and temporarily restored amicable relations between 
them. Axouch could continue his campaign, but had to give up the control of 
Ravenna. Following this incident, the Byzantines commenced a military campaign 
towards the South with the support of Andrew of Rupecanina and of the Roman 
opposition to the pontiff. Initially, the land operations were moderately successful – 
Andrew conquered Fondi and Aquino, and then defeated William’s men in 
Cassino –, but the Greek navy was defeated by the Sicilian fleet, which also raided 
some of the coasts of the empire, even reaching the shores of Constantinople.5 
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The conflict eventually ended in 1158, when, following an agreement brokered by 
Pope Adrian, William and Manuel agreed, according to the Annales Casinenses, on 
a thirty-year long peace treaty. All the Byzantine captives who had been taken in 
1156 (but not the people from Corinth and Thebes who had been deported in the 
late 1140s) were released. Furthermore, according to Kinnamos, an alliance 
between the Byzantines and the Sicilians was reached, and sometime later 
(possibly in 1160 or 1161) Manuel recognised William’s royal title.6 
The Sicilian naval threat, the German refusal to collaborate in the 
expedition, and the cost of the campaign were all undoubtedly significant factors 
that persuaded Manuel to settle for peace, but not the main ones. Furthermore, 
John Kinnamos is not reliable when he writes that the agreement was the result of 
private negotiations conducted by Alexios Komnenos Bryennios and by John 
Doukas to obtain their release.7 Indeed, the peace treaty was probably signed 
because new conflicts had broken out in the East, and Manuel did not want to be 
involved in simultaneous conflicts in different areas of his empire. Earlier in the 
same year, Princes Reynald of Antioch and Thoros of Lesser Armenia had 
conducted a naval raid on Cyprus, and by then the whole of Cilicia had been lost to 
Thoros himself. Therefore, probably in September, Manuel decided to sign a peace 
treaty with William, enabling him to focus on Cilicia and Northern Syria, where he 
hoped that he could obtain the support of King Baldwin III of Jerusalem, whose 
relations with Reynald were far from good.8 In addition, the basileus decided to put 
an end to his hostilities with William because of his own and of Pope Adrian’s fear 
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of Barbarossa’s ambitions. The German emperor began his second Italian 
expedition in June or July 1158, and commenced the siege of Milan in early 
August, and both Manuel and the pontiff were probably convinced that he would 
succeed in subjugating Lombardy. As suggested by the imperial notary Burkhard, 
Barbarossa’s next move would have then been the conquest of the Mezzogiorno 
for himself. This would have made the Western Empire the dominant force in both 
the West and the Mediterranean, thus threatening Rome, and making a German 
offensive against the Balkans not so unlikely. Therefore, Manuel realised that 
Frederick, and not William, was the main threat to him, and decided to listen to 
Adrian’s pleas, and to sign an agreement with the King of Sicily.9 
However, an interesting aspect to be taken into consideration is that the 
conclusion of the agreement with William I probably met with some internal 
opposition in Byzantium. Indeed, Niketas Choniates recalls that, in 1159, 
Andronikos Kamateros maliciously accused Theodore Styppeiotes, one of the most 
influential members of Manuel’s court, of sabotaging the emperor’s dealings with 
Sicily by forging the imperial correspondence with William I. It is extremely likely 
that, despite Niketas’ assertions, Styppeiotes (who was eventually blinded, and 
deprived of his tongue) was actually strongly implicated in this conspiracy, which, 
as suggested by Magdalino, possibly aimed at deposing Manuel, and at replacing 
him with his cousin Andronikos. Yet, Magdalino (together with Kresten) also 
believes that such a plot is to be interpreted as meaning that Styppeiotes was part 
of a pro-Sicilian faction in the Byzantine court.10 However, this analysis appears 
unconvincing. Since, in 1159, Manuel had already concluded peace with William I, 
Niketas’s passage suggests that Styppeiotes tried to sabotage the new and 
peaceful relations between the basileus and the King of Sicily. This seems to 
suggest that, just after the end of the conflict with William I, some of the members 
of the Constantinopolitan court were extremely unhappy with the signing of this 
agreement. 
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Venice, however, continued to avoid involvement during this second phase 
of the conflict between Byzantium and the Kingdom of Sicily. Despite the 
agreement with William, the Venetians once again behaved duplicitously, as there 
are indications which suggest that they maintained reasonably good relations with 
Barbarossa, and, apparently, also with the Byzantines. Envoys from Venice 
attended the Diet of Besançon in 1157, and the Adriatic city also acted as a 
mediator during the transfer of Prince Stephen of Hungary from the Western 
Empire to Constantinople.11 
Pisa did not take part in the conflict either. Even though the Annales Pisani 
record that, during their naval raid, William’s men sacked the Pisan quarter in the 
Byzantine city of Halmyros, the Tuscan city almost certainly did not play an active 
role in the conflict. Indeed, the relations between Byzantium and Pisa had recently 
worsened, as, according to Bernardo Maragone, starting from 1157, Manuel 
stopped paying the yearly tribute that the Byzantines had been providing to the 
Pisans since 1111. This makes any Pisan involvement in Manuel’s campaign in 
1157-58 extremely unlikely.12 Since Genoa had signed an agreement with William, 
not even the Ligurian city did provide any assistance to the Byzantines. Yet, the 
relations between Genoa and Manuel continued, as the Genoese sent an embassy 
to Constantinople in 1157, trying to obtain the quarter that they had been promised. 
However, Caffaro does not mention the outcome of this legation, and we may note 
that, in early July 1157, a Genoese merchant forbade his commercial partner from 
going to Romania unless he first returned to Genoa from Egypt. Thus, it is quite 
likely that Manuel only granted a quarter in Constantinople to Genoa in 1160, after 
another embassy reached Byzantium.13 
ii) Byzantium, Venice, and the Sicilians United against Barbarossa (1158-67) 
From 1158 until 1161, following the peace treaty with William, the 
Byzantines were mainly involved in warfare in the East. Following a victory over the 
Seljuk Turks of Sultan Kilij Arslan II, and the forced submission of Thoros and 
Reynald, the emperor celebrated a triumph in Antioch. The basileus further 
strengthened his links with the principality as, following his wife Bertha’s death in 
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1160, in December of the following year he married Maria, a daughter of Prince 
Raymond of Antioch.14 
Despite this focus on the East, Manuel did not entirely neglect the West in 
these years. Quite interestingly, according to Rahewin, in spite of the agreement 
signed with William I in Sicily (which had by then caused a rift with the German 
Empire), the basileus had once more set his eyes on the Mezzogiorno. The 
chronicler records rumours that, in early 1160, Manuel replied to a legation sent by 
Frederick suggesting a joint Italian expedition; the Byzantines claimed the former 
Pentapolis (the area around Ravenna) and coastal Apulia for themselves. Frederick 
did not accept this proposal. According to the chronicler, he was unwilling to ravage 
Lombardy again so soon after his previous campaign. However, a different 
explanation of these event can be made if we consider that by this time a papal 
schism had begun. Following the death of Pope Adrian IV in September 1159, two 
rival popes had been chosen as his successor. Alexander III was supported by a 
majority of the cardinals, Victor IV only by a small group, but he had obtained 
Frederick’s backing at the Council of Pavia. Barbarossa possibly tried to persuade 
Manuel to support Victor by offering control over these two areas in Italy to the 
Byzantines (rather than the other way around, as was suggested by Rahewin). Yet, 
reaching an entente with the Germans would only have been advantageous for the 
Byzantines if Victor had eventually succeeded in becoming the generally-
recognised pope. It would then have been almost certain that, as pope, he would 
have cut his ties with William I, thus making it possible for Barbarossa (or even 
encouraging him) to launch a campaign against the Mezzogiorno. Therefore, it was 
prudent for the basileus to resume negotiations with Frederick in order to prevent 
the Germans from eventually conquering the whole of Southern Italy.15 
Another occasion on which Manuel appears not to have wholeheartedly 
supported William I was during the insurrection in the Kingdom of Sicily sparked off 
by the murder of Maio of Bari in November 1160, which continued until 1162. The 
emperor did not send any troops, probably because he did not want to enrage 
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Pope Alexander, and as he was already involved in conflicts in other areas of his 
empire. Yet, it is extremely likely that Manuel realised that he could not even afford 
to remain neutral during this conflict, and that he thus decided to support the 
rebellion indirectly. The basileus might have chosen to do so in order to keep a 
closer eye on the Mezzogiorno so that he could send an army there in case of 
Barbarossa’s intervention in the conflict. Manuel could probably obtain first-hand 
information regarding the insurrection, as some of its leaders had had contact with 
him. While we cannot ascertain whether the action of these men was funded by 
Byzantium, the basileus allowed them to seek refuge into his empire following the 
failure of the rebellion. Indeed, two of the leaders of this insurrection were 
Alexander of Conversano and Andrew of Rupecanina. Neither appears to have 
initiated his action from the Eastern Empire, as Alexander had probably been 
captured and imprisoned in 1157 or 1158 during the second Byzantine campaign in 
the Mezzogiorno, while Andrew had joined Barbarossa in 1158. However, Andrew 
fled to Romania following the failure of this revolt, while the next surviving 
information that we have regarding Alexander and Roger Sclavus (another leader 
of this rebellion, who had had no previous contact with Byzantium) are of them 
being in Manuel’s service. Alexander would eventually have a long record as an 
imperial officer.16 Therefore, even if this does not clearly imply that Manuel was 
involved in the insurrection, it indeed seems to suggest that he was sympathetic to 
the rebels, possibly because he felt that they might be useful in case his relations 
with Sicily might worsen in the future. A letter that the basileus wrote to King Louis 
VII of France also provides more evidence of this. The letter, probably written in 
early 1162, mentions that William I had not allowed a Byzantine legate to pass 
through his kingdom while on his way to France, and that the letter could only be 
dispatched thanks to the mediation of Archbishop Henry of Benevento. This was 
clearly a hostile action by William I, and could be explained as a reprisal to what the 
king had probably perceived as Manuel’s indirect backing of the rebels.17 
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Manuel’s decision not to intervene directly in the Sicilian rebellion was 
probably also due to his simultaneous negotiations with Pope Alexander. The talks 
between the basileus and the pontiff probably started in mid-1161, following the 
beginning of Barbarossa’s siege of Milan. Alexander was in a very difficult situation, 
and the German notary Burkhard seems to suggest that the pope even offered to 
recognise Manuel as sole emperor. Whilst it is arguable whether on this occasion 
the initiative came from Alexander, the pontiff indeed took this idea into serious 
consideration, but with the indispensable condition that the Byzantine ruler reunite 
the Greek Church with the Roman one. Even though the refusal by the Byzantine 
clergy to ratify the Union led to the failure of these negotiations, Manuel appears to 
have been extremely keen on obtaining such recognition by the pope. While, 
following the negative outcome of his previous campaigns, Manuel was probably no 
longer interested in any territorial gains in Italy, he was nevertheless aware that 
maintaining good relations with the Papacy was crucial. This would have enabled 
him to continue his campaign against the Principality of Antioch with no risk that the 
pope might reach an agreement with Barbarossa. Should such an agreement have 
occurred, Frederick might well have obtained papal backing to launch a campaign 
in Southern Italy, and could also have obtained a pretext to invade Byzantium. Yet, 
Barbarossa’s claim over the Mezzogiorno was indissolubly linked to his imperial 
title; if he had been deprived of this, all his claims over Italy would have become 
null and void. Such an aspect needs to be taken into consideration especially after 
May 1162. The Kaiser’s successes in Northern Italy – and in particular the 
destruction of Milan –, together with his agreements with Pisa and, shortly 
afterwards, also with Genoa, had become alarming for Manuel as well. Both 
Kinnamos and the anonymous author of the Historia ducum Veneticorum suggest 
that the basileus was worried that Frederick might cross the Adriatic, and invade 
the Eastern Empire.18 
The negotiations between Alexander and Manuel continued in 1163-64, and 
William I was also involved in them, thus showing that, despite the incidents during 
the rebellion in the Mezzogiorno, Byzantine-Sicilian relations nevertheless appear 
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to have remained cordial. In early 1163, William I provided ten of his galleys to 
transport and escort two Byzantine envoys who were on their way to sail to France. 
The sources suggest that their initial task was to obtain Manuel’s recognition as 
sole emperor from the pope (who had moved to France following the fall of Milan), 
and they seem to have temporarily succeeded in this. A passage from a text by Leo 
Tuscus suggests that the pontiff did at some point recognise Manuel as sole 
emperor, but that he soon ‘revoked his acknowledgement’. Alexander’s sudden 
change of mind appears to be a consequence of his simultaneous talks with 
Barbarossa. The pontiff probably realised that recognising Manuel as emperor 
would only lead to even tenser relations with the Kaiser. Furthermore, such a 
change of mind might be a consequence of Louis VII’s attitude towards this project. 
Initially, Louis too probably recognised Manuel as sole emperor, since a letter 
written by the former to the basileus, which refers to the latter as Romanorum 
imperator, was probably written at the same time as these negotiations. However, 
the French king later showed hostility to this project. It is possible that this change 
of mind was due to the fear that backing Manuel in this project could be interpreted 
by the Frankish States in the Levant (which were strongly bonded with the Kingdom 
of France) as an all-around support for the Byzantine foreign policy, and, therefore, 
as an act of treason towards them. This could have indeed been the case 
especially considering that the relations between the Principality of Antioch and the 
Byzantines had recently worsened, to the point that, around this time, Louis 
received a series of letters from Outremer, which referred to the Eastern Empire as 
a main threat to the principality. We cannot even exclude that Louis might have 
even been afraid that, if he had recognised Manuel as emperor, Barbarossa might 
invade his kingdom as an act of reprisal. Therefore, since the French king, who was 
Alexander’s host, eventually did not support Manuel’s recognition, the pope may 
have felt compelled to follow a similar political line.19 
Manuel’s imperial recognition was probably only one of the two tasks that 
the Byzantine legates had. The other was the negotiation of an anti-Barbarossa 
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coalition that would include themselves, the Sicilians, Alexander III, and Louis VII, 
and which was probably also aimed at restoring Alexander to Rome. William I 
appears to have been one of the main proponents of this alliance, and that was 
why he provided the galleys for Manuel’s agents. The king appears to have been 
particularly keen on obtaining the support of the French monarch, as the evidence 
suggests that he entrusted the Greek envoys to obtain letters for him from Louis 
VII. Yet, even in this case the French monarch was quite reluctant to undertake an 
action that was not particularly advantageous to himself. If such a plan had been 
successful, Louis would have both been involved in a conflict against Barbarossa, 
and would have lost most of the influence that he could exercise as Alexander III’s 
host. Therefore, despite the Greek legates urging him to provide the letters for 
William, Louis failed to give them to Manuel’s men, and thus the coalition never 
eventually formed.20 However, the negotiations probably did not end with a 
diplomatic incident between the Byzantines and the Sicilians, as has been 
suggested by Tolstoy-Miloslavsky. Indeed, there is no actual evidence that 
Manuel’s envoys were not allowed passage through the Mezzogiorno while on their 
way back to Constantinople. A Byzantine legate who was trying to reach France 
had indeed not been allowed passage through Southern Italy, but this seems to 
have happened before the round of negotiations that took place in 1163-64. As 
mentioned by Lamma, the text that mentions this incident is a letter in which Louis 
VII was informed of Manuel’s marriage with Maria, and thus it was written shortly 
after the wedding (probably in early 1162). Tolstoy-Miloslavsky has probably been 
led to his conclusion by the role of mediator played by Archbishop Henry of 
Benevento both in this case and in a series of events that took place in 1164. 
However, the most sensible explanation is that Henry probably acted as a mediator 
on two distinct occasions.21 
Manuel’s negotiations with Alexander III continued in the following years. 
Probably in 1166, the emperor sent Jordan, a son of Prince Robert of Capua, as an 
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envoy to Rome, to which Alexander had returned in the previous year. The choice 
as a legate of Jordan, the son of an émigré who had been captured and blinded 
during the 1156 rebellion against William I, is particularly interesting, and has led 
Lamma to suggest that this embassy took place after the death of William I. Indeed, 
one of the first moves of the Sicilian regents who were governing for William’s 
minor son was to attempt a reconciliation with the former rebels. Hence, Lamma 
does not exclude that, while in Italy, Jordan negotiated not only with the pope, but 
also with the Sicilians. Regardless of the chronology of these talks, and despite 
Jordan’s offers of financial support from Byzantium, Manuel still did not obtain 
papal recognition as sole emperor. Alexander was probably unconvinced by 
Jordan’s claims that the Eastern emperor would reunite the Churches. Indeed, in 
that same year, the basileus had tried to summon a council to reconcile the 
theological differences with Roman Christianity, but his plans had been met with a 
strong opposition from his own clergy.22 
In the meantime, in addition to negotiating with Pope Alexander, Manuel 
also maintained good relations with Sicily. The emperor did not try to take 
advantage of the death of William I, and of the minority of his successor William II 
(1166-89). According to Kinnamos, Manuel indeed refused to give his support to a 
brother of William I (probably Simon, an illegitimate son of Roger II), who asked for 
Byzantine help in order to try to obtain the throne. Furthermore, the basileus 
renewed his alliance with the new king, and even started negotiating a matrimonial 
alliance with the Sicilians: his then only daughter and heiress Maria was to marry 
William II. While these diplomatic manoeuvres were certainly aimed at 
strengthening the Byzantine-Sicilian alliance against Frederick, they are probably 
also linked with Manuel’s talks with Pope Alexander. Indeed, as clearly shown by 
Romuald’s account, in the eyes of a Westerner, William II would have become the 
heir to the Byzantine throne. Therefore, Manuel possibly also hoped that this 
marriage could be seen as a further testament to his good will towards the Western 
Christians, and that it might remove any obstacle to his recognition as sole 
emperor. However, these matrimonial negotiations eventually stalled, probably 
because the failure of the talks with the pope made such a marriage much less 
advantageous for Manuel. Furthermore, Maria was already betrothed to the brother 
and heir of the King of Hungary. Thus, Manuel might have eventually preferred to 
halt his negotiations with the Sicilians in order to prevent the breaking of the 
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engagement, which would have destabilised the already-fragile relations between 
Byzantium and the Magyars.23 
As mentioned above, despite the failure of the matrimonial negotiations, 
Byzantium and the Kingdom of Sicily nevertheless remained allied. This alliance, 
together with Barbarossa’s siege of Ancona, explains why Manuel conducted some 
diplomatic activity against Barbarossa during the Kaiser’s new Italian campaign of 
1167. This time, Barbarossa’s campaign was not primarily aimed at Northern Italy, 
as Frederick spent little time in Lombardy before he besieged Ancona for about 
three weeks, until the city surrendered. Manuel still held a form of protectorate over 
Ancona (indeed, an Eastern imperial officer was in the city during the siege), and 
Barbarossa had decided to besiege it in order to get hold of the Byzantine money 
that he thought had been deposited there, and which would have been used for 
financing the Italian rebels. Frederick then entered Rome, where, as Alexander had 
fled for Benevento, he installed a new anti-pope (Paschal III), who crowned him 
emperor again. These were to be some preliminary moves before Barbarossa 
could attempt to achieve his main goal: taking advantage of William II’s minority to 
undertake an attack against the Mezzogiorno. However, an epidemic of bacterial 
dysentery struck Rome, and killed many of Frederick’s most trusted advisers, 
preventing Barbarossa from joining Andrew of Rupecanina and Robert of Loritello, 
who were already at the borders of the Kingdom of Sicily, and forcing him to return 
to Germany. Furthermore, in Northern Italy, Milan had been re-founded, and most 
of the Lombard cities had joined together, forming an anti-Barbarossa alliance (the 
Lombard League). This coalition soon allied with the League of Verona, which 
comprised the Veneto cities that had allied against the Kaiser.24 While Manuel 
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(obviously) had nothing to do with the epidemic, he appears to have had an 
important role as a financier of the Lombard League. Indeed, a variety of sources 
suggest that Manuel provided financial assistance to the league, in particular for the 
rebuilding of Milan.25 
The rivalry between the two emperors made it possible to restore good 
relations between Venice and Manuel in the first half of the 1160s, as the Adriatic 
commune had changed its policy towards Barbarossa even before Byzantium. 
Venice had started to keep a distance from Frederick in 1158, when it had felt 
worried by the plans for more direct imperial domination over Northern Italy that the 
Kaiser had revealed at the second Diet of Roncaglia. However, the point of no 
return had been the Venetian decision to support Alexander during the papal 
schism.26 The rift had turned into an open conflict in 1162, during Barbarossa’s 
second Italian campaign. While Frederick’s most trusted Italian ally, the Patriarch of 
Aquileia, unsuccessfully attacked Grado, the German emperor tried to besiege 
Venice with the help of the neighbouring cities of the Veneto. However, this attempt 
also failed, as the Venetians successfully counterattacked, and soon managed to 
persuade their neighbouring cities to desert Barbarossa, and to ally with them, thus 
forming the League of Verona (probably in August 1162). Manuel may have 
financially supported this coalition in order to hinder the German advance, but the 
only evidence of this comes from a passage by Kinnamos mentioning an embassy 
which has been variously dated by modern scholars. The chronicler mentions that 
the Greek envoy Nikephoros Chalouphes was sent to Venice ‘with money’, and that 
the Adriatic city promised to help the Byzantines against Barbarossa.27 It is 
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probable that this legation took place in late 1167, as Chalouphes had been 
captured by the Hungarians in 1166, and appears to have been released in 1167, 
shortly after Easter. Furthermore, the legation to which Niketas refers was probably 
the same embassy mentioned by the Annales Venetici breves (which dated it to 
December 1167), and also by Andrea Dandolo. Finally, a further element 
supporting this hypothesis comes from an anti-Barbarossa agreement that, also in 
1167, Venice signed with Ferrara, the Lombard League, and the League of Verona, 
according to which the Adriatic commune was only required to provide naval help 
against the Germans. This pact mentions that if Venice were to receive any money 
from the Byzantines (or from the Sicilians), this was to be divided equally amongst 
all the cities. This clearly suggests that the two leagues were expecting Manuel to 
help them financially, probably because they had recently obtained some economic 
assistance from him.28 
However, one feature of Dandolo’s account that is most improbable, is that 
during these negotiations the Byzantines unsuccessfully asked Venice for military 
help against the Sicilians. Even though the matrimonial negotiations between 
Manuel and William II had not been successful, it is difficult to accept the 
chronicler’s statement that this led to renewed hostility between the two powers, 
for, as Romuald clearly points out, relations between the two rulers nevertheless 
remained extremely friendly. Furthermore, another element which makes Dandolo’s 
account even more unlikely is that Manuel was then involved in negotiations for a 
joint naval attack on Egypt together with the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Considering 
that the basileus had always tried not to be involved in two conflicts in different 
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areas of his empire at the same time, it would be strange indeed for him to do 
exactly the opposite on this occasion.29 In addition, some further possible evidence 
of the existence of some hostility between Byzantium and the rulers of the 
Mezzogiorno around the mid-1160s, has recently been discredited. The hints were 
thought to be found in Michael of Anchialos’s inaugural lecture as hypatōs tōn 
philosophōn, which, in one of its passages, refers to the Sicilian king being about to 
be annihilated by Manuel. Yet, in a recent work, Ioannis Polemis has convincingly 
suggested that this lecture was delivered shortly after 1151, and not in 1165-66, as 
previously assumed by modern scholars. This means that Michael of Anchialos 
was referring to Roger II, rather than to William I, as about to face destruction from 
Manuel.30 
Venetian hostility towards Barbarossa differentiated this city from the other 
naval powers from Central or Northern Italy, as Pisa and Genoa had by then 
decided to support the German emperor. In 1162, Frederick reached an agreement 
first with Pisa and then with Genoa, which both agreed to support his planned 
expedition against William I. However, there is a major difference between the 
Pisan and Genoese attitude towards the two emperors. The Pisans had been long-
time supporters of Barbarossa, and this had led to worse relations with Manuel. 
Indeed, according to the Chronica regia Coloniensis, in 1162, after a fruitless Pisan 
embassy to Constantinople in 1161-62, Pisa offered to assist Barbarossa in case 
he might attack Byzantium. By contrast, the Genoese had decided to side with 
Frederick with extreme reluctance, and the Ligurian city had supported Alexander 
III in the papal schism until a few days before the signing of the agreement with the 
German Empire. This political volte-face was the result of the Genoese fear that a 
refusal to assist Barbarossa might have had extremely negative consequences. 
Genoa was persuaded to support Frederick after being granted some valuable 
prospective commercial advantages in Southern Italy, which would have further 
improved the city’s already-intense mercantile activity in the area. In addition, the 
Genoese were probably afraid that, if they had refused to assist Barbarossa, the 
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Germans might have tried to force them to submit, as they had done in most of the 
rest of Northern Italy.31 
However, the political alignment of Pisa and Genoa alongside Frederick was 
only possible after a truce between the two cities was reached with the mediation of 
the Germans in August 1162. While the conflict between Genoa and Pisa had been 
conducted mostly in Sardinia, it had probably broken out in Constantinople, where 
Genoa had obtained its quarter either in 1158 or, more likely, in 1160. According to 
Caffaro, the much more numerous Pisans attacked the Genoese, and prevailed 
over them thanks to the support of many Venetians and Constantinopolitan 
Greeks – Manuel does not appear to have provided any official backing. The 
Pisans pillaged 3000 hyperpera from the Genoese quarter, while the Genoese had 
to flee Constantinople. The conflict then moved to the Tyrrhenian Sea, and it finally 
ended when the Germans managed to broker a truce between the two cities.32 One 
of the consequences of the riot was that, in its aftermath, one of the commercial 
rivals of Venice, Genoa, no longer had a quarter in Constantinople. It has been 
suggested that Manuel took this decision in order to punish the Genoese. However, 
the surviving evidence suggests that he did not take any initiative following the riot, 
as Pisa does not appear to have faced any consequence immediately after this riot. 
The moving of the Pisan quarter to Pera or Scutari, and thus out of Constantinople 
(of which we are aware because, when Manuel issued a chrysobull for Pisa in 
1170, he restored it to its original location), probably happened a few years later, 
and is not to be associated with this raid. By contrast, the Ligurian city did not re-
obtain its quarter. However, this was probably a consequence of a Genoese 
decision not to try to recover the compound after the Pisan pillaging had led to a 
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loss of internal consensus of the pro-Byzantine faction of the city.33 The Venetians 
did not face any consequences for their involvement in the riot either, and appear to 
have taken advantage of the absence of the Genoese to increase their commercial 
activity in the Eastern Empire. 
The anti-German stance of the Venetians also meant that the Adriatic city 
remained allied with the Sicilians. If Frederick had succeeded in conquering 
Southern Italy, Pisa and Genoa would have undoubtedly obtained substantial 
commercial advantages, but Barbarossa never reached his goal (he had to return 
to Germany, and never led his army against William I). This meant that the decision 
by Venice not to break its alliance with the Sicilians was extremely wise. Indeed, 
the choice made by Pisa and Genoa of supporting Barbarossa’s planned expedition 
led to strained relations between William I and these two maritime republics, thus 
creating more commercial opportunities for Venice. The Pisans, due to the long-
lasting and unconditional support they had given to Barbarossa, were more 
severely affected by the king’s hostility. Indeed, Bernardo Maragone records that in 
October 1162 the Sicilian king imprisoned all the Pisans that he could find in his 
kingdom, and had their goods confiscated; William also captured a Pisan ship that 
was returning from Constantinople.34 Even if the Genoese did not have to face such 
acts of wrath, their agreement with Frederick nevertheless had negative 
consequences on their trade with the Mezzogiorno. Commerce had already 
decreased in the previous years due to the political instability generated by the 
city’s conflict with Pisa, by the foreign threats to Sicily, and by the rebellion that had 
generated after Maio’s death. After 1162, while trade between Southern Italy and 
Genoa did not further diminish, its pattern significantly changed, as those involved 
in this commerce were no longer Ligurian merchants, but rather traders from 
Southern Italy who resided in Genoa. This was mainly due to a fear of reprisals by 
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William, coupled with internal problems, and with renewed hostilities with Pisa over 
the control of Sardinia.35 
iii) The Byzantine Expansion in the Balkans (1161-67) 
We have seen how Byzantine diplomatic activity towards Italy obtained 
support from Venice. However, the policy that Manuel was conducting in the 
Balkans in the same years would lead to new tension with the Adriatic city, as soon 
as Venice no longer felt threatened by Barbarossa. 
Even though Manuel and King Géza II of Hungary had settled a peace in 
1155, and signed a five-year treaty in 1161, a new conflict between Byzantium and 
Hungary began in 1162 after Manuel was involved in a succession crisis, and then 
attempted to acquire some land that was under Hungarian control, especially 
Dalmatia and Bosnia. This would have allowed him to extend his control over the 
Eastern Adriatic, and thus to keep a closer eye on the possible threats coming from 
Italy. During one of the breaks in this conflict, Béla, the younger brother of the 
Hungarian monarch Stephen III, was handed over to Manuel, and betrothed to 
Maria, the daughter (and, at this stage, heiress) of the basileus. Soon afterwards, 
he himself would even be designated as Manuel’s heir. The Byzantine-Hungarian 
war ended in 1167 with Manuel’s conquest of Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Sirmium (this 
town had already been acquired in 1165, and had become the capital of a new 
province, initially governed by Chalouphes). The Eastern Empire was to hold on to 
these areas until the early 1180s, not least due to a policy of fiscal exemption 
enacted by Manuel.36 
In addition to being involved in the conflict with the Byzantines, the 
Hungarians had probably also taken advantage of the rebellion of Zadar in 1164. 
The Dalmatian city had already unsuccessfully revolted against Venice in 1159, 
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when the doge had summoned all the Venetians who were in Romania and in Syria 
to return to their homeland to help to recover the city. Following the suppression of 
this rebellion, Doge Domenico Morosini’s homonymous son was appointed as 
comes of the city, in an attempt to strengthen the Venetian hold on the area, and to 
prevent further rebellions.37 This was successful, and in 1164, the doge reacted by 
leading a fleet to Zadar, but he failed to reconquer the city. The Venetians 
eventually managed to recover Zadar after a new expedition which was probably 
launched in 1165 following a preliminary agreement with Byzantium – the two 
powers were now united due to their mutual hostility towards Hungary –, and led by 
Morosini, who was reinstated as comes.38 While until this stage Venice appears not 
to have been actively hostile to Byzantium, this situation would soon change. 
Indeed, after the recovery of Zadar, the Venetians reconciled with the Hungarians; 
peace was sealed with a marriage between one of the doge’s sons and a Magyar 
princess. In addition, another son of Vitale II Michiel married a daughter of the 
Serbian ruler Dessa, who had by then fallen out of Manuel’s favour (and lost his 
throne) after he had recognised the King of Hungary as his lord.39 These marriages 
appear to suggest that Venice realised that the Hungarians and the Serbs were no 
longer dangerous to them. It was the Byzantines that had now become the most 
relevant power in Dalmatia. Their presence in the area could indeed be perceived 
as a threat to the Venetian possessions in the north of this region, and this probably 
led to the worsening of relations between Venice and Manuel. The embassy which 
took place in December 1167, and in which, according to Dandolo, the Venetians 
refused to provide naval help to Manuel, might be considered as the first sign of 
such a change in attitude. However, as already mentioned, this account is 
extremely problematic, as a Byzantine request for naval help against the Sicilians 
makes little sense in the political context of the time. Lilie’s suggestion that the 
Venetians were asked for naval help against Hungary (rather than against Sicily) 
cannot be excluded, but is not entirely unproblematic either. Such a refusal, 
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together with the marriages between the sons of the doge and the Hungarian and 
Serbian princess, could indeed be explained as a Venetian political turnaround in 
the light of Manuel’s conquests in Dalmatia. Yet, the timing of this request for help 
makes this explanation not entirely convincing, as, by late 1167, the Byzantines 
had already decisively defeated Hungary, and do not seem to have been interested 
in continuing this conflict.40 However, we must admit that Lilie’s explanation still 
makes more sense than both the possibility that Dandolo’s account is entirely 
accurate, or that the chronicler misdated an actual Byzantine request for help 
against the Sicilians by at least a decade (for this might have happened either in 
1155, or in 1185). 
iv) New Byzantine-Papal Negotiations, and Manuel’s Hostility to Venice (1167-
72) 
Barbarossa’s disastrous Italian expedition in 1167 was an important turning 
point not only in the Byzantine relations with Venice, but also in those with the 
Papacy. Mutual hostility towards the German emperor had indeed been the only 
element that could lead Manuel to work with the other two powers. Therefore, after 
Frederick had (temporarily) abandoned his project of forcing Northern Italy to 
submit, Pope Alexander was no longer ready to recognise Manuel as sole emperor. 
Furthermore, the Venetians, especially following Manuel’s conquests in Dalmatia, 
began to consider the Byzantines a direct threat to their interests.41 
Alexander III would be the first to keep a distance from Manuel. In 1167 or 
1168, the pope turned down a new Byzantine offer to re-unite the Churches, and to 
provide military help to the pope, in exchange for the recognition of Manuel as sole 
emperor. Furthermore, probably around the same time, the pontiff, afraid of the 
increasing Byzantine power in the West, successfully dissuaded the Lombard 
League from offering Manuel suzerainty over Lombardy. The dating of such project 
is rather dubious, but one indication seems to suggest that these negotiations took 
place early in 1168. While the pact sworn by the members of the Lombard League 
in December 1167 mentioned the possibility that Manuel might finance the 
coalition, such a clause was not included in the new oath that was taken by the 
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Italian cities in March/April 1168. If indeed such an offer had been made to Manuel, 
and then withheld, it would seem quite natural for the basileus to react by ceasing 
to finance the League.42 
Relations between Venice and the Eastern Empire also dramatically 
worsened following the failure of Barbarossa’s Italian campaign. The Germans 
were no longer considered a major threat to the independence of the communes, 
and thus the Venetians could once more focus on the situation in the Adriatic area. 
Since the Eastern Empire now ruled over a portion of Dalmatia, and still held a form 
of overlordship over Ancona, it had become a major power in this region. This, 
coupled with the Venetian matrimonial alliances with two of Manuel’s traditional 
enemies in the area (the Hungarians and the Serbs), led to a major rivalry between 
the Byzantines and the Venetians over the control of the Adriatic.43 
This rivalry soon transformed into open tension. However, the Venetian and 
Byzantine sources make it difficult to examine how the situation evolved, as they 
both omit a part of the account of the development of the events, making it difficult 
to analyse them. Yet, it is highly likely that the first consequence of the tension was 
an order of repatriation issued by the doge a few years before 1171, which is only 
mentioned by the Venetian sources. However, most scholars have suggested that 
this ordinance was generally ignored by the Venetians in Romania, as the scale of 
their trade there skyrocketed in the years immediately preceding 1171 (despite a 
brief but significant diminution between December 1168 and September 1169).44 
Yet, as explained by Lilie, the scale of trade soon increased again as this order was 
withdrawn soon after it had been issued. The sources are rather unclear regarding 
what led Vitale Michiel II to recall his subjects to Venice. In November 1168 there 
had been a military confrontation between some Anconitan and Venetian ships. 
The former, who had conducted some piratical activity against the Venetians in the 
Adriatic, were defeated; five ships from Ancona and their crews were captured, and 
two crew members were hanged. Even though since the late 1140s the Eastern 
Empire had protected Ancona in case of foreign attacks, and used this city as a 
military base for its own troops, it is unlikely that these piratical deeds were directly 
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related with Byzantium.45 Furthermore, even if the raids by the Anconitans were 
orchestrated by Manuel, the sources seem to consider the naval confrontation as a 
minor skirmish. Therefore, this does not justify a reaction as strong as the 
withdrawal of all the Venetian merchants from Romania, which was clearly 
undertaken as a first step before launching a full-scale military campaign.46 A more 
likely explanation is that the turning point in this relationship was the unsuccessful 
Byzantine embassy of December 1167.47 The more convincing explanation is that a 
diplomatic breakout took place. The Greek envoys probably did not ask the 
Venetians to provide a fleet to assist the Eastern Empire, but rather ordered them 
to do so. They probably stressed that Venice was supposed to provide military 
assistance since it was part of the empire. This deeply offended the Venetian 
government, which did not want to help a rival to solidify its positions in Dalmatia, 
and, even more importantly, was proud of its own political autonomy. Therefore, 
rather than helping the Byzantines, Venice decided to launch an expedition against 
the Eastern Empire. 
However, in this case, open conflict was avoided, as Manuel realised that he 
was in serious trouble, and that he had better come to terms with the Venetians. 
The emperor was indeed aware that, since at that time he was planning a naval 
expedition against Egypt, his fleet was not strong enough to face Venice as well. 
The treaty that Pisa signed with Dubrovnik and Split in May 1169 possibly suggests 
that Manuel might have tried to obtain the support of the Tuscan city in case he 
could not appease Venice. However, if this move had some consequences, it was 
probably only that of creating a bigger rift with the Venetians, who did not 
appreciate the involvement of Pisa in a region in which their commercial presence 
was predominant. Therefore, Manuel realised that the best way to avoid a crushing 
defeat was to reconcile with Venice, and he eventually did so (it is likely that this 
happened in the summer of 1169). The emperor probably accepted all the terms of 
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his enemies, possibly with the idea of reneging on them later, once he was no 
longer in such a difficult situation.48 
According to the Historia ducum Veneticorum, Manuel even granted a 
commercial monopoly in Romania to the Venetians, but this passage has been 
given very little attention by scholars, with the exception of Lilie, who believes it to 
be unreliable.49 Yet, some evidence suggests that this account is to be trusted, and 
that it meant that the Venetians became the only Italians who could have a quarter 
inside Constantinople. The previously mentioned agreement which Pisa signed with 
Dubrovnik and Split in May 1169 provides a key element supporting this 
suggestion. Indeed, the Pisan commercial involvement in Dalmatia is highly likely to 
have caused Venice to request those conditions to Manuel when the reconciliation 
took place. Furthermore, the text of the agreement between Pisa and the two 
Dalmatian cities twice refers to the figure of a Pisan vicecomes 
Constantinopolitanus. It can be argued that in Medieval Latin Constantinopolitanus 
was often used as a synonym for ‘Byzantine’, but this is not entirely true. Indeed, its 
main use was as an attribute after imperator. However, the only reason why such 
term was used was because the Byzantine emperor was based in Constantinople. 
Therefore, Constantinopolitanus was actually a synecdoche that was skilfully 
preferred over the problematic alternatives (Graecorum or Romanorum). For the 
same reason, it would be extremely strange for the Pisans to use this term for their 
vicecomes unless he was also based in Constantinople, rather than somewhere 
else in the Eastern Empire. Hence, this means that, in May 1169, the Pisan quarter 
was still in Constantinople, and that the relocation of the Pisan compound across 
the Golden Horn took place sometime later. Indeed, it is very likely that this move is 
to be associated with the implementation of the terms on which Manuel agreed with 
Venice. Finally, even though the same person (Burgundio) was in charge of the 
negotiations in both Dalmatia and Constantinople, we cannot exclude that he 
returned to Pisa between the two embassies. Otherwise, he might have originally 
been entrusted to engage with talks with Manuel in order to obtain compensation 
for not having received the yearly tribute that the Byzantines were to provide to the 
Pisans according to the terms of the chrysobull of 1111. Yet, since in the meantime 
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the Pisan quarter had been moved, he may have ended up negotiating about this 
as well.50 Furthermore, when Genoa re-obtained its quarter in October 1169, this 
was also established outside Constantinople for exactly the same reason. This is 
also why Genoa also obtained significant limitations when it reached a new 
agreement with Manuel. In particular, the Genoese could neither trade silk in 
Thebes, nor could their commercial ships sail to two specific locations (Rhosia and 
Matracha, lying, respectively, on the shores of the Black and Azov Seas). Finally, 
outside of Constantinople, they were to pay the full-rate kommerkion (instead of the 
reduced amount that they had been granted in 1155). All these conditions are 
consistent with the promise of granting a commercial monopoly to the Venetians.51 
The Byzantine reconciliation with Venice was not Manuel’s only attempt to 
improve his relations in Italy, as the basileus also tried to improve his relations with 
Alexander III by arranging a wedding between his own niece Eudokia and Oddone 
Frangipani, one of the main Roman allies of the pope. Furthermore, as we shall 
soon see in more detail, the Eastern emperor began talks with Pisa and Genoa, the 
other two main naval powers of Italy, who had, respectively, previously supported 
Barbarossa, and maintained a duplicitous attitude towards him. In addition to trying 
to dissuade these two cities from backing Frederick’s plans of acquiring Southern 
Italy, Manuel may have hoped that these cities might support him if there were to 
be a Byzantine-Venetian conflict. The basileus probably also hoped that his 
involvement in naval operations in Egypt alongside the Kingdom of Jerusalem 
might encourage both Pisa and Genoa, who had strong commercial bonds with the 
Crusader States, to undertake negotiations with him.52 
However, the main factor that led to good relations between Manuel and 
both Pisa and Genoa being restored was the temporary end of Barbarossa’s plans 
to subjugate Italy, following his disastrous 1167 expedition. Both cities sent a 
legation to William II, but only the Pisan one bore fruit – a treaty was signed in 
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1169. Furthermore, in October of the same year the Genoese obtained a colony 
across the Golden Horn, together with a reduction of the kommerkion that they had 
to pay when they traded in Constantinople (four percent instead of ten percent). In 
return, the Ligurian city was to provide military help against Egypt. However, these 
conditions were probably not entirely accepted in Genoa, and were soon 
renegotiated. Eventually, in May 1170 Genoa re-obtained its original quarter in 
Constantinople (the Coparion, located directly to the East of the original Pisan 
compound, and also comprising a wharf, and some land where a church was to be 
built). It was also granted reparations for the losses that it had suffered in 1162.53 
This grant of a compound in Constantinople to the Genoese was, in effect, a 
breach of the earlier agreement concluded between Manuel and Venice. Yet, as we 
have seen, the emperor had been forced to grant the prerogatives to Venice while 
he was already involved in military operations in Egypt, and thus did not want to 
face naval raids from the West. However, once the situation had become calmer, 
he felt that, since he was not involved in any other conflict, he would be able to 
repel a possible attack from Venice with considerable ease. Furthermore, we know 
that in 1170 Manuel received a legation from Frederick’s arch-chancellor, 
Archbishop Christian of Mainz, probably aimed at reaching a reconciliation between 
the two empires. Even though we do not know when exactly this embassy reached 
Constantinople, by the time Manuel granted his new concessions to Genoa, he 
may have been aware that Barbarossa was planning to undertake a new expedition 
into Italy. Thus, Venice would have had more immediate threats to face, rather than 
worrying over the loss of its commercial monopoly in Constantinople. Finally, 
Manuel hoped that, in case of a violent reaction by Venice to such decisions, 
Genoa could provide some naval help in return for the concessions that it had 
obtained.54 
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The disastrous outcome of Barbarossa’s 1167 Italian expedition also led 
Pisa to try to restore good relations with Frederick’s enemies. In addition to the 
treaty with William II, the Tuscan city strengthened its bond with Byzantium. The 
first hint of this was the signing of the previously mentioned agreement with both 
Dubrovnik and Split, which was concluded in May 1169. It is highly probable that 
this pact (which was probably signed before Manuel’s reconciliation with Venice) 
was also aimed at countering the strong Venetian commercial presence in 
Dalmatia. Furthermore, we have already noticed that this charter provides key 
evidence that the Pisan quarter was moved out of Constantinople following the date 
of issue of this document (May 1169). Yet, the Pisan quarter was soon restored in 
its original location, as this was one of the concessions that Manuel granted to the 
Tuscan city in July 1170.55 The agreement between Pisa and Byzantium can most 
likely be explained as a consequence of the one that had just been negotiated 
between Genoa and the Eastern Empire. One would guess that the Pisans 
vigorously protested once they found out that their rivals, the Genoese, had 
obtained a quarter inside Constantinople. They undoubtedly insisted on obtaining 
similar conditions, as they did not want to be the only main Italian commercial 
power left out of the main Byzantine market. This agreement also made it possible 
for Pisa to develop fully the trade route that connected Tuscany with 
Constantinople via Dalmatia and, possibly, Ancona.56 
It is fair to say that the new concessions granted to Pisa and Genoa were 
not positively received by the Venetians, for whom they meant the end of their 
commercial monopoly. The coexistence of the three quarters soon became 
troublesome, and, according to Kinnamos, the Venetians (probably with some help 
from the Pisans) devastated the Genoese compound shortly after it was re-
established. Since the agreement with Byzantium was ratified by the Genoese 
parliament in July/August 1170, the devastation of the quarter must have happened 
either after, or just before, this ratification (and also after the restoration of the 
Pisan compound, as the Tuscans were also involved in the riot). Following this 
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violent action, Manuel asked the Venetians to rebuild the houses that they had 
destroyed, and to pay for the damage that they had inflicted upon the Genoese. 
The Venetians, however, refused, and threatened to attack the Eastern Empire.57 
While none of these events is narrated by the Venetian sources, two of them record 
that two envoys from Venice reached Constantinople. This legation is probably to 
be identified with the one mentioned by Kinnamos. However, the Venetian 
chronicles do not record that Manuel asked the legates for reparations, but rather 
that the emperor persuaded them that he intended to grant further and more 
extended privileges to the merchants from Venice. The legates heard rumours that 
Manuel was plotting something against their fellow citizens, but they eventually 
decided to trust the basileus after a series of assurances of his good will.58 If the 
information of each narrative source is partial but true, then, following the Venetian 
refusal to pay damages to the Genoese, the basileus probably pretended that he 
wanted a further reconciliation with the Adriatic commune, just as he had done a 
few years earlier. Yet, on this occasion, the rumours heard by the legates were 
actually true. Manuel indeed ordered the arrest of all the Venetians that were to be 
found in the empire, and the confiscation of their goods. This order was 
successfully carried out on 12 March 1171.59 
This explanation suggests that Manuel decided to grant extended privileges 
to the Venetians only because he was in a very difficult situation. Once he was no 
longer involved in another conflict, he changed his mind, since he was now 
confident that his fleet, which was still strong despite the loss of many vessels on 
their way back from Egypt, would be able to counter a possible reprisal by Venice. 
Yet, it is unclear whether he genuinely hoped that the Venetians would not react to 
his decision. Though it is extremely unlikely that the emperor already had a ‘grand 
anti-Venetian strategy’ ready when he first reconciled with Venice, his decision to 
reinstate both the Pisans and the Genoese into Constantinople was not particularly 
wise. Even though, in contrast to the earlier incident in 1162, the Greek population 
was not directly involved in the riot, there was still some strong popular resentment 
towards the Italians. Evidence of such a hostility can be seen not only in the events 
of 1162, but also in the anti-Latin reaction following the pro-Roman decisions taken 
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during the Constantinopolitan synod of 1166. Although the Greeks had sided with 
the Venetians in 1162, more than one chronicler recalled how the latter were 
deemed arrogant and greedy by many Byzantines. Therefore, we can safely say 
that the restoration of the Pisan and Genoese quarters, rather than pouring oil on 
troubled waters, created a time bomb.60 
While Manuel’s behaviour before the pillaging of the Genoese quarter was 
probably naive, it is fair to say that the basileus had already planned his revenge 
when he met the legates from Venice after the destruction of the Genoese quarter. 
It is not entirely clear why Manuel decided to take such a drastic decision. We have 
already seen that the Venetians had probably been offended by the Byzantine 
envoys who, in December 1167, had not acknowledged their autonomy. However, 
Manuel was probably also irked by the Venetian refusal to recognise his own 
authority, and thought that the Adriatic city deserved a significant punishment. 
Perhaps this was just one of the results of the emperor’s change of attitude towards 
Westerners. This might have originated after the birth of his son Alexios in 1169, 
and the ensuing relegation of his daughter Maria and, more importantly, of her 
Hungarian fiancé Béla-Alexios from being the heirs to the Constantinopolitan 
throne. Indeed, his decision to appoint a ‘barbarian’ as his own successor appears 
to have been opposed by part of the Byzantine hierarchy, and Manuel’s later 
decision to reverse it may have given encouragement to an anti-Latin faction of the 
Constantinopolitan court. In turn, the presence of this group might have persuaded 
Manuel to take such a strong measure against the Venetians following their 
devastation of the Genoese quarter.61 In addition, Manuel probably thought that, 
since Barbarossa was apparently planning to attack Italy again, and as he himself 
was holding so many Venetian citizens as hostages, Venice would be unwilling, or 
unable, to react violently to the imprisonment of its countrymen, out of fear that the 
city would be left undefended, and that the captives might be killed. Such 
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circumstances would therefore lead the Venetians to decide to come to terms with 
Byzantium, and to yield to the emperor’s conditions.62 
Manuel was indeed quite right. The Venetians did not react drastically to the 
news of the imprisonment of their citizens, most of whom were detained in the 
Byzantine prisons and monasteries – only a limited number of them some were 
soon liberated, or managed to evade arrest by fleeing Romania in a hurry. The 
doge’s first reaction was to send legates to the Bosporus to ask why their 
merchants had received such treatment. Yet, before the envoys could leave for 
Constantinople, twenty ships that had managed to leave Halmyros unharmed, 
arrived in Venice. Soon, news spread of what had actually happened, and the 
Venetian population forced the commune to attack the Byzantines. They demanded 
the building of a new fleet, and, once it was ready, around four months later, the 
doge was given the task of leading it against Manuel.63 
The Venetians also persuaded the Serbs to revolt in order to force (albeit 
unsuccessfully) the Byzantines to focus on two fronts. In addition, Venice attacked 
Trogir and Dubrovnik, capturing the former, but probably not the latter. The 
Venetians then began to besiege the capital of Euboea. However, they halted the 
hostilities when the governor of the island offered to broker talks between the doge 
and Manuel in exchange for calling off the siege. A Greek envoy was thus sent to 
Constantinople together with two delegates from Venice, while the rest of the fleet, 
led by the doge, moved to Chios to winter there. However, Manuel refused to 
receive the legates until the Venetians stopped attacking his lands, and sent his 
envoy to Chios. The imperial agent, once he was there, advised the Venetians to 
send a new embassy to Constantinople, and so they did. The envoys soon returned 
to the fleet (most of which had moved to Panagea due to an epidemic that had 
struck Chios), with news that the emperor had refused to listen to them, but that he 
had promised that he would do so if a third embassy were sent. This new legation 
was duly despatched, but the Venetians were still unable to speak directly to 
Manuel. The emperor was probably aware that, in the meantime, the fleet led by 
the doge had sailed back towards Venice, and was no longer an immediate threat 
to his empire. Indeed, the doge had returned to Venice in late 1172 after having 
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obtained the subjection of Dubrovnik.64 Soon after his return to Venice, Vitale II 
Michiel was stabbed to death by a ‘thief’, who was probably frustrated with the 
outcome of the expedition that the doge had launched against Manuel. Eleven of 
Michiel’s most trusted advisors were chosen to appoint his successor, and 
eventually Sebastiano Ziani was elected as doge. Ziani followed the strategy of his 
predecessor in negotiating with Manuel to secure the release of the imprisoned 
Venetians, but, as the basileus kept playing for time, he too failed to reach an 
agreement.65 
Procrastination had indeed proved to be an extremely efficient strategy for 
Manuel while the Venetian fleet was in the Aegean. It had made it possible for the 
emperor to reorganise his navy (indeed, according to the Greek sources, the arrival 
of a Byzantine fleet had been the main reason why the Venetians had retreated), 
and to engage in diplomatic talks.66 The Byzantines were meanwhile negotiating 
both with the Kaiser, and with the Sicilians. Talks with Frederick commenced in 
1170, probably with the aim that their success would lead to an end of the German 
threats to the Eastern Empire. They continued in the years following, with Manuel 
unsuccessfully offering to arrange a marriage between his daughter Maria and 
Frederick’s son Henry.67 However, at around the same time, the same matrimonial 
proposal was made to William II. The support of the Sicilian king would have been 
helpful against both Barbarossa (in case Manuel’s negotiations with the Kaiser 
were unsuccessful) and Venice. The basileus possibly hoped that William’s navy 
would have supported his own when the Venetians were conducting their retaliatory 
actions in the Adriatic and Aegean. In this case, everything seemed to be going as 
planned, but in May 1172 William II was eventually left waiting in Taranto for his 
fiancée, who never arrived. Yet, this probably happened after the Germans had 
refused the proposal to have Henry VI married to Maria Komnene. Thus, the 
reason why Manuel did not send his daughter to Apulia does not appear to be 
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linked with these negotiations.68 Moreover, the dating of the retreat of the Venetian 
fleet from the Aegean Sea is probably contemporary with the refusal to allow 
Maria’s wedding with William II. The marriage was not concluded because the 
Byzantines no longer needed William’s naval help against the Venetians. We shall 
also see that this aborted marriage led to worse relations between William II and 
Byzantium.69 
v) The German-Venetian Siege of Ancona, and the New Venetian-Sicilian 
Alliance (1173-75) 
Not only was Manuel’s proposal for a matrimonial alliance between his 
daughter and Barbarossa’s son rejected, but it also led to new tensions between 
the two empires. Indeed, Frederick sent Archbishop Christian of Mainz to Italy, with, 
amongst his aims, that of occupying Ancona, which, as a Byzantine protectorate, 
was an important centre of opposition against the Kaiser. As outlined by the 
chronicler Boncompagno da Signa, the German emperor probably felt that, 
because of the strategic importance of this city, and of the ensuing loss of influence 
in Italy of the Eastern Empire, acquiring control over Ancona was the key to the 
success of a new full-scale Italian campaign. Therefore, his men began the siege of 
Ancona in 1173, so that in the following year, when Barbarossa was planning a 
new descent to Italy, this city would have been under German control.70 Yet, 
Frederick and his men knew that the only way to make Ancona submit was to 
besiege it not only by land, but also by sea. Therefore, they asked for, and 
                                                          
68 Romuald, Annales, p. 261; Tolstoy-Miloslavsky, Manuel Komnenos and Italy..., pp. 
293-97; Graham A. Loud, ‘A Lombard Abbey in a Norman World: St Sophia, 
Benevento, 1050-1200’, in Anglo-Norman Studies, 19: Proceedings of the Battle 
Conference 1996, ed. by Christopher Harper-Bill (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1997), pp. 273-
306 (p. 290); Magdalino, The Empire…, pp. 93-94. William II’s presence in Apulia is 
attested by two charters that he issued in mid-May 1172: Pergamene Aldobrandini, 
Cart. II, no. 25; ‘Collezione di alcuni diplomi di Catapani d’Italia, e di Duchi di Napoli, ed 
altri documenti normanni, la maggior parte inediti, trascritti dal Grande Archivio di 
Napoli’, ed. by Giuseppe Del Giudice, in Codice diplomatico del regno di Carlo I e Carlo 
II d’Angiò, 3 vols (Naples: Stamperia della regia università, 1863-1902), I, no. 27, pp. 
liv-lv. 
69 However, that in 1173 William’s men attempted a naval raid against Manuel, as 
suggested by Andrew F. Stone, ‘A Norman Shipwreck in 1173’, Thesaurismata, 27 
(1997), 19-25 (pp. 20-22, 24), is no more than a suggestive hypothesis based on a 
rather imaginative interpretation of two orations by Eustathios of Thessalonica. 
70 Boncompagno da Signa, The History of the Siege of Ancona, ed. and trans. by 
Andrew F. Stone, Archivio del Litorale Adriatico 6 (Venice: Filippi, 2002), ch. 3, p. 8; 
Tolstoy-Miloslavsky, ‘Manuel I Komnenos and Italy...’, p. 292; Antonio Carile, ‘Federico 
Barbarossa, i Veneziani e l’assedio di Ancona del 1173: Contributo alla storia politica e 
sociale della città nel secolo XII’, Studi veneziani, 16 (1974), 3-31 (pp. 5-6, 29). The 
Chronica regia Coloniensis, a. 1171, p. 121 misdates the German siege of Ancona of 
1171, and erroneously suggests that the city was eventually taken. 
191 
 
obtained, naval help from the Venetians, who were more than happy to provide 
such assistance against a commercial rival over which Byzantium had a strong 
influence. The Venetians, therefore, temporarily reneged on the oath that they had 
taken together with the other members of the Lombard League, according to which 
they would not fight alongside Barbarossa, and their navy intervened alongside 
Frederick. The doge did not personally take part in the blockade, but we are aware 
of the active involvement of Romano Mairano, a Venetian merchant who had 
suffered a serious financial setback after his goods in Romania had been 
confiscated in March 1171. This suggests that some of the people who had been 
harmed by Manuel tried to seek their revenge on the basileus by trying to deprive 
him of what was perceived as his Italian bridgehead. In addition to enlisting the 
naval support of Venice, Barbarossa probably also hoped that, following the 
aborted Sicilian-Byzantine matrimonial negotiations, William II might join him 
against Manuel. It is probably with this aim that Frederick approached the Sicilian 
king, trying to reconcile with him, and offering him the hand of one of his own 
daughters. Yet, the proposal was not accepted, as William was aware that 
Alexander III would have strongly objected to it. Moreover, Ancona also obtained 
substantial military support from both within and outside Italy. In particular, the 
Byzantine governor of Dalmatia, Constantine Doukas, had arrived in Italy once he 
found out that Christian of Mainz was marching towards Ancona. We know that he 
was given considerable financial means, with which he managed to obtain military 
assistance from Aldruda Frangipani, the Countess of Bertinoro (whose relative 
Oddone had married Manuel’s niece), and from Guglielmo Marchesella, a 
nobleman from Ferrara. The support of these Italian allies, who would both be later 
generously rewarded by Manuel for their help, and the bad weather conditions that 
forced the Venetian fleet to return to the lagoon in the winter, prevented Christian of 
Mainz from gaining control of the city. Indeed, after seven months, the Germans 
lifted their siege of Ancona, possibly (as suggested by Romuald of Salerno) after 
receiving a tribute from the defenders. Therefore, Manuel kept his protectorate over 
Ancona, and in return granted commercial privileges to its loyal inhabitants.71 
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The failed siege of Ancona made one of the main aims of the Venetians, 
reconciling with Byzantium, even more difficult. Indeed, Manuel did not feel any 
need or urgency to concede anything to Venice, especially after its involvement in 
hostile activity against his protégé. Therefore, even though Doge Sebastiano Ziani 
was still attempting to reach a diplomatic solution to the hostage crisis, he also 
approached William II to obtain a renewal of the privileges that the commune had 
received in the Mezzogiorno around twenty years earlier. Furthermore, the 
Venetians hoped that an agreement with the Sicilians might have persuaded 
Manuel to seek a reconciliation with them, out of fear that, otherwise, he would 
have remained politically isolated in the Adriatic. Ziani sent the first envoys in 1173, 
but the legates were recalled when Byzantine legates approached the doge, 
persuading him that a reconciliation with the basileus seemed imminent. However, 
despite these new embassies, no agreement with Manuel could be reached. Since 
this meant that the Byzantine markets remained off limits, the Venetians realised 
that they had to conduct a different policy, and stop considering a reconciliation 
with Byzantium as their only diplomatic priority. Therefore, in 1174 two legates went 
to Alexandria, where they managed to conclude an agreement with the Muslim 
ruler of Egypt, Saladin, who possibly granted to the Venetians a mercantile 
warehouse in the city. In the following year, the Venetians also reached an 
agreement with William II: the treaty that had been originally concluded in 1154 or 
1155 was now renewed for twenty years.72 
These treaties concluded by Ziani’s legates, together with the anti-Ancona 
agreement signed by Venice and Rimini around 1175, and, most importantly, 
Manuel’s plan to undertake a campaign in Anatolia against the Turks, persuaded 
the basileus to try once again to reach an agreement with Venice. The Byzantine 
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ruler was probably afraid that the Venetians might take advantage of a lack of 
imperial forces in the West to launch a new naval raid, and so he made some 
conciliatory moves. He sent his own legates to Italy, promised to pay fifteen 
kentenaria of compensation (i.e. around twenty-five percent of the total losses) to 
Venice, and, as an act of good will, he released some of the Venetians who were 
still imprisoned. This did result in a minor improvement in relations between the two 
powers, to the point that some Venetians were once again active in trade in 
Romania in 1175-77. However, even though according to Niketas Choniates an 
agreement was reached, this was not the case, probably because Manuel in the 
end failed to send the promised money to Venice. Indeed, Andrea Dandolo relates 
that Doge Ziani, having finally had enough of the dilatory tactics that the Byzantine 
envoys employed, dismissed Manuel’s agents.73 
The agreement that Venice and William II signed in 1175 suggests that the 
Venetian participation in the siege of Ancona alongside the Germans did not hinder 
the diplomatic position of Venice in Italy. Furthermore, the involvement in military 
operations alongside Christian of Mainz meant that Venice had also restored good 
relations with Barbarossa. We shall see that this was one of the reasons why two 
years later the Adriatic city would be chosen to host the peace talks between 
Frederick and his enemies. 
By contrast, despite his military success in Ancona, Manuel’s diplomatic 
position in Italy changed appreciably in the early 1170s. After the confiscation of 
Venetian property, Genoa appears to have become the main commercial partner of 
Byzantium. Probably in 1172-73, the Genoese agreed to provide thirty galleys to 
the empire in return for a considerable amount of money, and for improved 
commercial privileges in the empire. Not much later, probably in the early months of 
1175, the Genoese required (and probably obtained) from the Byzantines the 
reparations that they were owed following the riots of 1162 and 1171, and other 
minor events. In addition, Manuel maintained good relations with the Kingdom of 
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Jerusalem and with the Antiochenes thanks to the wedding of his own grandnieces 
Theodora and Maria with, respectively, Prince Bohemond III and King Amalric I.74 
However, he could not restore good relations with the other political powers of the 
Italian peninsula, as he was unable to effect a reconciliation with either Barbarossa 
or Venice, and he had enraged William II of Sicily with the aborted marriage talks. 
Even the Lombard League had turned its back to Manuel, possibly due to the 
latter’s hostility towards Venice. Indeed, around 1170, a new member of the anti-
Barbarossa alliance (possibly Ezzelino da Romano) had taken an oath that he 
would not conclude any agreement with the basileus.75 
vi) Myriokephalon, the Peace of Venice, and the Final Years of Manuel 
Komnenos (1176-80) 
Despite the failure of the siege of Ancona, Barbarossa nevertheless 
attempted another Italian campaign (1174-76). Venice decided not to support this 
military expedition, and initially fought against the Germans, but soon concluded an 
agreement with Archbishop Christian of Mainz.76 Frederick suffered another defeat 
at the Battle of Legnano, and then realised that the time had come to seek a 
reconciliation with his long-time foes: the Lombard League, Pope Alexander, and 
the Kingdom of Sicily. Barbarossa had already tried to open talks with the pontiff in 
1175, when Cardinal Humbald of Ostia had unsuccessfully suggested to the 
emperor that he also conclude peace with William II and Manuel. Barbarossa had 
then planned to attack both rulers, and had given Christian of Mainz the task of 
commencing a campaign against Southern Italy. Even though the archchancellor 
had achieved some limited success, as he had managed to enter the Kingdom of 
Sicily, and to defeat William II’s men, the outcome of the Battle of Legnano had 
forced him to return to Northern Italy. Barbarossa thus re-opened peace talks with 
Alexander, whom he had still not recognised as the legitimate pope. In November 
1176, legates of the two met in Anagni. A preliminary agreement was reached: a 
truce was to be observed, and a peace council would be organised in the near 
future. As his representative had suggested in the previous year, the pope insisted 
that Frederick was to conclude peace not only with the Lombard League (which 
was not included in the truce, and upon which a settlement was to be imposed 
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without its direct representation), but also with both William II and Manuel. 
However, the peace council could only be organised in 1177, as the Lombards did 
not want a treaty to be imposed upon them, and Barbarossa and the pope 
struggled to agree on its location. Eventually, the pope, the German emperor, the 
Lombard League, and the Sicilians (represented by Romuald of Salerno and Roger 
of Andria, who had accompanied the pope in his naval voyage from Vieste to 
Venice in early 1177) agreed on meeting in Venice, as long as the doge did not 
allow Frederick to enter the city without Alexander’s permission.77 
Barbarossa did not directly take part in these negotiations, and remained in 
Ravenna until he was allowed to go to Chioggia. There, he was approached by 
some Venetians, who tried to convince him to come to Venice, where they would 
have helped him to obtain better terms with both the Papacy and the Lombard 
League. Even though most of his subjects were favourable to this proposal, the 
doge refused to consent to it. Furthermore, the Venetian government was also 
faced with a threat to have its commercial privileges in Southern Italy withdrawn 
should Frederick be invited into the city. After lengthy negotiations, the pope 
eventually allowed him to enter Venice, where Barbarossa humiliatingly reconciled 
with the pontiff, and agreed, amongst other things, to a six-year truce with the 
Lombard League, and to a fifteen-year peace with Sicily. Frederick also renewed 
the centuries-long commercial agreement between the Western Empire and 
Venice, and concluded a peace treaty with the doge.78 
In the preliminary agreement of Anagni, it had been decided that 
Barbarossa should also sign a treaty with Manuel, and this was also one of the 
clauses accepted by the Kaiser in Venice. However, the Byzantines played no part 
in these negotiations. The choice of Venice as the site of the conference, and the 
fear that this might jeopardise the other negotiations, probably prevented Alexander 
from insisting on including the Eastern Empire in the peace talks. Indeed, it is highly 
likely that the Venetians, who were still at war with Manuel, would have refused to 
host Byzantine representatives in their city. The Sicilians might also have opposed 
the presence of Greek legates at the conference, as William II was probably still 
irked with Manuel following his sudden change of mind regarding the wedding of 
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his daughter. In addition, after concluding peace with Barbarossa, the Sicilian king 
had little interest in restoring an alliance with the Byzantines. Since the Germans 
were no longer a threat to him, William II would not need the support of the basileus 
to prevent the Kaiser from attacking him. Finally, not even Frederick felt any 
urgency to reconcile with Manuel. By contrast, he might have felt that his renewed 
imperial legitimacy, and his good relations with the Italian powers, might have 
helped him to have a possible anti-Byzantine campaign endorsed by the pope, and 
militarily supported by the Venetians and the Sicilians.79 
Yet another reason why Manuel was not invited to send representatives to 
Venice was because, shortly after the Battle of Legnano, he had sustained an 
embarrassing defeat at Myriokephalon. The Eastern emperor had presented this 
campaign as aimed at reopening the land route to the Holy Land, and had thus 
obtained the support of Alexander III, who had called for a crusade. Manuel hoped 
that, if he had been successful, he would have strengthened his bond with the 
Frankish States. However, the plans of the Byzantine emperor came to nothing 
since the Turks routed him (and came to close to capturing him) at Myriokephalon. 
This military defeat was probably not as serious as it first appeared, but it lost 
Manuel a lot of prestige. In a letter that the Eastern emperor wrote to Frederick, 
which was probably sent soon after this battle, Manuel omitted to mention the 
outcome of this battle in it, and indeed claimed that the Turkish sultan had 
submitted to him – which was partially true, as the Byzantines had subsequently 
been successful in a series of minor confrontations. However, the Turkish sultan 
had previously informed Frederick that Manuel had been routed in Myriokephalon. 
Therefore, Barbarossa probably felt teased that Manuel’s letter was intended to 
deceive, and replied sarcastically. Needless to say, the two emperors did not 
manage to come to terms.80 
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In the years following, even though his military activity was mainly focused 
on the East, Manuel continued to be deeply involved diplomatically with the West.81 
The basileus was afraid that the Germans, who were once more active in Italy, 
ostensibly with the aim of restoring Alexander in Rome, and of crushing the 
opposition to the pope, might attempt to conquer Ancona, possibly in order to use 
this city as a base for an attack against the Eastern Empire. Therefore, the basileus 
continued helping Ancona financially, and tried to hinder Barbarossa’s plans in 
Northern Italy. In 1177 or shortly afterwards, he persuaded the Marquis of 
Montferrat to desert the Kaiser. This agreement was extremely effective, as the 
marquis’ own bonds with Genoa helped to cement Genoese-Byzantine relations, 
and Conrad, a son of the marquis, managed to capture Christian of Mainz in 
Camerino (considering the location of this town, Ancona may have been used as a 
base for the negotiations between the Montferrats and the Byzantines). The 
marquis was generously rewarded, and another son of his, Renier, married Maria 
(the daughter of the basileus, and second-in-line to Manuel’s succession). 
According to Robert of Torigny (a writer who is unfamiliar with Byzantine customs), 
Renier in return obtained the fief of Thessalonica, but we cannot exclude that he 
was merely granted the dignity of doux (military commander and governor) of this 
city. In addition, Genoa also played a crucial role as a mediator in the Byzantine 
negotiations with the French, which eventually ended with the betrothal of Manuel’s 
son and heir, Alexios, to Agnes, a daughter of the King of France. The Genoese 
provided the ships for the transport of Agnes to Constantinople.82 
In addition, Manuel improved his relations with Pisa, as his niece Eudokia, 
whose first husband Oddone Frangipani had since died, remarried to a Pisan 
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nobleman named Guelfo da Porcaria.83 However, even though Manuel’s ally, 
Genoa, had concluded a twenty-nine year-long peace treaty with Venice in 1177, a 
Venetian-Byzantine rapprochement did not take place. Indeed, Madden has 
convincingly argued against the suggestion made by other historians that in 1179 
the basileus released some of the Venetians that he still kept as prisoners. As we 
have seen, this had probably happened some years earlier, around 1175.84 
These were the final events of Manuel’s reign, as the emperor died in 
September 1180.85 If compared to his predecessors, Manuel, in particular since the 
1160s, had had much better relations with the Crusader States. This is exemplified 
both by his matrimonial alliances (in particular, his own wedding with Mary of 
Antioch), and by his military collaborations with the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Yet, 
despite this, the situation in the Middle and Near East was not as tranquil as it may 
have seemed. Indeed, a major threat was looming on the Frankish States in the 
Levant, as Saladin was becoming more and more powerful in the Near East. 
Furthermore, even though the Battle of Myriokephalon was followed by a 
moderately successful counteroffensive, Manuel had been unable to recover much 
territory in Anatolia, and most of this region remained under Turkish control.86 
In the West, by contrast, the land borders of Byzantium were under no 
serious threat, as Manuel had secured a network of personal alliances mainly 
thanks to a series of dynastic marriages. However, the empire had extended 
considerably, including many different ethnic groups, which, though quiet under a 
strong ruler, could rebel in no time under a weak basileus. Furthermore, while 
Manuel still had a solid diplomatic network in the West, this mainly included powers 
that, with the exception of Genoa and Pisa, were geographically distant from the 
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Byzantine lands, and had not engaged much (either in war, or in commerce) with 
the Eastern Empire. By contrast, the basileus had failed to maintain good relations 
with either the Germans or the Sicilians. Not only had these powers, which were 
geographically closer to Manuel’s lands, previously been involved in military activity 
against the empire, but they were now allied with each other. Even though none of 
them was apparently attempting to attack Byzantium, this was a clear diplomatic 
failure by Manuel. While for most of his reign he had tried to form an entente 
against his possible attackers in order to prevent any hostile action against himself, 
now they had all coalesced together.87 
Finally, when analysing Manuel’s dealing with the Venetians, it can be said 
that the emperor brilliantly played the role of a cynical and masterful puppeteer. 
This was possible because, during the latter half of Manuel’s reign, the Venetians 
always needed to have good relations with Byzantium in order to exploit the 
markets of Romania. On the other hand, Manuel did not have to face many threats, 
especially from the West, and thus most of the time had no need of maintaining 
good relations with Venice. Therefore, Manuel could follow the same strategy that 
he and his father had used in their relations with the Papacy and the Germans 
(which intensified whenever they wanted to undertake a campaign against Antioch). 
This became apparent since the late 1160s, when the Byzantine conquest of 
Dalmatia, and the imperial embassy to Venice of late 1167 led to a rift between 
Constantinople and the Adriatic commune. Indeed, the basileus would only grant 
concessions to the Adriatic city when his army or navy was engaged in wide-range 
military operations in the East. This is what happened in 1169, when Manuel was 
about to send his fleet to Egypt, and then in 1175-76, when he was preparing his 
(eventually ill-fated) attempted recovery of Anatolia. After 1171, on all the other 
occasions, the emperor pretended to be open to reaching an agreement with 
Venice, but actually pursued a policy of procrastination. He was indeed aware that 
the Venetians would always be willing to engage in negotiations because of how 
important it was for them to re-obtain their commercial privileges, and to have their 
fellow countrymen liberated. Furthermore, he was probably confident that, in case 
of a Venetian attack, his army and navy would be strong enough to repel it. 
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Manuel’s policy was dangerous, but eventually successful, mainly because a lack 
of external threats to the empire allowed him masterfully to play this role of 
puppeteer, and to compromise only whenever he wanted to conduct an aggressive 
policy. 
vii) The Reigns of the Final Komnenoi, and of the Angeloi 
Manuel’s death left the Byzantine Empire in a difficult position because of 
the minority of his son and heir, Alexios II, who was only eleven, and thus needed a 
regent.88 We shall here see how relations between Venice and Sicily evolved as a 
result of this. 
After the death of the basileus, and the succession of his minor son, most of 
the personal bonds that Manuel had secured with foreign rulers lapsed. This was 
especially the case with the Frankish States. Relations with Antioch deteriorated, 
as Bohemond III divorced from his Byzantine wife Theodora in 1180, and 
conquered Tarsus in the following year. Furthermore, the Kingdom of Jerusalem no 
longer needed Byzantine support as it had signed a two-year truce with Saladin in 
1180. The lack of Byzantine influence in Jerusalem was also a result of Baldwin of 
Ibelin’s unsuccessful bid to marry Sybilla, the heiress-apparent to the kingdom. 
Baldwin had strong bonds with the Eastern Empire as, when in 1179 he had been 
captured by Saladin, the Byzantines had ransomed him. However, Sybilla ended up 
marrying Guy of Lusignan, who, instead, had no links with Constantinople.89 In the 
West, Pisa had already signed a treaty with Venice in October 1180. Though this 
agreement did not contain any anti-Byzantine clause (apart from forbidding the 
Pisans to sail from Venice to Romania as long as Venice was still at war with the 
Eastern Empire), we can sensibly presume that this agreement was not well-
received in Constantinople.90 Furthermore, in the Balkans, Sirmium and Dalmatia 
were soon recovered by the Hungarians. In the latter region, a Byzantine official, 
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Rogerius Sclavone (probably to be identified with Roger Sclavus, an illegitimate 
son of Count Simon ‘of Policastro’ who had left Southern Italy in the early 1160s) is 
last recorded in this region in 1180, and the Hungarians had certainly regained 
control over Split by July 1181. Interestingly, the Magyar king in these years was 
Béla, who had once been Manuel’s heir, whom the basileus had later helped to 
obtain the Hungarian throne.91 Finally, the Byzantine protectorate over Ancona 
seems to have ended around 1180. Indeed, no source mentions any form of 
military or financial help provided by Byzantium to Ancona (or vice versa) after 
Manuel’s death.92 
The Eastern Empire also faced a complicated internal situation. Alexios II’s 
mother, Mary of Antioch, formally became the regent for her son with the 
assistance of her lover, Manuel’s nephew Alexios Komnenos the protosebastos, 
who became the de facto ruler of the empire. In February 1181, their pro-Latin 
measures, and the fear that the protosebastos might replace Alexios II as emperor, 
led some of the main court aristocrats to organise a coup which was led by 
Manuel’s daughter Maria Komnene. The plot failed, as Mary and Alexios had the 
support of the imperial guards and of the Latin population. An armistice was 
reached thanks to the mediation of the patriarch, and Maria and her husband were 
granted an amnesty.93 
Even though a solution seemed to have been reached, Manuel’s cousin, 
Andronikos, who had been recently pardoned, and had been granted extensive 
land in Paphlagonia in return for his obedience, and for recognising the rights of 
Alexios II, tried to take advantage of the chaotic situation.94 Andronikos, claiming to 
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be acting in accordance with the oath to protect Alexios II that he had taken when 
Manuel had pardoned him, assembled an army, and marched towards 
Constantinople, camping near Chalcedon. The protosebastos sent a naval force in 
order to block the passage of the Bosporus to Andronikos; however, the 
commander of the fleet defected to Andronikos, and offered to escort him into 
Constantinople, where his partisans had already managed to take control of the 
city. Alexios the protosebastos was imprisoned, and then sent to Andronikos, who 
had him blinded.95 Andronikos soon gained power in Byzantium, first as Alexios II’s 
regent, then as co-emperor, and finally, after he had the boy killed, as sole basileus 
(he even married Alexios II’s fiancée, Agnes of France, in order to obtain some 
legitimacy). Andronikos’s regime was a reign of terror, as, with the help of a select 
group of collaborators, he either exiled or had physically eliminated most of his 
Constantinopolitan opponents (this was the case, in particular, of Mary of Antioch, 
Maria Komnene, and her husband Renier).96 
Yet, even before Andronikos himself had entered the city, the Italian 
population of Constantinople had been attacked by his troops. The sources suggest 
that Andronikos claimed that such an action was needed in order to save 
Byzantium from the Latins. However, even if he did order the massacre, 
Andronikos took advantage of it to gain greater popular support, for the Italian 
merchants were disliked by many of the Constantinopolitan Greeks. Furthermore, 
the usurper might have been afraid that the Genoese and the Pisans, who enjoyed 
extremely good relations with the regency, might try to prevent him from taking 
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control of the city out of fear that a new regime would not be as favourable towards 
them, and that it might seek a reconciliation with Venice. The Genoese and the 
Pisan quarters were destroyed (the Ligurian city would later claim a significant 
financial loss), and, even though most of their dwellers managed to flee before the 
attack was launched, there were nevertheless some victims, including a papal 
legate. All the survivors fled Constantinople as soon as they could, and spread the 
news of the massacre throughout the Mediterranean, especially in the Latin East.97 
That the situation was extremely serious for every Westerner is confirmed by a 
charter issued in June 1182, which recorded that some Venetians who were sailing 
towards Constantinople had to divert their voyage to Alexandria out of fear that 
their lives might be in danger.98 A final element which may have led to further Latin 
hostility towards Andronikos was a probable misunderstanding of the nature of his 
negotiations with Saladin. In the West, the chronicler Magnus of Reicherberg had 
heard rumours that Andronikos had agreed on an offensive alliance with Saladin. 
According to Magnus, the Byzantines would have obtained control of Jerusalem 
and of most of the Palestinian coast had they helped Saladin to crush the Crusader 
States. However, since Andronikos had to face many threats from the West, it is 
highly unlikely that he would have sought to conduct such an aggressive policy in 
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the East. Thus, Magnus’s assertion is probably incorrect, as has recently been 
suggested by Harris and Neocleous. Yet, it is quite probable that similar rumours of 
an alliance between Byzantium and Saladin had spread throughout Europe, further 
worsening Andronikos’s reputation in the West.99 
Even though the pogrom had led to the end of most of the alliances that 
Manuel had cultivated in the West, the lack of any significant Venetian presence in 
Constantinople at the time of the pogrom made it possible for Andronikos to 
improve his relations with Venice. Furthermore, the basileus had probably realised 
that an alliance with Venice could come handy in case of a naval attack against the 
empire, especially if William II had already started planning a Balkan campaign.100 
Therefore, Andronikos, trying to rid himself from his international isolation, engaged 
in negotiations with the Venetians as soon he obtained his regency. In addition to 
Andronikos’s offers, which were probably too good not to accepted by the 
Venetians (see below), what had made a reconciliation possible was the recovery 
of Dalmatia by Hungary, which meant that the Eastern Empire was no longer an 
Adriatic rival of Venice. Finally, since the Pisans and the Genoese no longer had a 
quarter in Constantinople, successful negotiations with the new emperor would 
have given Venice a commercial monopoly in the empire. Andronikos did indeed 
make some extremely favourable concessions to Venice. However, since the 
chrysobull that he issued (probably in early 1185) has not survived, we are only 
aware of them thanks to the Venetian chronicles. The emperor had already made a 
conciliatory move in 1183 by releasing all the Venetians still in captivity. Eventually, 
after three legates were sent to the Bosporus by the doge to make an inventory of 
the properties of the Venetian citizens and ecclesiastical institutions, Andronikos 
restored the quarter to the Adriatic city. The quarter was located by the Golden 
Horn, in an area close to Perama that is now part of the former district of Eminönü 
in Fatih, Istanbul. The Amalfitan, Genoese, and Pisan quarters also lay (or used to 
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lie) in the same area, but slightly to the East, in positions that were not as 
favourable as the one occupied by the Venetians. Andronikos also agreed with the 
Venetians on the compensation that the empire owed them, and promised to pay it 
in yearly instalments. Finally, the doge was granted the dignity of protosebastos.101 
Despite the success of his negotiations with Venice, Andronikos still had to 
face many external problems. Isaac Komnenos, a great-nephew of Manuel, took 
control of Cyprus, which, from then on, he would rule independently from 
Constantinople. Andronikos did not even attempt to recover it. Furthermore, the 
Hungarians and the Serbs, whose rulers had been strongly supported by Manuel, 
had started penetrating deep into the empire, claiming that they were avenging 
Alexios II.102 
Yet, the most dangerous of all the threats against Andronikos came from the 
Sicilians, who attacked the Balkans in June 1185. William II took advantage of 
Andronikos’s lack of any potential support from the West (except for that of Venice), 
as the rulers of the other powers that had previously engaged in commerce in 
Byzantium hoped that the usurper might be overthrown, so that they could possibly 
resume trade in Romania. However, not even the Venetians were willing to 
intervene in case of a Sicilian campaign against Byzantium. Such an intervention 
would have meant the end of the alliance between the Adriatic commune and the 
Kngdom of Sicily. Furthermore, the Venetians were possibly doubtful that William 
would have been more successful than his predecessors, who had only achieved 
some ephemeral success when they had tried to attack the Balkans. In addition to 
the neutrality of Venice, William’s campaign was further facilitated by the 
circumstance that no Italian power threatened him at this time. In particular, in 1184 
he had further consolidated his alliance with Frederick I; his own aunt Constance 
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had been betrothed to Barbarossa’s son and heir Henry, and had been recognised 
as William II’s heiress to the kingdom should she outlive him. In addition, William 
already had a strong fleet at his disposal, as, since his coming of age, he had 
already launched two important (albeit unsuccessful) naval expeditions, first against 
Alexandria (in 1174), and then against the Balearics (in 1181). Furthermore, 
William hoped that some of the Eastern imperial army might defect to him. Indeed, 
the Byzantine exile Alexios Komnenos the Cupbearer (probably one of Manuel’s 
nephews or grand nephews; his ancestry is unclear) had reached Sicily to ask for 
his help to replace Andronikos on the throne, and would join William’s men during 
the campaign. Finally, the appearance in Sicily of a boy pretending to be Alexios II 
also made it possible for William to claim that his expedition was aimed at 
defending the rights of a deposed pro-Latin emperor. While it appears that William 
realised that an attack against Andronikos stood a good chance of success, his 
actual goals are rather unclear due to a lack of detailed sources from the West. Did 
a raid initially aimed at punishing the Eastern Empire for its past faults (Manuel’s 
raids, and the failed Byzantine-Sicilian marriage) eventually turn into a war of 
conquest due to its initial success? Or did he rather attempt to proceed as close to 
the Bosporus as he could, and possibly even to conquer Constantinople (as 
suggested by the Annales Ceccanenses and by Eustathios of Thessalonica)?103 
The Sicilian attack was initially extremely successful. Thanks to the 
ineptitude of Andronikos and of his generals, William’s commanders managed to 
capture not only the islands in the Ionian Sea and Dyrrachion without any 
opposition, but even all the territories as far as Thessalonica. This city was also 
conquered (in August 1185), and its sack has been described in detail by both 
Eustathios of Thessalonica and Niketas Choniates. Part of the Sicilian contingent 
then started marching towards Constantinople, threatening its inhabitants. This, 
together with Andronikos’s unpopular measures, soon deprived him of all the 
support of which he had taken advantage a few years earlier. It was, therefore, 
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fairly easy for one of his relatives, Isaac Angelos, to rebel successfully, overthrow 
Andronikos in September 1185, and have him killed. Once Isaac II starting ruling, 
the tide of the war turned. The Annales Casinenses mention that William’s men 
were defeated by Greek trickery and strength. While this might at first be seen as 
an example of a long Western tradition of blaming the diplomatic cunning of the 
Byzantines, on this occasion there appears to be more than an element of truth. 
Indeed, the Annales Ceccanenses relate that Alexios Branas, whom Isaac had put 
in charge of repelling the invaders, persuaded the invading generals to march back 
towards the Ionian Sea. He told them that they could not advance any further, but 
that he would allow them to march westwards in safety. However, the general 
deceived the Sicilians, and captured their commanders, who were taken to 
Constantinople as prisoner. Niketas Choniates also confirms this view. He wrote 
that, following some minor Byzantine victories, the Greeks were convinced that the 
Sicilian attempt to negotiate for peace was a stratagem. However, the Byzantines 
soon attacked and routed their unprepared enemies, also capturing their generals, 
in a battle fought by the Strymon River in early November 1185. Therefore, it is 
quite likely that they had deliberately (and dishonestly) told the Sicilians that they 
wanted to accept the terms that had been proposed so that they would face an 
unprepared enemy. William’s men fled Thessalonica on their ships, and soon 
withdrew from Dyrrachion, which was recovered by the Byzantines. Alexios 
Komnenos the Cupbearer was captured and blinded. After the defeat of William’s 
land troops, the Sicilian navy, which had been sent to attack the empire jointly with 
the army, and had reached the vicinity of Constantinople, decided not to go any 
further. The ships nevertheless managed to raid the Dardanelles and some 
neighbouring islands, and then returned to Southern Italy.104 
Despite the failure of this expedition, the Sicilian hostile activity against 
Byzantium continued in 1186, with a series of naval operations conducted by the 
Greek pirate Margaritus of Brindisi. Margaritus, who had been hired by William, 
raided some of the Aegean islands, and intervened militarily in Cyprus alongside its 
rebel ruler Isaac Komnenos. Then, on his way towards Italy, he tried (apparently 
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unsuccessfully) to obtain some relics in Patmos, and, once more, raided other 
Aegean islands. His activity in Cyprus led Isaac II’s expedition to recover Cyprus to 
fail. Margaritus, probably summoned by Isaac Komnenos, reached the shores of 
this island, where he destroyed the imperial ships that he had found empty as all 
the men had disembarked. Isaac II’s men were then captured by Isaac Komnenos, 
and handed over to Margaritus, who took them to Sicily. In addition to his activity in 
the Aegean and in Cyprus, we cannot exclude that, probably before leaving for 
Patmos, Margaritus had conducted some naval operations in the Ionian Sea. 
Indeed, Kiesewetter and, subsequently, Carito have suggested that, already in 
1185 or early 1186, Margaritus had begun the occupation of Zakynthos, 
Kephalonia, and ‘Serfent’ (probably Ithaca). Yet, this suggestion is mainly based on 
Robert of Auxerre, according to whom, in 1187 (and not in 1186, as indicated by 
Kiesewetter), Margaritus ‘devastated and occupied many of the islands of the 
Constantinopolitan emperor’. Yet, while we cannot exclude that these might be the 
Ionian islands, it is much more likely that that this passage refers to Margaritus’s 
Aegean raids. Indeed, there is no clear reference to Margaritus’s rule over the three 
Ionian islands before 1191.105 
Despite Kiesewetter’s suggestions, I am inclined to believe that Margaritus 
took control of the Ionian islands sometime later, probably after the Byzantine-
Sicilian peace treaty of 1187. At the beginning of his reign, Isaac realised that he 
was unable to overcome the many different external threats that he faced. 
Therefore, in order to be able to focus on the war against the Sicilians, he had to 
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pay a tribute to the Turks (who had invaded the Byzantine lands in Anatolia), and 
come to a compromise with the Serbs and, in particular, with the Hungarians. 
Indeed, Isaac recognised Hungarian control over almost all the regions that Manuel 
had conquered from them in the 1160s, and only recovered some land near the 
Morava River as part of the dowry that he obtained when he married Béla III’s 
daughter.106 We cannot exclude that something similar happened when Isaac and 
William concluded their peace treaty. The emperor was also facing a Vlach-Bulgar 
revolt, and Alexios Branas’s usurpation attempt, which had led to a subsequent 
unsuccessful popular reprisal against the Italian colonies as Branas had been 
supported by Italian mercenaries. The Byzantine emperor had to deal with many 
issues, and thus probably accepted a rather disadvantageous agreement. It is likely 
that he ceded three Ionian islands to William, who then handed them over to 
Margaritus as a reward for his services. In return for this, Isaac received, amongst 
the other things, a considerable number of weapons and sets of armour, which 
would be later presented to Saladin as a gift. There may, indeed, have been 
another clause in this treaty. If we can trust the Byzantine orator Sergius Colypa 
(the veracity of whose statement has admittedly been disputed by Kiesewetter), the 
Sicilian king was also to provide a fleet to the Byzantines whenever he was 
requested to do so.107 
Yet, the advantageous agreement leading to the cession of some of the 
Ionian islands was not the only reason why William II chose to conclude a peace 
with the Byzantines. The recruitment for this expedition, and the campaign itself, 
had been extremely expensive, and the king could no longer afford to continue this 
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conflict: Eustathios of Thessalonica suggests that the Sicilian king was near 
bankruptcy.108 
Furthermore, William probably realised that continuing to attack Byzantium 
might eventually lead to tension with the Venetians. In addition to the other reasons 
mentioned above, the Adriatic commune had remained neutral in the conflict also 
because it was preparing an expedition to recover Zadar, which had once again 
revolted and joined Hungary in 1180. However, the Sicilians might have been afraid 
that their ships were the real target of the fleet that the Venetians were building. In 
addition, Isaac II probably realised that, if he had managed to sign a treaty with 
Venice, he would have further worried the Sicilians, and thus he started negotiating 
with the Adriatic commune. An agreement was reached in February 1187. Venice 
obtained trade exemptions in the empire, together with Isaac’s assurance that the 
compensation that Andronikos had promised them would be paid, albeit with some 
delay. Yet, another chrysobull was drawn up, which, for the first time, mentions the 
duties of the Venetians towards Byzantium, showing that this agreement was a 
military alliance inter pares. Indeed, the basileus had probably recognised that 
Venice could provide some help to make up for the weakness of his own fleet. In 
the years immediately before this, the Byzantines had been unable to patrol the 
Aegean waters, which had become a nest of Greek pirates – before Margaritus, a 
certain Siphantos had played an important role during the siege of Thessalonica. 
This problem had become even more serious after the imperial fleet had been 
destroyed during Isaac II’s attempt to recover Cyprus. If the Byzantines were not 
able to patrol their waters in times of peace, this clearly meant that they were 
completely unprepared in case of a foreign naval attack. Therefore, Isaac tried to 
prevent this potential problem by signing an agreement with Venice, which, in 
return, obtained extensive commercial concessions. The emperor stipulated that, 
within six months of a foreign attack by a navy of forty to one hundred galleys, the 
Venetians would provide the same number of galleys to him. These ships would be 
under the command of a Byzantine admiral, and their number could not be superior 
to that of the Greek vessels. The emperor himself would pay all the expenses 
needed for supplying the galleys with arms, and could recruit for the crews up to 
three-quarters of the Venetians living in the Byzantine Empire. Yet, since the 
Germans and the Sicilians were allied with Venice, the agreement was not to be 
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valid if the Byzantines had to face either fleet (although, if the Sicilians were the 
attackers, Venice would still have to provide fifteen ships within three months).109 
Even though Isaac would find it difficult to pay all the compensation that he 
promised to Venice, this agreement made a reconciliation possible between 
Byzantium and both the Venetians and, indirectly, also the Sicilians. However, in 
the West, Isaac still had to face the revolts of the Serbs and of the Bulgarians, and 
furthermore the Cumans had made some incursions over the Danube.110 This 
problem was to become even more serious when the areas where these rebellions 
had taken place were crossed by Frederick Barbarossa’s huge crusading army, 
which set off for the Holy Land in May 1189. This expedition was part of the Third 
Crusade, which had been summoned by Pope Gregory VIII following Saladin’s 
conquest of Jerusalem in October 1187. Barbarossa, King Richard I of England, 
and King Philip II of France had all decided to join the crusade. The passage of 
Frederick’s army across the Balkans created some considerable problems to the 
Byzantine Empire. At a certain point, the Kaiser was so upset with Isaac’s 
opposition to his plans that he took into consideration the idea of diverting the 
crusade. In fact, he sent a letter to his son Henry, who was still in Germany, asking 
him to try to obtain naval support from Genoa, Pisa, Venice, and even Ancona 
(which was no longer a Byzantine protectorate) for an attack against 
Constantinople. Yet, the two emperors eventually reached an agreement, and their 
open hostility was limited to some minor skirmishes.111 
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Despite this tension with the Germans, Isaac nevertheless managed to take 
some measures to ensure that, unlike during the Second Crusade (when Roger II 
had attacked the Balkans), this time the passage of a huge crusading army did not 
have further serious consequences for Byzantium. The basileus concluded a treaty 
with Venice in June 1189, which was facilitated by the limited role of the Adriatic 
commune in the crusade. An agreement was reached over the payment of the 
compensation that the Venetians were owed following the confiscations of 1171. 
Isaac promised to pay the full compensation, including the kentenarion that had 
already been deposited by Andronikos: two and a half kentenaria were to be paid 
immediately, followed by six yearly instalments. In addition, the Venetian compound 
in Constantinople was extended to include the quarters which had been granted to 
the Germans and to the French, which were probably located slightly to the West of 
the original Venetian compound, and were seldom used. This pact assured Isaac 
that the Venetians would not take advantage of the passage of the German 
crusaders to launch a raid on his empire. Furthermore, Isaac hoped that, in case 
any other power might conduct a naval attack against Constantinople, Venice 
would abide by the military alliance that had been agreed upon two years earlier, 
and intervene against the enemy fleet.112 This clause was never implemented, 
since no other naval power attacked Constantinople. 
A matrimonial alliance with the Hungarians (Isaac married Margaret, the 
eldest daughter of King Béla III), and this agreement with Venice were only the first 
moves undertaken by Isaac II to normalise relations between the Eastern Empire 
and its Balkan and Italian neighbours. Indeed, after a Byzantine victory over the 
Serbs, Isaac arranged a marriage between his own niece and the son of their ruler 
Stefan Nemanja (in 1190/91). In 1192, the emperor also renewed the commercial 
agreements that Byzantium had made with Pisa and with Genoa.113 
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In addition to the precautions taken by Isaac II, other reasons prevented the 
Sicilians from attempting to replicate the hostile actions undertaken by Roger II at 
the time of the passage of the Second Crusade. The Sicilian treasury had probably 
been exhausted by the previous military enterprise against Byzantium, and, even 
more importantly, in November 1189, William II died with no legitimate issue, 
leaving a disputed succession. According to the terms of the agreement concluded 
before their wedding was celebrated in January 1186, Constance, Roger II’s 
posthumous daughter, and her husband Henry of Swabia were to inherit the 
kingdom. However, many members of the nobility of the Mezzogiorno, and almost 
all those of the royal court were reluctant to accept a German king, and elected 
their own king, Tancred of Lecce, an illegitimate cousin of William II. Thus, the only 
way Henry could obtain Southern Italy on behalf of his wife was by conducting a 
military campaign. Yet, since his father Barbarossa had left for the crusade, Henry 
had been left in charge of administering German affairs, and thus could not 
immediately attempt to conquer the Mezzogiorno. Frederick’s death in Cilicia in 
June 1190 would further postpone any such intervention, since Henry needed to 
consolidate his position in Germany before he could undertake an expedition to 
Italy. However, even though Tancred of Lecce had the support of Pope Clement III, 
he nevertheless had to face a certain amount of internal opposition, led by Roger of 
Andria. Roger had also managed to obtain the support of Henry VI, who 
unsuccessfully tried to back him by sending an army to Southern Italy. 
Furthermore, Tancred had to face another opponent in Richard I of England, who 
stopped in Sicily on his way to the Holy Land. Richard only left the island once 
Tancred had released Richard’s sister Joan (William II’s widow), whom he had 
previously imprisoned, and had handed over all of Joan’s dowry to the English 
king.114 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Appears?...’, pp. 40, 42-43. Even though Isaac signed an agreement with both Genoa 
and Pisa, the piratical actions conducted by some Genoese and Pisans against the 
Byzantine ships would lead to some minor tension between the emperor and these 
cities in the following years. See CDRG, III, no. 35, pp. 101-07; ‘Acta et diplomata 
imperatorum…’, nos. 6-7, pp. 37-46; Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane…, 
no. 41, pp. 66-67. 
114 Roger of Hoveden, Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi et Gesta Regis Ricardi, ed. by 
William Stubbs, Rerum Britannicarum medii aevi scriptores, 49, 2 vols (London: 
Longmans, 1867), II, 102, 125-29, 132-38; Otto of St Blasien, ’Chronica’, chs 28, 37, 
aa. 1186, 1190, pp. 78-80, 106-08; Richard of San Germano, Chronica, ed. by Carlo 
Alberto Garufi, RIS2, 7/2 (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1936-38), aa. 1189-90, pp. 6-10; 
‘Annales Ceccanenses’, aa. 1189-90, p. 288; ‘Annales Casinenses’, aa. 1189-90, p. 
314; ‘Annales Marbacenses’, ed. by Franz-Josef Schmale, in Ottonis de Sancto 
Blasio…, a. 1190, pp. 180-82; Chronica ignoti monachi Cisterciensis S. Mariae de 
214 
 
Soon after the departure of Richard I, Henry VI undertook an expedition to 
be crowned emperor in Rome, and then to conquer Southern Italy, which he 
regarded as his wife’s rightful inheritance. Even though the Genoese had once 
more decided to side with the Germans with a considerable amount of reluctance, 
and Venice remained neutral throughout the course of this confrontation, Henry had 
managed to obtain naval support from both them and the Pisans by confirming the 
privileges that his father had issued to them. However, despite some initial 
success, the emperor’s naval allies were defeated by Margaritus (who had decided 
to support Tancred). Furthermore, an epidemic struck many of Henry’s men, forcing 
them to return to Germany following the rebellion of Barbarossa’s cousin Henry the 
Lion. Finally, Constance, who had remained in Salerno, was handed over to 
Tancred, who kept her imprisoned.115 
Even though Constance was released in 1192 thanks to the mediation of 
Pope Celestine III (who, in return, recognised Tancred as king), the Sicilian 
monarch still had to win over all the peninsular nobility, and to deal with the 
garrisons that Henry VI had left in the border regions of the kingdom. Therefore, 
Tancred tried to obtain support from Byzantium by having his son and co-king 
Roger III married to Isaac II’s daughter Irene. This was made possible by the 
mutual hostility towards the Germans, and, possibly, by Tancred’s links with the 
Eastern Empire in the 1150s and 1160s. However, the marriage was short-lived 
because Roger died late in 1193, followed, two months later, by Tancred himself. 
The latter was succeeded by his younger son William, but, since he was still a 
child, he could not exercise real power, and Tancred’s widow had to act as regent. 
Henry VI, aware of this situation of weakness in the region, once more attempted a 
campaign to conquer the Mezzogiorno with some naval help from Genoa and Pisa. 
The political difficulties of the Kingdom of Sicily, and Henry’s prosperous financial 
state thanks to the ransom that he had received to release Richard I of England 
(who had been captured while he was on his way back from the Holy Land) made it 
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possible for this expedition to succeed. Henry was crowned king in Palermo on 25 
December 1194.116 
After his conquest of the Kingdom of Sicily, Henry VI tried to undertake 
another project that his father had failed to accomplish – recovering Jerusalem. 
While he was preparing this campaign, Henry undertook an aggressive diplomatic 
policy towards Byzantium. Here, Alexios III had overthrown, blinded, and 
incarcerated his brother Isaac II when the latter was fighting the Bulgarians. 
According to Choniates, Henry had already asked Isaac for the ‘cession’ of the land 
from Dyrrachion to Thessalonica that his predecessor William II had briefly held. 
However, Lounghis has outlined that relations between the two rulers were friendly, 
and that the Western emperor had probably merely asked to obtain a form of 
indirect suzerainty over this area. It was after Alexios III rose to power that Henry 
demanded that the Byzantines provide financial and military backing for the 
crusade, threatening the basileus with an attack on the Balkans if he did not obtain 
it. Even though after further negotiations the proposed financial contribution was 
substantially reduced, Alexios III still feared an attack, and started to amass the 
money that was being demanded by levying a new tax (the alamanikon), and by 
plundering the tombs of his deceased predecessors. Yet, Henry VI’s death in 
September 1197, before he could sail to the Holy Land, meant that the tribute was 
never delivered to the Western emperor.117 Even though Henry’s demands might 
be interpreted as evidence of his plans to conquer at least a part of the Eastern 
Empire, it has been convincingly suggested that this was not in fact the case. They 
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were probably mere threats aimed at ensuring that the Byzantines would assist the 
crusade, as Henry realised that this aid would greatly enhance the expedition’s 
chances of success.118 
There are many reasons why Henry’s threats were effective, the main one 
being the military strength of the Kaiser. Yet, Alexios also felt that the German 
threat was so serious because his predecessor Isaac and Henry had had rather 
friendly relations, to the point that Otto of St Blasien relates that the former had 
asked for German help during Alexios III’s rebellion. Furthermore, the Kaiser’s 
brother Philip of Swabia had married his niece Irene (Isaac II’s daughter, and Duke 
Roger’s widow) in 1196/97. This meant that the Western emperor could present 
himself as Isaac’s avenger, and pretend that his campaign was also aimed at 
restoring the previous basileus to the throne.119 In addition, while the treaty of 1187 
meant that Isaac II could have responded to such a situation by trying to obtain 
naval support from Venice, Alexios III had changed his policy towards the Adriatic 
commune. After his seizure of power, he had suspended payment of the 
reparations promised to the Venetians (the Byzantines still owed them a significant 
amount of money), and withdrawn their tax exemptions. Furthermore, according to 
Niketas Choniates, even though talks on the confirmation of Isaac’s concessions to 
Pisa would only begin in 1197, Alexios III had nevertheless sided with the Tuscan 
city when a Pisan-Venetian conflict broke out in 1195 following a new Venetian 
attempt to recover Zadar (the Dalmatian city had been allied with Pisa since 1188). 
According to the Greek chronicler, the hostility between the two Italian cities 
reached Constantinople as, after the emperor incited the Pisans to attack the 
Venetians, there were skirmishes between the two groups of Italians. This is 
possibly the reason why for a few years we have no surviving documentation 
regarding Venetian trade in the Byzantine Empire. However, possibly out of fear of 
a Venetian fleet stationed in Abydos in March 1196, Alexios soon began to 
negotiate with Venice. Yet, Doge Enrico Dandolo (1192-1205) conducted such talks 
extremely cautiously. He ordered his legates to postpone any discussion if the 
Byzantines wanted the treaty to include a Venetian obligation to provide naval help 
to them in case they were attacked by the Sicilians or by the Germans (i.e. by 
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Henry VI). Dandolo conducted the negotiations (which ended with the granting of a 
new chrysobull in November 1198) in such way because he did not want this 
agreement with Byzantium to damage his good relations with Henry. Indeed, during 
his brief reign, Barbarossa’s son took many favourable measures towards the 
Venetians. Not only did he renew the concession of the Palermitan church of St 
Mark to the Venetians, and would he confirm the pacts between the Western 
Empire and Venice, but he also acted as a mediator in the Venetian-Pisan peace 
talks, and a ten-year agreement was eventually signed in September 1196. He 
hoped that after the end of this conflict both cities would provide naval help to his 
forthcoming crusade. Yet, we also need to consider that a successful campaign 
would have made Barbarossa’s son the ruler of most the central Mediterranean, 
thus potentially hampering Venetian maritime trade.120 Dandolo nevertheless 
supported Henry, probably because, while he thought that the Kaiser might raid 
parts of the Byzantine Empire, he did not expect him to conquer any land. This 
further confirms the interpretation that Henry’s threats to the Byzantines were 
aimed at obtaining their collaboration, and that Barbarossa’s son was not interested 
in conquering the Eastern Empire. 
The death of Henry VI was followed, just over a year later, by that of his 
widow Constance, who had acted as regent for their son Frederick, and who had 
conducted an anti-German policy in the Kingdom of Sicily. Since Frederick II was 
only a small child when his mother died, he could neither obtain the support needed 
to become King of Germany (and thus emperor-elect), nor could he effectively rule 
over the Kingdom of Sicily. Indeed, the Mezzogiorno was marred by years of 
conflict amongst German and Southern Italian nobles who unsuccessfully tried to 
claim the regency over the child Frederick for themselves. This loss of political unity 
meant that, in contrast to the previous decades, the Kingdom of Sicily could no 
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longer conduct a strong foreign policy. Therefore, the Mezzogiorno temporarily lost 
its role as a Mediterranean power, and its diplomatic and political contacts with both 
Venice and Byzantium significantly diminished.121 
viii) Conclusions 
The years from 1156 to 1197 saw increased contact between Byzantium 
and Venice. Until the late 1140s, the Adriatic city had mainly had a minor role in 
international politics, often acting as a mediator between the two empires, or 
providing naval help to the Eastern Empire when its Balkan coastline was under 
threat. However, from the second half of the 1150s, Byzantine interest in the 
Adriatic area made the empire a potential rival to Venice. This initially led to the end 
of military collaboration between the two, and tension later increased following the 
conquest of Dalmatia by Manuel I. Conflict was about to break out while the 
Byzantines were planning an expedition against Egypt, so, to safeguard the latter 
enterprise, the basileus managed to effect a reconciliation with the Venetians by 
granting them some extremely advantageous concessions. Yet, once the 
Byzantines were no longer involved in warfare in the East, these concessions were 
withdrawn. When the Venetians attacked and destroyed the Genoese quarter in 
Constantinople, Manuel exacted his revenge against his rivals by having all the 
Venetians who were in the empire incarcerated, and by confiscating their 
properties. After an unsuccessful military reprisal by Venice, Manuel’s coup evolved 
into a long series of diplomatic exchanges in which the emperor postponed any 
definite concessions unless he was politically or militarily involved in other foreign 
entanglements. Such was the case of 1175-76, when, after the conclusion of a 
Venetian-Sicilian alliance that could be worrying for Byzantium, and before the ill-
fated campaign in Asia Minor, a temporary reconciliation was reached. 
While Manuel managed to keep the Venetians under his thumb, his 
immediate successors failed to do so. Indeed, Byzantium significantly lost Western 
support after the Latin massacre that had inaugurated Andronikos’s regime. 
Therefore, the only way this emperor could achieve some international recognition 
was by obtaining a reconciliation with Venice. This meant not only releasing the 
incarcerated Venetians, but also repaying them for the damage that they had 
suffered. This latter aspect would be a constant and problematic issue in 
Byzantine-Venetian relations up until the Fourth Crusade. On the one side, the 
various emperors were willing to pay the Venetians part of the compensation only 
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when they were facing other threats, but they nevertheless increasingly lacked the 
resources to find this money; thus, the problem of compensation was left 
unresolved. On the other side, the Venetians tried to take advantage of the 
Byzantine need for their support to reobtain properties and commercial 
concessions in the Eastern Empire. 
Relations between Byzantium and the Kingdom of Sicily mainly developed 
as a consequence of the Byzantine unwillingness to undertake a conquest of part 
of the Mezzogiorno following the campaigns of 1155-58, and of Barbarossa’s 
offensive policy. An alliance between Manuel and William I was therefore 
concluded in 1158, and the two political entities would maintain good relations until 
the beginning of the reign of Andronikos I. Yet, after Andronikos rose to power, 
William II realised that he could take advantage of the emperor’s lack of both 
external and internal support to attack the Balkans, with at the very least the hope 
of conquering part of them. This campaign proved to be both unsuccessful and 
extremely expansive; thus, the King of Sicily eventually gave up his Balkan 
ambitions, and came to terms with Isaac II; he only maintained control over the 
Ionian islands. 
Following William’s death, his successor Tancred found himself in an 
extremely difficult position, as the Germans had allied with both Pisa and Genoa to 
try to conquer Southern Italy. Therefore, since Venice maintained an absolute 
neutrality between Henry and Tancred, the latter, who desperately needed 
international support, concluded a matrimonial agreement with Byzantium. Yet, this 
alliance was to be of short duration, as Tancred’s son Roger III died soon after his 
wedding with a Greek princess, soon followed by Tancred himself. The resulting 
lack of leadership enabled Henry VI to conquer the Mezzogiorno with ease, and to 
be crowned King of Sicily in late 1194. Henry maintained good relations with Isaac 
II, but, following the latter’s deposition, he tried to take advantage of the weakness 
of Alexios III. Indeed, the main goal of the Western emperor was that of 
undertaking a crusade to recover Jerusalem for Christianity, and he realised that 
such an enterprise would be considerably aided by the support of Byzantium. 
Therefore, Henry started blackmailing Alexios III to obtain his collaboration, and the 
basileus had no choice but to bow to the requests of the Kaiser. Yet, in the event, 
only a preliminary expedition, and not a full-scale crusade, could be launched, 
since Henry VI died in 1197, soon followed by his wife. The lack of an adult ruler 
led to a long period of internal problems in Southern Italy, and to the Mezzogiorno 
consequently losing political strength and prestige. 
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Finally, the Venetians maintained good relations with the Kingdom of Sicily 
for most of his period. This was facilitated by the significant distance that the 
Venetians kept towards Barbarossa (except in 1173). In the following years, Venice 
conducted a careful political approach towards the Kingdom of Sicily. Whenever 
Byzantine-Sicilian relations were tense, the Adriatic commune remained neutral in 
each controversy, while trying to take advantage of the Eastern Empire’s need for 
external support to recover and enhance its commercial privileges there. Such a 
strategy was continued when Henry VI attacked the Mezzogiorno, and when, 
following its conquest, he started (in effect) to blackmail Alexios III.  
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2) Trade 
We shall here analyse the evolution of Venetian commerce in the Adriatic 
and Eastern Mediterranean in the years 1156-97. In particular, we shall see to what 
extent the economic relations between Venice and Byzantium followed, and were 
influenced by, their political relationship. Furthermore, we shall focus on how the 
patterns of trade changed following Manuel Komnenos’s coup in 1171, and on 
whether the scale of Venetian commerce in the Byzantine Empire after the 
reconciliation of the 1180s was similar to that of the 1160s. 
i) 1156-71 
The fifteen years that preceded the confiscation of Venetian property by 
Manuel I in 1171 can arguably be considered the golden age of Venetian trade in 
Byzantium due to the concurrence of the privileged commercial conditions in 
Romania, and of the economic expansion of both the Eastern Empire and Northern 
Italy. Venice and Constantinople were the main bases of commercial activities 
conducted by a significant number of merchants throughout the Eastern 
Mediterranean.122 Despite the Venetian agreement with William I, only two charters 
(issued, respectively, in 1159 and 1160) which directly record trade in Southern 
Italy have survived.123 Yet, a third document issued in Abydos is even more 
interesting, as it records a commercial operation to be conducted in Constantinople 
using a ship de Longobardis (probably an Apulian vessel), captained by a certain 
Pagano from Messina.124 The Byzantine cities and islands (in addition to 
Constantinople, Halmyros, Thebes, Corinth, and Crete) were the most popular 
locations of trade, but commerce was also conducted in Syria, mostly in Acre, 
where two charters mention that the Venetians traded iron and luxury cloths, but 
also in Tyre and in Egypt. It is not uncommon to find merchants being involved in a 
commercial voyage that would lead them to trade both in Romania and in the 
                                                          
122 Rösch, ‘Lo sviluppo mercantile’, pp. 131, 133-35. Indeed, Romano Mairano, as 
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Mediterranean and in Dalmatia. 
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Eastern and/or South-Eastern Mediterranean.125 This is mainly a testament to the 
diplomatic ability of Venice, which made it possible for the Adriatic city to maintain 
good relations with both the Latin East and the Muslim rulers of Egypt, and to take 
advantage of the favourable commercial conditions in Byzantium.126 Since we have 
just mentioned Egypt, we cannot omit that the main commercial target for the 
Venetians who were trading in this region was Alexandria, followed by Damietta. 
Even though the political centre of Fatimid Egypt was Cairo, Alexandria 
nevertheless maintained its role as the most important Egyptian Mediterranean 
port. This was due to the physical advantages of its harbour (if compared to that of 
Rosetta), to the presence of the still-functioning Hellenistic lighthouse, which 
significantly helped the sailors while they were sailing near the shore of Alexandria, 
and to the difficult navigation conditions of the western ‘Rosetta branch’ of the Nile 
delta. Furthermore, even though by the Middle Ages the ‘Alexandria branch’ of the 
Nile had already silted, Alexandria was nevertheless connected to Cairo thanks to a 
canal that connected these two cities, and which was generally open and navigable 
for around three months a year. By contrast, the choice of Damietta is rather 
interesting. Indeed, due to the difficult navigation conditions in the ‘Damietta 
branch’ of the delta of the Nile, the main port of the area was not Damietta, but 
Tinnis (until Saladin forced its population to evacuate it, and to move to Damietta in 
1192-93). However, Damietta was nevertheless chosen as a commercial 
destination by some Venetian merchants. This was because Damietta was the 
main fortification of the region, and because of its location at a short distance from 
the border with the Kingdom of Jerusalem. This probably led to the commercial 
growth of the city due to the frequent exchange of goods between Christian 
Palestine and Islamic Egypt.127 
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The ships that allowed most of these commercial activities to take place 
were in some cases captained by the socius procertans himself (generally when he 
was sailing on his own vessel).128 Yet, many times the ships were captained by a 
nauclerus who was not directly involved in the trading activity.129 A third solution 
was that the merchant travelled with a muda, a naval convoy organised by the 
Venetians to connect regularly their homeland with Constantinople, and with the 
Eastern Mediterranean: there could be up to four mude per year.130 
Despite the increasing importance of centres like Acre and Alexandria, 
Romania nevertheless remained the main area in which the Venetian merchants 
were involved. Even though few charters record what goods were traded, some 
charters record that, in the late 1160s and shortly before 1171, Venetian merchants 
were involved in the commerce of cotton, luxury cloths, spices, and copper in 
Constantinople, and of oil in Sparta.131 Furthermore, in the early 1160s, there is 
evidence of horsehair being exported from Constantinople to Alexandria.132 The 
scale of commerce in the Eastern Empire appears to have reached a first peak in 
1167-68, when over twenty charters concerning trade in some part of it were 
issued.133 Yet, starting from December 1168, the documentation suddenly 
decreased for almost a year: indeed, from then until September 1169 only three 
documents were issued.134 From the following month, the scale of trade once more 
increased, and reached a new peak until February 1171: over twenty charters were 
issued in these months.135 This data can be explained by the order to return to 
Venice issued by Vitale II Michiel following the break-down of Venetian diplomatic 
relations with Byzantium, and by the ensuing reconciliation between Manuel and 
the Adriatic city. The Venetian merchants clearly took advantage of the renewed 
political harmony, and the scale of their commercial activity did not decrease 
following the reinstatement of the Genoese and of the Pisans in Constantinople.136 
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Indeed, even though the estimate provided by the Historia ducum Veneticorum that 
20,000 Venetians went to the Byzantine Empire following the reconciliation 
between Manuel and the Adriatic commune is clearly an exaggeration, there were 
nevertheless quite a few Venetians in Romania. Considering the total amount of 
money that Venice obtained once an agreement over compensation for the 
confiscations was reached, and the average claim of each person, probably around 
6000 Venetians were in Romania in 1171.137 
It was not only merchants that profited widely from the reconciliation and 
from the extensive privileges, but also religious institutions. We know from two later 
charters that, in October 1169, the Patriarch of Grado subcontracted the collection 
of the Constantinopolitan incomes of his patriarchate to the Venetian merchant 
Romano Mairano.138 Such a move suggests that the Patriarchate of Grado owned 
so many properties in Constantinople (many of which were then rented out) that it 
was more convenient to subcontract the collection of the incomes, rather than to 
collect them autonomously. The above-mentioned Romano Mairano is arguably the 
best-documented twelfth-century Venetian merchant. In most of the charters in 
which he appears, he is mentioned as a socius procertans, and he often captained 
the ship in which he sailed. In the early 1170s, he owned an extremely large ship 
nicknamed Totus mundus, with which he fled from Constantinople in March 1171, 
and which he used during the blockade of Ancona in 1173.139 Before conducting a 
specific mercantile voyage, Mairano (as well as other socii procertantes) often 
concluded commercial agreements with more than one socius stans. This became 
a fairly common operation, which, on the one hand, increased the scale of the 
commerce conducted by the socii procertantes, and, on the other, allowed even 
people who were not extremely wealthy to become socii stantes, despite only 
having a limited amount of money to invest.140 Yet, this structure of trade also had 
its disadvantages, as will be evident when we analyse what happened following 
Manuel’s coup. 
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In addition to Constantinople, Thebes remained an important commercial 
destination. Although little is known regarding the goods traded there, it is quite 
likely that the merchants were active in the commerce of silk. Indeed, even after the 
deportations during the raids orchestrated by Roger II, Thebes remained an 
important centre of the silk trade. This can be inferred from a letter written by John 
Tzetzes between 1148 and 1154, from the account of Benjamin of Tudela, who 
visited the city in the early 1160s, and from the chrysobull that Manuel I issued for 
Genoa in October 1169, which banned the Genoese from buying silk in Thebes.141 
Amongst the Venetian merchants who were based in Thebes, we can mention 
Marino Serzi, who, between the late 1160s and 1170, conducted several 
commercial operations with his brother Giovanni (who was based in 
Constantinople). When they traded together, Giovanni was always the socius 
stans, while Marino was later to obtain the money from the procertans.142 Yet, 
Marino had previously conducted autonomous activity as a socius stans at least 
once, in September 1165.143 
Another merchant who appears to have been based in Thebes for most of 
the 1160s was Vitale Voltani. The early documents record him as a socius 
procertans on different occasions. His wealth, and the massive scale of trade 
conducted by Voltani can be inferred as, around the mid-1160s, he even hired 
another man (Marco Betani) to act as his assistant in Tyre for two years.144 Yet, 
Voltani, just like many other merchants, would switch to being a socius stans in a 
couple of commercial operations conducted in the early 1170s, when he had 
reached a more advanced age (and acquired a considerable wealth).145 Indeed, 
while it is quite rare to see members of the richest Venetian families acting as socii 
procertantes, they were often involved in trade as socii stantes. This is especially 
the case of the Zianis. This family gave Venice two doges between the second half 
of the twelfth century and the early thirteenth century (Sebastiano – 1172-78 – and 
his son Pietro – 1205-29).146 Another interesting figure was Giacomo Venier. A 
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Saracen servus of Marco Venier, he was freed in Halmyros in September 1158, 
and in the following decade he conducted trade on his own. Unlike Dobramiro 
Dalmatino Stagnario, there is no evidence that his descendants were also active in 
commerce.147 Finally, two documents interestingly show that the same person 
could both issue a charter, and draw it up as a notary, the men in question being 
Giovanni Rustico and Ottone Cipriano.148 
ii) 1171-97 
The most striking difference between Venetian trade before and after March 
1171 is that, understandably, commerce in the Byzantine Empire almost stopped 
until Andronikos I reached a settlement with Venice. Yet, even after the 
reconciliation with Byzantium, the scale of Venetian trade in the Eastern Empire did 
not reach the peaks of the years that had preceded Manuel’s coup. Furthermore, 
there were also some changes in the pattern of commercial operations. 
The main issue addressed in the several commercial charters of the period 
is that of the credit of the Venetians. Indeed, following the suspension of Venetian 
commerce in the Byzantine Empire, many socii stantes who had loaned money, or 
agreed on a colleganza to trade in Romania in late 1170 or in early 1171 would 
have to wait for many years to recover their capital from the procertantes.149 Other 
charters refer to those who had been deprived of their money, goods, properties, or 
revenues following the confiscations in 1171, and who were entitled to 
compensation after first Andronikos I and then Isaac II had reached an agreement 
with Venice. Yet, these were partial payments as the emperors only paid some 
instalments of the compensation, corresponding roughly to five percent of the total 
sum.150 Being a debtor did not prevent merchants from conducting new commercial 
operations, as in the case of Romano Mairano. Mairano had to repay several 
creditors as he had failed to complete some mercantile operations in 
Constantinople because of the confiscations. Yet, in the following dozen years, he 
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remained extremely active in trade, conducting commerce mainly in Alexandria and 
in Acre, but also in Dalmatia and, with very limited success, on the Western coast 
of Northern Africa.151 
Even though relations between Venice and Byzantium only normalised in 
1182, there is nevertheless some evidence of Venetians being active in the Eastern 
Empire years before a reconciliation was reached. A later charter mentions that 
Fazio Totulo and Pietro Rambaldo were in Paphos (Cyprus) sometime before 
March 1173, but the presence of the latter is not so strange as he was the nepos of 
a citizen of Paphos itself. Furthermore, Vitale Voltani was involved in commercial 
activity in Thebes between 1175 and 1176.152 In addition, as was recorded by two 
Venetian charters and by a Pisan one, a few people from Venice had returned to 
live in Constantinople between 1176 and 1177.153 This can probably be correlated 
with the overtures towards Venice that Manuel made around the mid-1170s, after 
the Venetian agreement with William II, and before his own expedition in Asia 
Minor. Some further possible evidence that trade in the Byzantine Empire might 
have resumed shortly after 1171 might come from the edict on prices issued by 
Doge Sebastiano Ziani in November 1173. This document mentions the price of 
meat imported not only from Sclavinia (presumably Dalmatia), but also from 
Romania.154 Yet, as a normative text, this edict does not necessarily reflect the 
situation of commerce at the time when it was issued. Thus, Romania was probably 
included not because the Venetians were still importing meat from the Eastern 
Empire, but rather because they had done so until recently. Another possible 
explanation might be that petty trade between Venice and Byzantium continued, 
but that it was not recorded in commercial contracts. This would also explain the 
paucity of documents regarding mercantile activity in Dalmatia, both before and 
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after 1171.155 Finally, the most striking document is arguably a charter which 
records that some Venetians were conducting business at their own (extremely 
high) risk in Constantinople in May 1171, just two months after Manuel’s coup.156 
It was hardly surprising that, due to the problematic conditions in Byzantium, 
most Venetian merchants preferred to trade elsewhere. From 1176, there is a slight 
increase in the documentation regarding commerce in cities of the Kingdom of 
Sicily, namely in Brindisi, Squillace, Cotrone, Messina, Trani, Siponto, and 
(possibly) Pescara. The Calabrian cities and Messina acquired a significant 
importance as stopovers for Palestine or Egypt, and as exporters of wheat for those 
lands. The choice of these cities was sometimes a necessity due to the risks of 
sailing by the Eastern Adriatic shore, which was mostly under the Byzantines.157 
However, Southern Italy was not the main area in which the merchants from Venice 
conducted their activity, as the Frankish States in the Levant and Alexandria 
became the main destinations of Venetian trade. In particular, since the early 
1170s, the Egyptian city appears to have supplanted Constantinople as the main 
centre of Venetian trade outside of the Adriatic. The importance of this market for 
the citizens of Venice following the rise of Alexandria as a spice market was 
undoubtedly the main reason that persuaded the Venetian government to conduct 
negotiations with Saladin. The Adriatic commune obtained commercial privileges in 
the lands of the sultan, and its subjects appear to have been moderately active in 
Alexandria following this agreement.158 As usual, little is known about what goods 
were traded in this city, although a few charters issued between the early 1170s 
and the late 1180s mention the export of timber, and the import of pepper and 
alum.159 The other important area in which the Venetians were involved in trade 
was the Christian Levant. Unlike in the previous decades, and despite the 
conclusion of an agreement with Bohemond III in 1167 (which was annulled in 
1183), there is no evidence of Venetian commerce in Antioch. While this might be 
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linked with the fairly good relations that Byzantium and the principality had 
throughout most of the 1170s, the paucity of documentation regarding the activity of 
Venetian merchants in Antioch throughout the second half of the twelfth century 
suggests that that this city was no longer an appealing destination for the Venetian 
traders mainly for commercial reasons – probably due to a change in the spice 
route.160 Instead, the Frankish city in which merchants from Venice were mostly 
active in the 1170s and early 1180s was Acre.161 
Following the reconciliation between Venice and Constantinople, Venetian 
trade in the Byzantine Empire resumed. Yet, even though for around a decade 
Venice had what was virtually a monopoly on trade with Romania due to the limited 
presence of Genoese and Pisans, the scale of Venetian trade in the Eastern 
Empire remained limited if compared to the situation before 1171.162 This is 
because, in the years in which the Venetians had been prevented from trading in 
the Eastern Empire, they had found alternative markets, and their involvement in 
commerce there did not cease after the resumption of relations with Byzantium in 
1183. In particular, after a break in the documentation during and following William 
II’s Balkan campaign, the Venetians resumed their commercial activity in Southern 
Italy in the late 1180s and early 1190s, during Tancred’s reign. On one occasion, 
commerce was conducted together with a merchant from the Mezzogiorno, who 
was the owner of the ship. However, Henry VI’s invasion would lead to a new break 
in Venetian trade in Southern Italy.163 The Eastern Mediterranean also remained an 
important destination for merchants from Venice, with Alexandria maintaining its 
preminence until 1185.164 After this year, the scale of trade with this city diminished. 
A possible explanation for this is that Saladin’s conquests eventually persuaded 
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Venice to abide by the ban on the export of strategic goods into the lands of the 
sultan that Pope Alexander III had issued between 1179 and 1181. This would 
have deprived the Venetian merchants of the chance of conducting commercial 
activity by barter in Egypt, thus hampering the continuation of large-scale trade in 
Alexandria.165 In the following decade, instead, there is more evidence of 
commerce taking place in the Frankish States. The main commercial centres were 
Tyre and Acre; yet, between 1187 and 1191, the Venetians were seldom active in 
these cities since Venice did not initially support the lord of Tyre Conrad of 
Montferrat, while Acre was in the hands of Saladin.166 Interestingly, a charter issued 
in Tyre in 1192 is the earliest Venetian document which clearly refers to the slave 
trade, as the ambiguous term servus, often used in similar cases, was here 
replaced by sclavus. Ironically, the person who sold this Saracen slave is Giannone 
Stagnario, who was himself the grandson of a freed Dalmatian servus (Dobramiro 
Stagnario).167 The other reason why commercial activity in Byzantium was limited 
between 1183 and 1197 is probably that the Venetian merchants still did not feel 
confident trading there. They were probably afraid that a sudden unfortunate turn of 
events might lead to new confiscations, or to another anti-Latin pogrom. 
Furthermore, especially at the beginning of the reign of Alexios III, reaching 
Constantinople was probably quite dangerous as, due to the lack of a Byzantine 
fleet patrolling the nearby waters, the Aegean Sea had become infested by Pisan 
pirates. It is this, rather than Alexios III’s hostility towards Venice, that explains why 
trade in Constantinople appears to have stopped in 1195-96. The Venetians were 
nevertheless still active in Romania. There is evidence of trade in other areas of the 
empire, notably at Corinth, Thebes, and Skyros, and some charters which refer to 
changes of ownership of Constantinopolitan properties were issued in these years. 
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Therefore, what probably prevented trade in the capital city of the Eastern Empire 
was the dangers of reaching it by sea, rather than the hostility of the basileus.168 
Furthermore, in this period, Romano Mairano, the merchant whose career is 
best documented, appears to have significantly reduced his commercial activity. 
After 1171, he only appears to have traded in the Byzantine Empire once, in 
1190.169 Other merchants were, indeed, more active in the 1180s and 1190s. For 
instance, Pietro da Molin, who had been imprisoned in 1171, and had had some of 
his goods confiscated, was extremely active in both the Byzantine Empire and the 
Frankish States in the Levant for around a dozen years after his release (which 
probably took place in 1182, as the first subsequent charter he issued was in 
January 1183).170 Pietro Tiepolo and his son Giacomo also conducted a significant 
number of commercial operations both within and without Romania.171 Another 
interesting aspect is that, while in most cases Venetian commercial documents 
were written by notaries who had moved to the Eastern Mediterranean (and who 
were always clerics), there were nevertheless some notaries who followed the 
merchants during their voyages, and wrote charters for them. Indeed, many of the 
documents regarding Romano Mairano were drawn up by a priest who was 
probably a relative of his, Pietro Mairano.172 Despite the fluctuating nature of the 
political relations between Venice and Constantinople, there is nevertheless some 
evidence of a commercial partnership between the Venetians and the Byzantines. 
In 1192 some Greek merchants were trading in Cairo using a Venetian ship.173 
While the evidence for Venetian trade in Romania is quite sparse, and we 
have no raw data regarding the number of people from Venice in the Byzantine 
Empire after 1182, other kinds of documents nevertheless suggest a renewed and 
significant Venetian presence in the Eastern Empire. Some Venetians are clearly 
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mentioned as habitatores (i.e. dwellers) in Constantinople, or Thessalonica. This 
might mean that these people lived in Constantinople outside of the Venetian 
quarter.174 Furthermore, several Venetians died, or at least wrote their last will, in a 
Byzantine city. Yet, this does not necessarily suggest that they had permanently 
moved to the Eastern Empire; it is quite possible that they died while they were 
temporarily in Romania in order to conduct some business operations.175 
Further evidence of the settlement of people from Venice in the Byzantine 
Empire comes from a series of contracts in which Venetian citizens rented some 
land or a house in Constantinople. In the 1180s, the religious institutions managed 
to recover the extensive properties that they had obtained before 1171, and they 
continued to rent some of them out to increase their incomes. Most of the surviving 
charters refer to properties owned by the Venetian monasteries (both in Venice and 
in Constantinople), or rented out to private individuals, who sometimes sublet them. 
Only on a few occasions would the properties be directly rented out by a private 
citizen, or by the commune.176 Although the properties of the religious institutions 
were undoubtedly extensive, the main reason why so many documents regarding 
them have survived is that these institutions were accustomed to preserve their 
charters to make sure that all dues were paid to them, and that nobody could claim 
their lands.177 The latter was quite a serious problem in the case of the properties in 
Romania. The dozen years when there was no Venetian presence in the 
Constantinopolitan quarter had led to many controversies regarding the ownership 
of the various properties. Moreover, the Venetian colony did not have a juridical 
structure, and, until 1171, the trials were judged either by the legates (when they 
were in town), or by a commission of boni homines. This was no longer a viable 
solution, and the commune probably took action, as, from the mid-1180s onwards, 
the presence of Venetian judges is recorded in Constantinople. Yet, these judges 
only had juridical powers, and not executive, and thus could not prevent acts of 
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rebellion like that of a fleet anchored off Abydos, whose crew refused to obey the 
doge’s orders, and to return to Venice.178 
iii) Conclusions 
To sum up, the Venetians continued to trade in Byzantium as long as it was 
not too dangerous to do it, or they were forcibly excluded. This is why in the 1160s, 
when the political contrasts between Venice and Manuel I had significantly 
increased, the scale of Venetian trade in the Eastern Empire did not decrease. It 
was indeed quite the opposite, as the 1160s appear to have been the decade in 
which Venetian merchants were most active in Byzantium (apart from a brief hiatus 
in 1168-69). 
However, commerce in the Eastern Empire did almost cease in 1168-69, 
after Vitale Michiel issued a decree ordering his citizens to return to Venice, and 
then again for around twelve years between 1171 and 1183. Finally, there is no 
evidence of Venetian traders reaching Constantinople in 1195-96, when navigation 
in the Aegean Sea was hampered by Pisan pirates. While in the first and in the 
third case, there is little evidence of commerce overall, twelve years was too long a 
break for the Venetian merchants not to look for different commercial destinations. 
Therefore, there was a significant expansion of trade in Alexandria and in the 
Crusader States. 
Moreover, although, following the reconciliation with the Byzantine Empire 
during the reign of Andronikos I, the Venetians did once again trade in Romania, 
the scale of this trade was appreciably lower than before 1171. This was both 
because merchants from Venice continued to remain active in the markets that they 
had exploited in the 1170s, and because the political instability in Byzantium 
probably discouraged some of the traders from being too strongly involved in the 
Eastern Empire. Therefore, from 1183 to 1197, the Venetians conducted commerce 
in a variety of locations in the Byzantine Empire and in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Beginning with the second half of the 1180s, this pattern slightly changed as there 
is little evidence of Venetian trade in areas that were under Muslim control. This 
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may be associated with the expansive strategy and conquests by Saladin. The 
Venetians possibly decided to stop providing the sultan and his heirs with strategic 
materials, out of fear that, if they had not done so, they would have been indirectly 
responsible of the demise of the Latin States in the East. 
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VII. General Conclusions 
The years from 1081 to 1197 were characterised by complex, changing, and 
often problematic relations between Venice, Byzantium, and Southern Italy. In 
particular, the Eastern Empire was involved in many conflicts with the rulers of the 
Mezzogiorno, and the Venetians decided whether or not to side with the Eastern 
Empire due to a combination of factors. Initially, they chose to intervene in the 
conflict alongside the Eastern Empire due to their longstanding good relations with 
Byzantium, to the promise of obtaining commercial privileges in Romania, and to 
their fears that a Norman conquest of part of the Balkans would destroy the status 
quo in the area, and thus hamper the Venetian plans of maritime hegemony in the 
Adriatic. Similar motivations led Venice to intervene against Roger II when the King 
of Sicily attacked Byzantium in the late 1140s. However, the commercial 
concessions soon became a double-edged weapon. The main Venetian interest 
was no longer that of maintaining a political alliance with Byzantium, but merely 
continuing to have privileged commercial conditions in Romania. This was clearly 
evident when, after the privileges granted by Alexios I were cancelled by John II 
Komnenos, the Venetians suddenly broke their centuries-long tradition of alliance 
with the Eastern Empire, and launched a series of naval raids against its islands 
and coastal areas. By this time, Venice had also obtained relevant commercial 
concessions in the Holy Land, and thus probably felt that it had nothing to lose from 
attacking Byzantium. If the Venetians had won the war, they would have re-
obtained their commercial concessions in Romania, while a defeat would not have 
deprived them of their newly-acquired trading privileges in the Holy Land. 
Eventually, the Venetians were victorious, and thus managed to re-obtain 
commercial advantages in Byzantium, and, soon later, to restore good relations 
with the Eastern Empire. The second reason why the Venetians had decided to 
side with Alexios I against Robert Guiscard (maintaining the status quo in the area) 
became the main factor that led Venice not to intervene when the Byzantines tried 
to launch an offensive against Southern Italy. The Venetians had no interest in 
taking part in this conflict alongside Manuel I Komnenos, as they would have had 
nothing to gain in case of a Byzantine victory. Therefore, they showed some 
hostility to Manuel’s project by agreeing on an alliance with William I, the man 
whose lands were about to be invaded by Byzantium, and the descendant of the 
rulers against whom Venice had fought in many conflicts. However, despite the 
signing of this agreement with the Kingdom of Sicily, the Venetians did not take part 
in the conflict alongside William I, probably out of fear that such an intervention 
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would have led to the cancellation of their privileges in Byzantium. The Venetian 
opposition to Manuel’s aggressive foreign policy, together with the growing wealth 
of the Adriatic commune, eventually irked the emperor, who was unwilling to 
recognise that Venice had achieved complete political autonomy from Byzantium. 
Therefore, in 1171, Manuel had all the Venetians who were in the Byzantine 
Empire imprisoned, and their goods confiscated. Even though the Venetian military 
reaction was not extremely energetical due to the fear that commencing a full-scale 
conflict would have led to the execution of their fellow countrymen who were 
imprisoned in Romania, Venetian trade in Byzantium nevertheless almost stopped 
until 1183, when all the captives were released. The agreement of 1183 was the 
first of a series of treaties that Byzantium signed with Venice in the following fifteen 
years. Due to the difficult political situation of the empire following the death of 
Manuel I (especially when the Balkans were invaded by William II in 1185-86), the 
following emperors felt the need of pacifying with Venice. However, the Venetians 
were only willing to accept an agreement as long as the emperors swore to 
compensate them of all the losses that they had encountered in 1171. Such 
negotiations would take place many times until the end of the century, as the 
Byzantines were never able to fulfil their promises, but often felt in danger; hence, 
due to its condition as a creditor, Venice was often able to dictate the terms of all 
the new agreements. Despite this, the scale of Venetian trade in Romania after 
1183 appears to have been significantly smaller than that of the years that had 
preceded 1171. This was probably the consequence of a series of factors, including 
the political instability of the Eastern Empire, the lack of mutual trust between the 
Byzantines and the Venetians, and the latter continuing to trade in the alternative 
markets in the Holy Land that they had started to exploit at a higher scale after 
1171. 
Taking Southern Italy into consideration is vital to understanding Venetian-
Byzantine relations. Indeed, the extensive commercial concessions that Alexios I 
granted to Venice were a direct consequence of the first Balkan attacks by Robert 
Guiscard, while the significant extension to the Venetian quarter in the late 1140s 
was a consequence of Roger II’s attacks and raids. Therefore, omitting the 
Mezzogiorno from the conversation would also mean not explaining the origins of 
the commercial growth of Venice in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, since the 
1150s, maintaining good relations with the Kingdom of Sicily was one of the main 
political goals for both Venice and Byzantium. The Venetians felt that, by doing this, 
they could limit Manuel I’s western political ambitions, and that they could obtain 
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better commercial conditions in the markets of Southern Italy. By contrast, the 
Byzantines were mainly interested in an alliance with the Sicilians in order to form a 
coalition against Frederick Barbarossa. By the late 1150s, Manuel I had realised 
that the Kaiser, rather than William I, was the main threat to the western territories 
of the Byzantine Empire. Indeed, many contemporary sources suggest that, if 
Barbarossa had managed to obtain control of Southern Italy, he would have then 
attempted to attack the Balkans. While Frederick I did not manage to conquer the 
Mezzogiorno, his son Henry VI did accomplish this goal. The marriage between 
Irene Angelina and Roger III of Sicily can probably be interpreted as a last-minute 
attempt to form an alliance that might dissuade the Germans from trying to conquer 
Southern Italy, and thus becoming the hegemonic political power in the 
Mediterranean. However, on this occasion this strategy, which had been successful 
in the 1150s and 1160s, failed miserably due to the political weakness of both the 
Sicilians and the Byzantines. 
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Appendix: 
An incomplete family tree of the Komnenoi and Angeloi 
(emperors in bold) 
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